UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
AT   LOS  ANGELES 


EDITED  BY  ANDREW  LANG 


MAELBOEOUGH 


BY 
GEORGE    SAINTSBUKY 


NEW  YOKE: 
D.    APPLETON   AND    COMPANY, 

1,  8,  ASD  5  BOND  8TEEET. 
1886. 


• 


H3S/-? 

CONTENTS. 


J!           CHAPTER  PAGB 

I.  YOUTH  AND  EARLY   CAMPAIGNS    .           .          •          .           •  1 

o 

H.  MARRIAGE,  AND  ATTACHMENT  TO   THE  PRINCESS  ANNE  9 

^          III.   IN   THE   REIGN   OF  JAMES   II.         .           .           .           .           .  16 

IV.  UNDER  WILLIAM   OF  ORANGE  .««...  38 

V.  FIRST  PERIOD   OF   GENERALSHIP-IN- CHIEF — BLENHEIM  61 

VI.  SECOND  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF — RAMTLLIES 

AND   OUDENARDE       .           t 83 

VH.   THIRD    PERIOD     OF    GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF — MALPLA- 

QUET  AND   THE   PEACE            ......  113 

VIII.  MARLBOROUGH  AS  DIPLOMATIST  .           .          •           .           .  127 

IX.   DOMESTIC  AND   POLITICAL    ATTITUDE    DURING    PERIOD 

OF   GENERALSHIP           .......  141 

; 

f                 X.  LAST  YEARS           ........  181 

CONCLUSION 204 

U 

INDEX           .........  215 

^                     BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE                        .                                  ,     .  219 


394869 


MABLBOROUGH. 

CHAPTER  I. 

YOUTH  AND  EAELY  CAMPAIGNS. 

JOHN  CHUECHILL,  Duke  of  Maryborough,  is  the  subject 
of  not  the  least  known  or  the  worst  executed  of  standard 
biographies  in  English.1  He  has  also  been  celebrated 

1  Memoirs  of  the  Duke  of  Marlboroiigh,  by  W.  Coxe.  The  edi- 
tion used  here  is  that  edited  by  J.  Wade  in  Bonn's  Standard 
Library,  3  vols.  8vo.  with  atlas  in  4to.  Although  Coxe  wrote  more 
than  sixty  years  ago,  it  is  surprising  how  few  mistakes  have  been 
detected  in  his  work,  and  how  few  valuable  additions  have  been 
made  to  it  by  the  abundant  overhauling  of  documents  which  the  last 
half-century  has  seen.  A  short  bibliography  of  works  on  Marlborough 
will  be  found  subjoined  to  the  Index.  It  is  said  that  the  best  known 
English  soldier  of  the  present  day  has  an  elaborate  work  on  Marl- 
borough  in  preparation,  or  at  least  in  contemplation.  The  excellent 
little  book  of  Mrs.  Creighton  (London,  1879)  deserves  mention 
here  all  the  more  that  my  attempt  in  no  way  competes  with  hers. 
Her  object  was  to  sketch  the  history  of  England  and  Europe  as 
Marlborough  was  concerned  with  it ;  mine  is  to  attempt  a  portrait 
of  Marlborough's  life  and  character,  taking  knowledge  of  the 
historical  surroundings  mostly  for  granted.  The  only  other  recent 
book  which  has  to  be  mentioned  is  the  late  Dr.  J.  Hill  Burton's 
Reign  of  Queen  Anne  (3  vols.  Edinburgh  and  London,  1880),  a 
singular  mixture  of  desultory  learning  and  capricious  judgment, 
which  will  sometimes  be  quoted. 


2  MARLBOROUGH 

or  defamed,  criticised  or  merely  anecdotised  by  a  vast 
number  of  other  pens,  whose  productions  have  not,  like 
Archdeacon  Coxe's,  furnished  necessary  items  to  the 
catalogue  of  every  gentleman's  library.  But  what  is 
noticeable  in  all  these  books,  and  especially  noticeable 
in  Coxe's,  is  the  disproportionate  space  allotted  to  his 
period  of  brilliant  military  success  and  political  in- 
fluence. Marlborough  was  fifty-two  years  old  at  the 
accession  of  Queen  Anne ;  he  outlived  her  eight  years. 
Yet  a  not  too  laborious  calculation  will  establish  the 
fact  that  Coxe  gives  about  one-twentieth  of  his  entire 
space  to  the  first  five-sevenths  of  his  hero's  life.  That 
to  the  purely  military  historian  the  history  of  those 
brilliant  campaigns  in  which,  alone  of  great  modern 
soldiers,  Marlborough  proved  himself  invincible  for  a 
long  series  of  years,  dwarfs  all  the  rest  of  his  history 
may  be  freely  granted ;  that  he  contributed  more  to 
the  making  of  the  English  Empire  in  these  years  than 
in  any  others  is  also  certain.  Finally  (a  circumstance 
which,  biographers  being  human,  must  be  allowed  its 
weight),  the  material  available  for  biographical  use  during 
these  years  far  exceeds  in  amount  the  material  available 
for  the  rest  of  the  life.  But  it  is  seldom  that  in  the 
case  of  a  man  of  great  parts,  and  raised  to  fortune  not 
by  the  mere  turn  of  fortune's  wheel,  it  is  safe  to  con- 
centrate attention  on  one  part  of  his  career.  For  the 
estimate  of  Marlborough's  character  and  personality, 
which  is  the  chief  object  here,  the  desertion  of  James  II. 
is  a  matter  certainly  not  to  be  treated  less  fully  than 
the  battle  of  Blenheim,  or  the  question  of  complicity  in 
the  guet-apens  at  Brest  than  the  circumstances  of  the 
victory  of  Malplaquet. 


YOUTH  AND  EARLY  CAMPAIGNS  3 

Marlborough  was  born  on  Midsummer  day,  1650, 
at  Ashe,  a  Devonshire  manorhouse,  between  Axminster 
and  Seaton,  which  is  still  in  existence.  His  father,  Sir 
Winston  Churchill  (who,  however,  was  not  yet  knighted), 
had  been  a  man  of  some  property,  a  soldier,  and  in  his 
way  an  author,  nor  is  his  folio  of  English  history,  '  Divi 
Britannici,'  more  deserving  of  the  scorn  which  Macaulay's 
pen  throws  as  a  matter  of  course  on  the  production  of 
a  Cavalier  squire  than  might  be  expected.  But  Ashe  was 
not  a  seat  of  the  Churchills  ;  it  belonged,  and  continued 
to  belong  till  the  end  of  the  last  century,  to  the  old 
Devonshire  family  of  Drake,  the  Drakes,  with  whom 
Sir  Francis  was  not  connected,  though  he  assumed  their 
arms,  and  was  thereby  involved  in  a  somewhat  ludicrous 
quarrel.  Mary  Drake  (others  call  her  Elizabeth),  John 
Churchill's  mother  and  Sir  Winston's  wife,  was  the 
granddaughter  of  the  Sir  Bernard  Drake  whose  family 
pride  had  declined  to  welcome  a  distinguished  but  parvenu 
namesake,  and  the  Churchill  property  of  Mintern1 
having  been  sequestrated  she  was  fain  to  seek  a  refuge 
with  her  own  family.  All  her  children  from  Winston, 
the  eldest  son,  who  died  young,  were  born  at  Ashe. 
John  was  the  second  son,  and  of  the  other  children  the 
most  notable  were  George,  John's  younger  brother,  and 
Arabella,  his  eldest  sister,  the  mistress  of  James  II.  and 
the  mother  of  Berwick.  No  one  seems  to  have  dis- 
covered in  any  Churchill  ancestor  a  forewarning  of  the 
extraordinary  military  genius  which  in  this  generation 

1  Sir  Winston  Churchill's  designation  is  of  '  Wooton  Glanville.' 
Wooton  Glanville  and  Mintern  (Hagnaand  Parva)  are  neighbouring 
villages  of  Dorset  nearly  in  the  centre  of  the  county,  and  between 
Cerne  Abbas  and  Sherborne. 


4  MARLBOROUGH 

John  showed  in  his  own  person  and  Arabella  trans- 
mitted to  her  son,  but  the  family  was  an  old  one,  and 
had  '  come  over  with  Kichard  Conqueror.'  Very  little 
is  recorded  of  Marlborough's  early  youth.  His  father 
and  a  neighbouring  clergyman  are  said  to  have  given 
him  such  education  as  he  possessed,  though  after  the 
Restoration  (when  Sir  Winston,  more  fortunate  than 
many  Cavaliers,  was  not  merely  knighted  but  recovered 
his  estate  and  obtained  some  post  about  Court)  he  was 
for  a  time — it  is  not  certainly  known  how  long — at 
St.  Paul's  School.  One  of  the  rare  stories  about  his  early 
days  recounts  that  he  was  fond  of  reading  the  Latin 
tactician  Vegetius.  The  evidence  is,  as  evidence  of 
anecdotes  goes,  indifferent  good,  for  the  Rev.  G.  North, 
rector  of  Colyton,  testified  that  he  heard  it  from  an  eye- 
witness and  schoolfellow  of  Churchill's  about  two  years 
after  the  Duke's  death.  Intrinsically  it  is  suspicious, 
and  the  suggestion  of  rationalists  that,  instead  of  read- 
ing, the  future  warrior  was  looking  at  the  illustra- 
tions, possesses  plausibility ;  but  there  is  no  reason  for 
regarding  it  as  impossible  that  Marlborough  may  have 
had  and  forgotten  a  smattering  of  Latin,  while  Macaulay 
exaggerates,  as  usual,  the  badness  of  his  English  spelling. 
Facsimiles  of  his  writing  are  easily  accessible,  and  will 
show  anyone  who  is  at  all  conversant  with  seventeenth- 
century  ways  that  Marlborough  in  this  branch  of  ac- 
complishment was  little  worse  than  most  men  not  pro- 
fessed scholars,  and  a  great  deal  better  than  most 
women.  The  well-known  saying  that  he  learnt  all 
the  English  history  he  knew  out  of  Shakespeare  is 
another  of  the  anecdotes  which  only  dulness  takes 
literally.  The  son  of  the  author  of  '  Divi  Britannici '  is 


5 

nearly  certain  to  have  received  historical  instruction 
from  the  author  of  that  work,  though  if  Shakespeare's 
teaching  stuck  in  his  memory  better  it  is  not  to  his 
discredit.  The  story,  however,  is  of  some  value  as 
illustrating  the  baselessness,  easily  proved  from  other 
sources,  of  a  notion — often  put  forward  in  vulgar 
histories  of  literature  and  the  stage — that  Shakespeare 
was  forgotten  in  England  during  the  last  half  of  the 
seventeenth  century. 

The  success  of  the  Churchill  family  at  Court  is  made 
a  rather  awkward  subject  by  the  notorious  fact  that 
Arabella  Churchill,  who  became  maid  of  honour  to  the 
Duchess  of  York  (the  first  Duchess,  Anne  Hyde)  soon 
after  the  Restoration,  also  became  the  mistress  of  her 
mistress's  husband.  It  is,  however,  asserted,  or  hoped,  by 
the  biographers  that  John's  appointment  to  an  ensigncy 
in  the  Foot  Guards  at  the  age  of  sixteen  preceded  the 
liaison  between  James  and  Arabella.  If  the  Duke  of 
Berwick  was  right  as  to  the  date  of  his  own  birth  l 
there  is  fortunately  no  unsurmountable  difficulty  in 
accepting  the  more  charitable  view  of  the  foundation,  if 
not  the  rise,  of  Marlborough's  fortunes.  Appointed 
page  to  the  Duke,  he  is  said  to  have  taken  advantage  of 
James's  presence  at  a  review,  and  of  his  asking  what 
profession  the  boy  preferred,  to  beg  for  a  pair  of  colours. 
James,  though  always  careful  of  money,  was  not  at  this 
time  ungenerous  or  churlish  to  his  friends,  and  it 
is  not  necessary  to  believe  that  the  sister's  dishonour 
bought  the  brother's  entrance  into  the  career  where . 
he  afterwards  won  more  honour  for  himself  and 

1  He  says  (Mcmoires,  ed.  Michaud  et  Poujoulat,  xxxi.  371),  '  Je 
naqnis  le  21  aout  1C70.'    John  Churchill  was  16  in  1666. 


6  MARLBOROUGH 

England  than  almost  any  other  Englishman.  At  the 
same  time,  considering  the  manners  of  the  Court  and 
the  morals  of  the  time,  he  would  be  a  very  rash  man 
who  did  more  than  point  out  that  such  a  belief  is  not 
necessary.  Scandal,  however,  is  not  contented  with 
attacking  the  origin  of  Churchill's  fortune ;  and  consider- 
ing the  facts  just  mentioned,  and  the  animus  of  his 
political  enemies  in  later  life,  it  would  be  strange  if  it 
had  been  so  contented.  That  at  some  time  or  other  he 
attracted  the  attention  of  Barbara  Palmer  is  pretty 
certain,  but  it  is  disputed  whether  this  occurred  before 
or  after  he  made  the  journey  to  Tangier,  which  then 
formed  the  usual  and  only  turn  of  foreign  service  for 
the  small  regular  army  of  England.  He  did  not  stay 
at  Tangier  long,  and  on  returning  home  was  received 
with  open  arms  by  the  Duke  of  York,  by  the  Duchess 
of  Cleveland,  and  apparently  by  her  royal  lover,  who 
never  affected  an  excessive  jealousy.  The  best  known 
story  of  his  connection  with  Barbara  Palmer  is  that, 
being  on  one  occasion  surprised,  or  nearly  so,  by  Charles, 
he  leaped  out  of  a  window  and  was  presented  by  his 
mistress  with  5,OOOZ.,  4,500Z.  of  which  he  invested  on 
an  annuity  of  500Z.  a  year,  which  he  bought  from 
Halifax,  or  which  was  at  any  rate  secured  on  Halifax's 
estate.  Of  the  fact  of  this  annuity  transaction  there  is 
nodoubt,.the  papers  existing.  The  origin  of  the  money 
has  the  at  least  respectable  authority  of  Chesterfield,1 

1  Chesterfield  does  not  vouch  for  the  window  story,  which  is 
probably  due  to  the  fertile  invention  of  Swift's  friend,  Mrs.  Man- 
ley.  Chesterfield  merely  says  that, « struck  by  his  genius,  she  gave 
him '  the  6,0001.  There  was  a  legend  that  royal  jealousy  sent  him 
to  Tangier.  This  may  pair  off  with  the  other  legend  that  Mulgrave 
waj  sent  to  the  same  place  in  a  leaky  ship  in  hopes  to  drown  him. 


YOUTH  AND  EARLY  CAMPAIGNS  7 

who  was  the  son  of  Halifax's  daughter.  Putting  aside 
the  question  of  immorality  in  the  connection  itself,  it 
must  be  remembered  that  the  mere  fact  of  receiving 
money  from  a  woman  was  not  at  all  discreditable  accord- 
ing to  seventeenth-century  etiquette.  But  undoubtedly 
the  contemporaries  of  Rochester  and  Etherege  would 
have  thought  better  of  Captain  Churchill  if  he  had 
spent  the  money  he  got  from  one  mistress  on  another 
or  several  others. 

But  not  even  in  this  heyday  of  his  blood  was  John 
Churchill  a  mere  man  of  pleasure.  The  annuity  trans- 
action dates  from  1674,  and  at  least  two  years  before 
Churchill  had  begun  to  see  service  very  different  from 
the  parades  of  Whitehall  and  the  razzias  of  Tangier. 
The  occasion  was  the  discreditable  combination  of 
England  with  France,  in  virtue  of  the  Treaty  of  Dover, 
in  1672.  A  contingent  of  6,000  English  troops  was 
then  sent  nominally  under  the  Duke  of  Monmouth  to 
join  Turenne,  and  Churchill,  as  captain,  commanded 
the  Grenadier  company  of  Monmouth's  own  regiment. 
Although  the  enemy  were  greatly  overmatched,  the 
reduction  of  the  strong  fortresses  which  guarded  the 
Dutch  frontier  under  such  a  leader  was  necessarily  of  no 
small  value  as  education  for  a  young  soldier.  Churchill 
repeatedly  distinguished  himself,  the  siege  of  Nirneguen 
being  especially  mentioned  as  the  occasion  of  his  at- 
tracting Turenne's  attention,  and  winning  from  him  the 
name  of '  the  handsome  Englishman.' J  From  this  time 

The  fact  is  that  the  Tangier  service,  which,  as  has  been  seen,  was 
practically  incumbent  on  English  soldiers,  was  extremely  unpopular, 
and  all  sorts  of  stories  were  got  up  about  it. 

1  It  should  be  said,  however,  that  these  stories  of  his  service  with 
Turenne  are  founded  upon  no  solid  evidence. 


8  MARLBOROUGH 

dates  the  second  of  the  generally  known  anecdotes 
which  concerns  this  time.  An  advanced  post  having 
been  given  up  to  the  enemy,  Turenne  is  said  to  have 
betted  a  supper  and  a  dozen  of  claret  (but  Bordeaux  was 
not  then  the  fashionable  wine  in  France)  that  'his 
handsome  Englishman '  would  recover  it  with  half  the 
number  of  men  who  had  abandoned  it.  The  wager  was 
of  course  won,  or  the  anecdote  would  not  have  been  told. 
In  1673  another  siege,  that  of  Maestricht,  brought  even 
more  credit  to  Churchill,  who  not  only  led  the  stormers 
with  Monmouth,  but  after  the  successful  explosion  of  a 
mine  had  enabled  the  enemy  to  recover  their  ground, 
took  part  in  a  second  forlorn  hope  again  with  success, 
being  in  consequence  thanked  by  Louis  at  the  head  of 
the  army,  and  presented  by  Monmouth  to  Charles  II. 
as  his  '  saviour.'  His  military  service  with  the  French 
army  appears  to  have  extended  over  nearly  five  years, 
but  the  information  on  the  subject  is  mainly  con- 
jectural. He  was  certainly  appointed  colonel  of  the 
English  regiment  by  Louis  on  April  3,  1674,  but  the 
proofs  of  his  participation  in  Turenne's  last  campaign 
and  in  the  two  campaigns  following  appear  to  be  want- 
ing. His  military  occupations,  however,  did  not  sever 
him  from  the  household  of  the  Duke  of  York,  in  which 
he  was  successively  Gentleman  of  the  Bedchamber  and 
Master  of  the  Robes.  He  was  still  more  closely  bound 
to  this  service  by  his  marriage,  the  circumstances  of 
which  will  be  told  in  the  next  chapter. 


CHAPTER  n. 

MARRIAGE,   AND   ATTACHMENT   TO   PRINCESS  ANNE. 

IN  hardly  any  man's  life  does  his  marriage  hold  a 
higher  place  of  importance  than  in  Marlborough's.  If 
John  Churchill  had  never  met  Sarah  Jennings,  or  if  the 
obstacles  put  in  the  way  of  their  marriage  had  prevented 
it,  it  is  still  improbable  that  a  man  of  such  commanding 
talents  in  peace  and  war  would  have  failed  to  take  his 
part  in  stirring  times  such  as  those  in  which  he  lived. 
He  might  still  have  served  and  deserted  James,  still  have 
faced  both  ways  under  William,  and  still  have  obtained 
distinction  in  the  war  of  the  Spanish  Succession.  But  it 
is  extremely  improbable  that  he  would  have  been  in  a 
position  to  dispose  almost  at  his  pleasure  of  the  whole 
power  of  England  for  several  years,  and  so  to  overcome 
the  difficulties  which  lie  in  the  path  of  the  servant  of  a 
constitutional  monarchy,  the  general  of  a  confederate 
force.  To  estimate  what  Mrs.  Freeman  was  to  Mr.  Free- 
man's military  opportunities,  it  is  only  necessary  to  com- 
pare the  careers  of  Marlborough  and  of  Wellington. 

Sarah  Jennings  was  the  younger  daughter  of  Richard 
Jennings  of  Sandridge,  in  Hertfordshire,  a  squire  of  re- 
spectable position,  ancient  family,  and  fair  fortune,  which 
latter,  however,  was  of  necessity  divided  among  a  some- 


i  o  MARLBORO  UGH 

what  numerous  family.  The  escapades  and  the  beauty 
of  her  elder  sister  Frances,  who  married  Count  George 
(according  to  English  rank,  Sir  George)  Hamilton, 
the  brother  of  Anthony  Hamilton,  have  been  recorded 
in  Anthony's  delightful  '  Memoires  de  Grammont.' 
Sarah  was  far  less  flighty  than  her  sister,  and  though 
she  was  also  less  beautiful  she  was  still  attractive.  The 
exact  character  of  her  face  in  youth  is  not  easy  to  deter- 
mine ;  for  in  one  of  Marlborough's  domestic  epistles 
he  hopes  that  his  daughter  Henrietta's  nose  has  '  grown 
straight,  like  her  mother's,'  while  in  Kneller's  portrait 
of  the  duchess  the  nose  is  decidedly,  though  not  more 
than  becomingly,  retrousse.  The  same  portrait,  however, 
gives  no  idea  of  the  ill-temper  and  self-will  which 
too  deservedly  rank  among  the  best-known  character- 
istics of  the  Duchess  of  '  Molberry,'  as  she  is  styled, 
according  to  the  phonetic  spelling  of  the  title  in  the 
4  Wentworth  Papers ; '  and  report  seems  to  agree  that  in 
her  youth  her  complexion,  hair  and  figure  were  all  ex- 
ceptionally advantageous.  Colonel  Churchill,  ten  years 
her  senior,  fell  in  love  with  her  when  she  was  only  six- 
teen, and  it  does  not  seem  that  he  was  ever  less  in  love 
with  her  during  the  more  than  forty  years  of  their 
marriage.  The  exact  character  of  his  affection  has  been 
a  good  deal  discussed,  and  the  late  Mr.  Hill  Burton  has 
perhaps  been  happier  than  in  some  of  his  other  comments 
on  Marlborough,  in  defining  it  to  be  fear  of  losing  his 
NV  lie's  love.  In  other  words,  he  was  rather  uxorious  than 
henpecked,  and  in  the  abundant  correspondence  which 
we  possess  there  does  not  so  much  appear  any  undue 
docility  to  her  bad  humours  as  a  fervent  desire  that  she 
should  be  in  a  good  humour.  When  she  was  in  such  a 


MARRIAGE  n 

humour,  lie  seems  to  have  constantly  preferred  her 
society  to  anything  else,  even  to  his  own  pecuniary  and 
worldly  interest.  The  abundance  of  disquisition  on 
Duchess  Sarah's  peculiarities  (which  I  shall  endeavour 
not  to  imitate  here)  has  not  spared  inquiry  as  to  how  far 
she  returned  this  unique  devotion.  Her  letters  to  him 
are  rare]y  of  an  intime  character,  and  as  she  was  long  the 
chief  channel  of  intercourse  between  him  and  his  party 
in  England  there  is  some  excuse  for  this.  Indeed,  the 
whole  evidence  against  her  having  been  as  loving  a  wife 
as  her  rough  temper  would  permit  is  purely  negative. 
That  she  was  a  faithful  one  in  the  ordinary  sense  there 
is  not  the  slightest  reason  for  doubting ;  at  least,  any 
one  who  doubts  may,  if  he  likes,  also  adopt  the  belief 
that  Marlborough  was  a  coward,  or  that  he  was  the  lover 
of  Anne,  as  they  used  to  think  on  the  Continent,  or  any 
other  inevitable  commonplace  of  scandal.  Sarah  has 
had  few  thoroughgoing  defenders,  and  indeed  there  is 
not  to  posterity,  whatever  there  may  have  been  to  Marl- 
borough,  anything  particularly  lovable  about  her.  She 
was  certainly  pars  maxima  of  her  husband's  fortunes. 
With  his  downfall  she  had,  as  I  shall  endeavour  to  show, 
much  less  to  do  than  the  lovers  of  gossiping  history  and 
the  devotees  of  the  doctrine  of  small  causes  and  great 
events  have  usually  pretended. 

The  marriage  itself,  however,  was  not  brought  about 
without  considerable  difficulties;  the  relations  of  both 
parties  being  much  averse  to  the  match  on  the  same 
score  of  want  of  fortune.  The  most  curious  thing, 
however,  is  that  the  date,  place,  and  circumstances  of 
the  actual  ceremony  seem  to  be  unknown.  The  nearest 
indication  of  the  time  is  taken  to  be  an  endorsement  of 


1 2  MARLBOROUGH 

a  letter  from  Churchill  to  Miss  Jennings,  dated  Brussels, 
April  12,  1678.  This  endorsement  runs, 'I  believe  I 
was  married  when  this  letter  was  written,  but  it  was  not 
known  to  any  but  the  duchess.'  On  the  other  hand, 
the  first  child  of  the  marriage,  Henrietta,  afterwards 
duchess  in  her  own  right,  was  not  born  till  July  20, 
1681.  Husband  and  wife,  however  (if  they  were  then 
husband  and  wife),  were  much  separated  in  the  interval, 
and  the  tone  of  the  letter  which  bears  the  endorsement 
is  much  more  that  of  a  husband  who  has  not  ceased  to 
be  a  lover,  than  of  a  lover  who  has  not  yet  become 
a  husband.  From  the  duchess's  curious  expression,  '  I 
believe  I  was  married,'  it  may  perhaps  not  be  fanciful  to 
conclude  that  the  ceremony  had  actually  been  performed, 
but  that,  either  owing  to  a  sudden  summons  abroad  or 
to  a  wish  to  keep  the  matter  secret,  it  had  been  merely  a 
ceremony.  By  the  summer  Churchill  must  have  been 
able  to  publish  his  proceeding  and  to  obtain  his  parents' 
approval,  for  his  wife  went  to  stay  with  the  Churchill 
family  at  Mintern.  The  uncertainty,  therefore,  can  only 
extend  to  the  early  months  of  1677-78. 

The  first  year  of  the  marriage,  however,  saw  yet 
another  separation  of  the  pair,  for  Churchill  was  ap- 
pointed Brigadier-General  under  Monmouth  in  the  brief 
and  abortive  expedition  sent  to  support  the  Prince  of 
Orange  against  France.  No  blow  was  struck  by  the 
troops  which  Churchill  commanded,  and  the  peace 
speedily  sent  him  back  to  England.  Up  to  this  time 
he  had  taken  little  part  in  politics,  properly  so  called, 
and  indeed  domestic  politics  had  been  in  something  of 
a  lull  for  many  years.  The  Popish  Plot,  the  Exclusion 
Bill,  and  the  Parliamentary  struggles  of  the  last  years 


MARRIAGE  13 

of  Charles  II.  could  not  fail  to  concern  very  closely 
one  who  was  certainly  the  ablest  and  perhaps  the  most 
trusted  of  the  Duke  of  York's  servants.  There  waa 
still  no  break  in  his  direct  attachment  to  his  patron,  for 
it  was  not  till  the  Princess  Anne's  marriage  and  separate 
establishment  in  1683  that  she  could  be  regarded  as 
an  independent  or  quasi-independent  patroness.  Both 
Colonel  Churchill  and  his  wife  accompanied  the  Duke 
and  Duchess  of  York  when  they  were  compelled  by  the 
popular  feeling  to  leave  England  in  the  spring  of  1679, 
and  Churchill  also  bore  his  master  company  on  his  almost 
clandestine  visit  to  Charles  in  the  summer.  He  then  re- 
ceived an  extremely  important  if  not  extremely  honour- 
able appointment,  being  sent  to  Paris  to  conduct  those 
private  negotiations  between  Charles  and  Louis  which, 
whatever  their  immediate  object,  meant  in  the  long  run 
the  damage  or  the  disgrace  of  England.  He  accompanied 
James  back  to  Brussels,  and  was  with  him  when  he  was 
sent  to  Scotland  in  a  kind  of  honourable  banishment. 
During  1680  hewas  chiefly  resident  at  Edinburgh,  though 
he  was  despatched  on  more  than  one  mission  of  James's 
restless  secret  diplomacy,  the  most  important  being  to 
London  in  January,  1680-81,  in  which  the  object  was 
to  prevail  on  the  king  to  enter  into  a  yet  stricter  alliance 
with  Louis,  to  persist  in  not  summoning  a  Parliament, 
and,  in  short,  to  carry  out  the  same  policy  of  provocation 
which  afterwards  proved  fatal  to  James  himself.  These 
are  the  earliest  transactions  in  which  Marlborough's 
public  conduct  can  be  said  to  be  dubious.  Yet  it  must  be 
remembered  that  the  extreme  Whig  party  were  as  much 
tainted  with  the  gold  of  France  as  Charles  and  James ; 
that  in  the  incredible  height  to  which  party  spirit  had 


14  MARLBOROUGH 

run,  owing  chiefly  to  the  machinations  of  Shaftesbury, 
it  might  well  seem  a  quarrel  of  life  and  death  between 
the  Royalist  and  the  Eepublican  party;  that  Marlborough 
himself,  though  circumstances  in  later  life  brought  him 
into  alliance  with  the  Whigs,  was  undoubtedly,  if  he 
was  anything,  a  Tory  at  heart;  and  that,  as  the 
bitterest  and  the  least  scrupulous  of  recent  historians 
has  admitted,  if  the  chief  object  of  the  sovereign  was 
to  infringe  the  privileges  of  the  Legislature,  the  chief 
object  of  the  Legislature  was  also  to  encroach  on  the 
prerogative  of  the  sovereign.  When  Algernon  Sidney 
could  definitely  arrange  for  an  English  insurrection  in 
conjunction  with  French  troops,  and  could  pocket 
Barillon's  guineas,  it  is  not  surprising  that  Churchill 
should  not  have  been  straitlaced  about  negotiations  on 
the  part  of  persons,  constitutionally  at  any  rate,  entitled 
BO  to  negotiate  for  similar  objects.  It  is  unfortunately 
certain  that  no  single  English  politician  of  eminence 
and  ability — not  even  Halifax — kept  a  wholly  straight 
course  in  these  difficult  times.  Indeed,  Marlborough's 
enemies  have,  as  a  rule,  laid  little  stress  on  this  part  of 
his  conduct;  and  as  we  shall  have  to  take  a  more 
lenient  view  than  they  do  of  his  whole  character,  it  is 
as  well  to  acknowledge  at  once  that  this  part  of  it  is 
not  beyond  reproach.  The  Churchills'  eldest  child, 
Henrietta,  was  born,  as  has  been  said,  in  the  summer  or 
1681,  Mrs.  Churchill  being  then  in  London.  Churchill 
himself  accompanied  James  on  his  return  from  Scotland 
next  year  (the  return  magnificently  celebrated  by 
Dry  den  in  more  than  one  piece  of  verse),  was  wrecked 
with  him  in  the  'Gloucester'  on  the  Lemon  and  Ore 
Sandbank,  and  was  among  the  few  that  escaped.  He 


MARRIAGE  15 

soon  had  his  reward  for  these  years  of  active  and  not  al- 
together un-risky  service,  being  created  in  1682  Baron 
Churchill  of  Eyemouth,  in  the  peerage  of  Scotland,  and 
appointed  to  the  colonelcy  of  a  newly  raised  dragoon 
regiment — the  First  Royals.  Macaulay  has  printed  a 
doggerel  contemporary  complaint  of  this  as  jobbery,  the 
point  of  which  is  that  Churchill  had  hitherto  served  in 
and  commanded  regiments  of  foot  only.  But  the  dragoon, 
as  is  well  known,  was  regarded  as  a  kind  of  mounted 
infantryman,  and  considering  the  fashion  in  which  then 
and  long  afterwards  regiments  were  given  to  persons  of 
distinction,  who  were  totally  unversed  in  military  affairs, 
the  appointment  will  hardly  be  considered  one  of  the 
sins  of  the  Stuarts.  Shortly  afterwards,  Lady  Churchill, 
on  the  marriage  of  the  Princess  Anne,  who  had  now 
been  her  attached  friend  for  years,  was  appointed  Lady 
of  the  Bedchamber  in  the  Princess  of  Denmark's  estab- 
lishment. The  friendship  of  the  two,  or  rather  the 
subjection  of  Anne  to  the  imperious  Sarah,  grew  ever 
closer,  but  nothing  else  of  public  or  private  importance 
concerning  Churchill  himself  is  recorded  during  the  last 
two  years  of  Charles  II. 


16  MARLBOROUGH 


CHAPTER  III. 

IN  THE   REIGN  OF  JAMES  II. 

Ax  the  accession  of  James  II.  to  the  throne  there  was 
hardly  anyone  who  seemed  to  stand  higher  for  that 
royal  favour  which  never  counted  for  more  than  at  thia 
period  than  John  Lord  Churchill.  He  had  exactly 
reached  the  half-way  house  of  ordinary  human  life,  and 
he  had  for  very  many  years  had  experience  of  men  and 
of  affairs.  At  this  time  no  vice,  even  by  the  account 
of  his  enemies,  was  chargeable  against  him  except 
avarice ;  and  hitherto  his  gains  had  of  necessity  been 
gains  rather  of  parsimony  than  of  dubious  acquisition, 
according  to  the  morals  of  the  time,  for  it  must  be 
repeated  that  very  few  men  in  the  late  seventeenth 
century  would  have  blamed  him  for  receiving  money 
from  Lady  Castlemaine.  His  posts  hitherto,  though  not 
very  lucrative  according  to  the  standard  of  the  age,  had 
been  profitable,  and  he  was  able,  when  the  estate  of 
Sandridge  fell  to  his  wife  and  her  two  sisters  as  co- 
heiresses, to  buy  out  the  sisters  and  to  establish  himself 
at  Holywell  House,  near  St.  Albans,  which  was  his 
country  seat  till  the  building  of  Blenheim.  Mintern 
went  to  his  younger  brother  Charles,  a  fact  which, 
though  the  details  appear  to  bo  imperfectly  known,  would 


IN  THE  REIGN  OF  JAMES  II.  17 

seem  to  show  that  Maryborough,  accused  as  he  is  of 
grasping,  did  not  carry  his  acquisitiveness  into  family- 
matters.  Lady  Churchill  at  this  time  was  still  quite  a 
young  woman  and  still  handsome,  and  more  than  ever 
intimate  with,  or  rather  ascendant  over,  the  Princess 
Anne.  (  Atossa  '  has  filled,  and  must  necessarily  fill,  a 
large  space  in  every  biography  of  her  husband.  But, 
as  has  been  hinted,  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  say  any- 
thing good  for  her  except  that  she  was  at  one  time 
pretty,  and  that  Marlborough  loved  her.  The  imperi- 
ousness  which  has  always  been  charged  against  her 
was  in  truth  the  least  of  her  unpleasant  qualities. 
While  there  is,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  not  very  much 
evidence  that  she  really  appreciated  or  even  strongly 
reciprocated  the  steady  attachment  of  her  husband,  it  is 
certain  that  she  was  abominably  ungrateful  to  Anne. 
Her  self-seeking  was  (as  is  the  manner  of  women  when 
they  are  self-seeking  at  all)  pure  and  unalloyed  with 
any  spark  of  honour,  gratitude,  patriotism,  decency,  or 
moderation.  She  was  not,  as  her  husband,  with  all  his 
faults,  evidently  was,  sincerely  religious.  Her  family 
affection  was  merely  selfish,  and  did  not  in  the  least 
prevent  her  from  being  a  curse  to  her  family.  She 
had  not  even  the  magnanimity  which  sometimes  accom- 
panies imperious  temper ;  and,  in  short,  it  is  difficult  to 
discover  even  a  negative  good  quality  in  her  except 
that  she  was  not  a  hypocrite,  and  that  her  intellectual 
abilities  were  very  considerable.  Her  writings,  though 
unpolished,  are  singularly  vigorous ;  and  her  account 
of  the  rise  and  progress  of  the  family  of  Abigail  Hill 
would,  if  it  were  fiction,  imply  genius. 

Her  husband,  on  the  other  hand,  had  up  to  this 


1 8  MARLBOROUGH 

time  done  little  or  nothing  to  discredit  himself. 
Enough  has  already  been  said  of  his  early  Court  fredaines, 
and  of  his  participation  in  the  negotiations  for  enslaving 
England  to  France  and  violating  the  constitution  of  the 
former  country,  not  indeed  in  the  letter  but  in  the 
spirit.  On  a  third  point,  and  a  very  important  one, 
both  in  the  opinion  of  the  time  and  in  his  own  history, 
his  record  is  even  more  creditable.  No  competent 
authority  has  ever  impugned  Marlborough's  religious 
sincerity,  and  Macaulay's  covert  sneer  at  it  is  more 
than  compensated  by  the  acknowledgments  of  Thackeray ? 
not  of  course  an  authority  on  historical  details,  but  a 
man  violently  prejudiced  against  Marlborough,  well 
acquainted  with  the  particular  documents,  and  a  fear- 
less critic  of  religious  hypocrisy.1  No  one  to  whom  it 
is  still  a  puzzle  that  men  of  Marlborough's  type  should 
have  constantly  done  acts  apparently  in  direct  con- 
travention of  their  religious  principles,  and  should  yet 
have  been  sincerely  religious,  need  hope  to  understand 
history  of  this  or  indeed  of  any  other  time.  No  one 
who,  in  face  of  the  documents  that  exist,  questions 
Marlborough's  sincerity  as  a  Christian  and  as  a  member 
of  the  Church  of  England,  can  hope  to  understand 
Marlborough.  But  I  shall  have  to  deal  more  fully  with 
this  when  the  question  of  his  desertion  of  James  II. 
is  reached  at  the  end  of  this  chapter.  The  first  apology 
of  Coxe,  that  'he  had  hitherto  regarded  with  indul- 

1  Compare  Macaulay's  History,  i.  452  (2-vol.  ed.) :  'It  soon 
appeared  that  there  was  no  guilt  and  no  disgrace  which  he  was  not 
ready  to  incur  in  order  to  escape  the  necessity  of  parting  either 
with  his  places  or  with  his  religion; '  and  Esmond,  p.  221  (1-vol.  ed.), 
as  to  Marlborough's  language  about  his  victories. 


IN  THE  REIGN  OF  JAMES  II.  19 

gence  the  failings  of  a  prince  to  whom  he  was  bound 
by  so  many  ties,'  is  of  course  valueless.  But  the  posi- 
tive statement  that  Marlborough,  at  the  very  begin- 
ning of  James's  reign,  assured  Galway  that  '  if  the  king 
should  attempt  to  change  our  religion  and  constitution 
I  would  instantly  quit  his  service '  stands  on  very  diffe- 
rent grounds.  It  is,  as  far  as  it  goes,  and  if  it  be 
accepted,  positive  evidence ;  it  is  consistent  with  what 
followed,  and  it  to  a  great  extent  excuses  what  followed, 
though  by  no  means  wholly. 

The  very  beginning  of  the  new  reign  brought 
Churchill  promotion  of  various  kinds.  Louis,  as  is  well 
known,  no  sooner  heard  of  Charles  II.'s  death  than 
he  sent  a  large  present  of  money  to  the  new  king 
of  England — a  present  which  not  only  James  himself 
and  Sunderland,  but  men  of  supposed  honour  like 
Rochester  and  Godolphin,  accepted  with  joy  only 
tempered  by  a  desire  for  more.  Before  the  new  reign 
was  ten  days  old  Churchill  was  despatched  as  envoy 
extraordinary  to  Paris  to  return  thanks  for  the  gift  in 
secret  and  to  deliver  a  formal  notification  of  James's 
accession  in  public.  It  is  on  this  occasion  that 
Churchill  is  said  to  have  made  the  declaration  above 
noted.  He  returned  in  time  for  the  coronation,  and  on 
May  14  was  made  an  English  peer,  still  as  Baron 
Churchill,  but  of  Sandridge.  In  a  little  more  than  a 
month  he  had  an  opportunity  of  doing  service  in  return 
for  these  honours.  As  soon  as  the  first  confusion  on 
the  news  of  Monmouth's  landing  had  subsided  he  was 
sent  westwards  with  the  Blues,  and  at  Salisbury  he  was 
able  to  assemble  a  small  force  of  infantry.  While 
Feversham  was  collecting  troops  Churchill  advanced  as 


2o  MARLBOROUGH 

j  far  as  Chard,  where  he  received  a  summons  from  Mon- 

j  mouth  to  acknowledge  him  as  king,  and  then  hung 
on  the  flanks  of  the  rebel  army  as  it  moved  through 
Wells  from  Bridgwater  to  Bristol,  and  during  the  rest 

,  of  the  Duke's  ill-advised  and  devious  movements. 
When  the  small  Royal  army  was  at  length  got  together, 
Churchill  was  nominally  second  in  command.  He  had, 
however,  the  difficult  duty  of  really  commanding  the 
force,  while  its  nominal  commander  was  not  only  in- 
capable but  jealous.  Coxe  gives  him  the  credit  of 

^  saving  the  Royal  troops  from  surprise  at  Sedgmoor, 
but  detailed  accounts  of  the  battle  show  that  they 
were  in  fact  surprised,  though  Monmouth's  ill-luck, 
his  imperfect  knowledge  of  the  ground,  and  the  want  of 
discipline  of  his  troops,  especially  his  cavalry,  lost  him 
the  advantage  so  gained.  It  is  agreed  that  Churchill 
practically  commanded  the  troops,  and  as  far  as  was 
necessary  in  a  conflict  between  veteran  regulars  and 
country  levies,  won  the  battle.  From  any  sort  of  guilt 

•  in  the  massacres  which  followed  he  is  acknowledged  to 
be  free.  Macaulay  has  told  the  story  of  Churchill's 
befriending  Miss  Hewling  when  she  went  to  Court  to 
beg  her  brother's  life,  and  of  his  preparing  her  for  the 
fruitlessness  of  her  errand  by  the  famous  sentence,  '  This 
marble  [laying  his  hand  on  the  chimneypiece  of  the 
ante-chamber]  is  not  harder  than  the  king.'  Nor  is 
he  charged  with  having  in  any  way  shared  in  the 
ransoming  and  plundering  which  equally  disgraced  the 
triumph  of  the  Royal  cause,  though  this  opportunity 
would  have  appealed  to  what  is  generally  thought  his 
weakest  side.  Indeed  there  seems  very  good  reason  for 
believing  that  in  his  refusal  to  change  his  faith,  or  even 


IN  THE  REIGN  OF  JAMES  II.  21 

to  wink  at  assaults  on  it,  is  to  be  found  the  cause  of 
the  almost  total  absence  of  mention  of  his  name  from 
the  summer  of  1685  to  the  winter  of  1688.  That 
James  had  no  further  occasion  for  Churchill's  military 
talents  till  the  invasion  of  the  Prince  of  Orange  is  no 
explanation,  for,  as  has  been  seen,  he  had  repeatedly 
employed  him,  and  had  had  ample  experience  of  his 
ability,  in  civil  matters.  Even  the  reward  bestowed  on 
him  for  the  suppression  of  the  rebellion  (which,  as  far  as 
it  was  the  work  of  a  general  at  all,  was  his),  was  very 
small,  being  only  the  colonelcy  of  another  cavalry  regi- 
ment. This  was  long  before  the  time  when,  as  Macaulay 
says  (in  one  of  those  question-begging  innuendoes  of 
his,  which  are  among  the  most  immoral  things  in  litera- 
ture, for  the  very  reason  that  there  is  nothing  cate- 
gorical in  them  which  can  be  contradicted  or  exposed), 
'men  who  had  never  had  a  scruple  before  began  to 
become  strangely  scrupulous.  Churchill  whispered 
gently  that  the  king  was  going  too  far.' 

What  is  known  of  his  history  during  this  difficult 
period  may  be  rapidly  summarised.  He  was  one  of  the 
'  Triers '  in  Delamere's  case — a  body  of  peers  nominated 
by  the  Lord  High  Steward  during  the  Parliamentary 
recess  to  take  the  place  of  the  whole  House  of  Lords — 
and  as  junior  baron  he  gave  what  may  be  called  the 
prerogative  vote  of  Not  Guilty.  But  no  other  public  or 
quasi-public  appearance  is  made  by  him  until  the  famous 
budget  of  letters  which  Dykvelt  carried  back  with  him 
to  the  Hague  in  the  summer  of  1687,  after  he  had  been 
sounding  the  chief  men  of  England  on  the  Declaration 
of  Indulgence  and  the  other  arbitrary  acts  of  James. 
This  letter  is  of  sufficient  importance  to  be  given  in 
2 


22  MARLBOROUGH 

extenso.1  It  must,  however,  be  remembered  that  at  this 
time  nothing  like  rebellion  or  revolution  can  be  said  to 
have  been  arranged,  and  that  Dykvelt's  negotiations, 
though  looked  on  with  natural  dislike  by  the  king,  were 
notorious,  and  scarcely  in  any  sense  clandestine.  When 
James  was  employed  in  his  insane  crusade  against  the 
laws  of  England  and  the  statutes  of  Magdalen  College, 
he  made,  as  is  known,  a  tour  or  progress,  and  at  Win- 
chester a  remarkable  conversation  is  reported  between 
him  and  Churchill  on  the  state  of  the  public  feeling  and 
Churchill's  own.  It  is  evident  that  if  this  conversation 
and  that  with  Galway  are  accepted  as  authentic, 
Churchill's  attitude  was  not  only  consistent  but  ex- 
pressed with  a  good  deal  of  boldness.2  Anne,  moreover, 

1  'May  17,  1687.  The  Princess  of  Denmark  having  ordered  me 
to  discourse  with  Monsieur  Dykvelt,  and  to  let  him  know  her  reso- 
lutions, so  that  he  might  let  your  Highness  and  the  princess  her 
sister  know  that  she  was  resolved  by  the  assistance  of  God  to  suffer 
all  extremities,  even  to  death  itself,  rather  than  be  brought  to 
change  her  religion,  I  thought  it  my  duty  to  your  Highness  and  the 
Princess  Royal  by  this  opportunity  of  Monsieur  Dykvelt  to  give  you 
assurances  under  my  own  hand  that  my  places  and  the  king's  favour 
I  set  at  naught  in  comparison  of  being  true  to  my  religion.  In  all 
things  but  this  the  king  may  command  me,  and  I  call  God  to  witness 
that  even  with  joy  I  should  expose  my  life  for  his  service,  so  sensible 
am  I  of  his  favours.  I  know  the  troubling  you,  sir,  with  thus  much 
of  myself,  I  being  of  so  little  use  to  your  Highness,  is  very  imperti- 
nent. But  I  think  it  may  be  a  great  ease  to  your  Highness  and  the 
princess  to  be  satisfied  that  the  Princess  of  Denmark  is  safe  in  trust- 
ing me ;  I  being  resolved,  although  I  cannot  live  the  life  of  a  saint, 
if  there  be  occasion  for  it,  to  show  the  resolution  of  a  martyr.' 
This  letter,  which  Macaulay  summarises  but  does  not  quote  in  full, 
deserves,  almost  as  much  as  the  later  one  (given  below),  his  famous 
description  of  '  the  elevation  of  language  which  was  a  certain  mark 
that  he  (Churchill)  was  going  to  commit  a  baseness.'  This  peculia- 
rity has  been  observed  of  others. 

*  Coxe  gives  the  conversation  at  considerable  length  (i.  20).    As 


IN  THE  REIGN  OF  JAMES  II.  23 

who  was  not  much  given  to  thinking  for  herself,  exercised 
that  process  sufficiently  to  be  a  very  firm  and  decided 
member  of  the  Church  of  England,  and  it  is  known  that 
she  rejected  the  wild  proposal  made  to  her  that  if  she 
would  turn  Roman  Catholic  she  might  be  made  heiress  to 
the  exclusion  of  Mary.  Lady  Churchill  was,  as  has  been 
said,  somewhat  of  an  indifferent  in  religion.  But  here 
even  she  could  only  hope  to  direct,  and  not  to  thwart, 
the  resolve  of  her  husband  and  her  friend.  Moreover, 
the  prospect,  and  then  the  actual  birth,  of  a  Prince  of 
Wales,  soon  made  it  useless  for  Anne  to  be  converted, 
even  if  she  would  have  consented  to  be  so.  One  of  the 
stories  of  the  time  quoted  by  Macaulay  shows  that 
Churchill  was  not  wont  to  hide  his  opinion.  It  is  the 
speech  of  Sunderland  to  him,  '  Oh  silly !  your  troop  of 
guards  shall  be  called  up  to  the  House  of  Lords.'  This 
jest  could  only  have  been  made  in  answer,  if  not  to  a 
protest,  at  any  rate  to  a  prophecy  of  difficulties.  As 
all  know,  James  went  from  bad  to  worse,  and  in  the  days 
following  the  acquittal  of  the  seven  bishops  the  famous 
invitation  was  sent  across  by  Herbert  to  William  of 
Orange.  In  this  Churchill  had  no  part.  But  his 
patroness  Anne  was  bitterly  estranged  from  her  father 
and  stepmother  by  the  mismanagement  or  ill-luck  which 
sent  her  to  Bath  when  the  Prince  of  Wales  was  born. 
The  impossibility  of  any  member  of  the  Church  of 
England  remaining  much  longer  in  favour  with  James, 
or  indeed  being  able  conscientiously  to  execute  his  or- 
ders, became  more  and  more  evident ;  and  on  August  4 

it  is  expressly  said  that,  save  the  two  interlocutors,  nobody  was 
present,  the  reporter  must  have  been  Churchill  himself,  which,  of 
course,  to  some  extent  lessens  the  value  of  the  testimony. 


24  MARLBOROUGH 

Churchill  despatched  to  William  another  letter,  also 
important,  which  shall  be  discussed  presently.1  The 
history  of  the  manner  in  which  the  actual  desertion  of 
James  for  William  was  effected  by  Lord  and  Lady 
Churchill  is  striking  enough,  and  may  be  told  briefly. 
It  will  not  be  complicated  here  by  the  gratuitous  sup- 
position of  Macaulay  that  Churchill  planned  the  defec- 
tion of  Cornbury,  Clarendon's  eldest  son  and  Anne's 
first  cousin,  which  preceded  his  own  by  some  days.  He 
has  quite  enough  to  answer  for  without  being  accused 
of  offences  which  there  is  no  evidence  to  fix  on  him. 
All  that  can  be  said  is,  that  Anne  did  not  disapprove  of 
her  cousin's  proceeding,  and,  according  to  her  uncle 
Clarendon,  remarked  that  '  she  believed  many  of  the 
army  would  do  the  same.'  Zealous  loyalist  as  Clarendon 
was  at  this  time,  he  does  not  seem  to  have  thought  it 
necessary  to  tell  the  king  this,  though  James  was  not 
obtuse  enough  wholly  to  misunderstand  the  warning 
which  the  desertion  itself  plainly  gave  as  to  the  conduct 
of  the  husband  of  Anne's  closest  friend. 

Before  setting  out  for  the  west,  James  called  a  coun- 
cil of  officers,  among  whom  was  Churchill,  just  created 
lieutenant-general.  The  king,  according  to  his  own 
account,  which  is  not  confirmed,  gave  all  present  leave 
to  throw  up  their  commissions  if  they  had  scruples 
about  serving  him,  and  Churchill  was  the  first  to  vow 

1  '  Mr.  Sidney  will  let  you  know  how  I  intend  to  behave  myself : 
I  think  it  is  what  I  owe  to  Ood  and  my  country.  My  honour  I  take 
leave  to  put  into  your  Ilighness's  hands,  in  which  I  think  it  safe.  II 
you  think  there  is  anything  else  that  I  ought  to  do,  you  have  but  to 
command  me ;  I  shall  pay  an  entire  obedience  to  it,  being  resolved 
to  die  in  that  religion  that  it  has  pleased  God  to  give  you  both  the 
will  and  power  to  protect.' 


IN  THE  REIGN  OF  JAMES  II.  25 

fidelity  to  the  death.  After  this  James  refused  the 
petition  of  Halifax  for  a  free  parliament,  and  set  out  for 
Salisbury,  which  he  reached  on  November  19.  On  the 
24th  a  council  of  war  was  held,  and  Churchill  argued 
against  a  retreat.  He  had  previously  advised  the  king 
to  visit  the  outposts  at  Warminster,  and  James  seems 
to  have  afterwards  imagined  that  this  advice  implied  the 
extremity  of  treason — a  design  to  make  away  with  him 
or  deliver  him  into  the  enemy's  hands.  Of  this  there  is 
no  proof  whatever,  and  it  is  intrinsically  improbable. 
But  Churchill,  after  the  king  determined  on  retreat,  and 
probably  after  some  private  intelligence  that  his  designs 
were  blown  upon,  thought  it  unsafe  to  wait  longer. 
During  the  night  he  fled,  accompanied  by  the  Duke  of 
Grafton,  one  of  Charles's  bastards,  to  William,  leaving  a 
letter,  which  is  another  important  document  in  the  case.1 

1  '  Since  men  are  seldom  suspected  of  sincerity  [insincerity  ?]  when 
they  act  contrary  to  their  interests  ;  and  though  dutiful  behaviour 
to  your  Majesty  in  the  worst  of  times  (for  which  I  acknowledge  my 
poor  services  much  overpaid)  may  not  be  sufficient  to  incline  you 
to  a  charitable  interpretation  of  my  actions ;  yet  I  hope  the  great 
advantage  which  I  enjoy  under  your  Majesty,  which  I  can  never 
expect  in  any  other  change  of  government,  may  reasonably  convince 
your  Majesty  and  the  world  that  I  am  actuated  by  a  higher  principle 
when  I  offer  that  violence  to  my  inclination  and  interest  as  to  desert 
your  Majesty  at  a  time  when  your  affairs  seem  to  challenge  the 
strictest  obedience  from  all  your  subjects,  much  more  from  one  who 
lies  under  the  greatest  obligations  to  your  Majesty.  This,  sir, 
could  proceed  from  nothing  but  the  inviolable  dictates  of  my  con- 
science, and  a  necessary  concern  for  my  religion  which  no  good 
man  can  oppose,  and  with  which,  I  am  instructed,  nothing  can  come 
in  competition.  Heaven  knows  with  what  partiality  my  dutiful 
opinion  of  your  Majesty  has  hitherto  represented  those  unhappy 
designs,  which  inconsiderate  and  self-interested  men  have  framed 
against  your  Majesty's  true  interest  and  the  Protestant  religion;  I 
but  as  I  can  no  longer  join  with  such  to  give  a  pretence  by  conquest  ' 


26  MARLBOROUGH 

Lady  Churchill  played  her  part  with  equal  success. 
Anne  had  already  signified  to  William  her  approval 
of  his  enterprise,  but  she  took  no  overt  step  till,  on  the 
Sunday,  news  of  Churchill's  flight  reached  London.  A 
kind  of  informal  captivity  was  thereupon  imposed  by 
the  queen  on  the  princess,  and  that  night  she  and 
Lady  Churchill  escaped  in  deshabille  from  Whitehall, 
were  received  in  a  hackney-coach  by  Compton,  Bishop  of 
London  and  by  Dorset,  spent  the  evening  at  the  bishop's 
palace,  journeyed  thence  to  Dorset's  hunting  seat  near 
Epping,  and  then  fled  to  Nottingham,  Compton  leading 
the  escort  in  buff  coat  and  boots,  or,  as  others  say  (but 
perhaps  this  was  a  little  later),  'in  a  purple  uniform 
coat  and  orange  breeches.' 

Little  more  actual  fact  belongs  to  this  part  of  the 
story  as  it  concerns  the  Churchills.  But  Macaulay 
is  justified  in  dwelling  on  the  refusal  of  James,  almost 
at  the  last  moment  (when  it  might  have  been  barely 
possible  for  him  to  save  himself  if  he  had  complied 
with  Halifax  and  the  other  peers  who  remained  faithful), 
to  proclaim  a  general  amnesty.  He  specified  Churchill 
,  as  one  whom  it  was  impossible  to  pardon.  It  was 
extremely  natural,  but  it  was  intensely  unwise  and 
fully  of  a  piece  with  the  incredible  imprudence  which 
some  years  afterwards  dictated  the  too  famous  Pro- 
clamation of  Indemnity-with-exceptions  from  Versailles. 
Meanwhile  Churchill  undertook  no  military  operations 
against  his  countrymen  or  his  old  master,  but,  on  the 

to  bring  them  to  effect,  so  I  will  always,  with  the  hazard  of  my  life 
and  fortune  (so  much  your  Majesty's  due)  endeavour  to  preserve 
your  royal  person  and  lawful  rights  with  all  the  tender  concern  and 
dutiful  respect,'  dec.  &c. 


IN  THE  REIGN  OF  JAMES  II.  27 

contrary,  performed  the  great  service  of  bringing  to 
order  and  discipline  the  greater  part  of  the  army  which 
Feversham  had  let  loose  upon  the  country  on  receiving 
the  news  of  James's  first  flight.  Lord  Churchill  voted 
for  the  regency  in  the  debates  as  to  James's  abdication, 
and  finally  did  not  vote  at  all  on  the  offer  of  the  crown 
to  William  and  Mary. 

We  now  come  to  the  first  of  not  a  few  occasions  on 
which  it  is  necessary  to  discuss  patiently  and  at  some 
length  the  ethical  problems  presented  by  Marlborough's 
life.  If  such  discussion  is  dull  or  uninteresting  to  any 
reader,  for  that  reader  Marlborough's  biography  can 
have  no  special  attraction.  Its  interest  at  best  musfc 
for  him  be  concentrated  in  the  events — a  thousand  times 
recounted — of  his  period  of  military  glory,  with  the 
possible  addition  of  the  opportunity  which  his  other 
actions,  as  commonly  interpreted,  give  for  the  common 
and  cheap  antitheses  about  glory  and  shame,  greatest 
and  meanest  of  mankind,  and  the  like.  For  such  I  do 
not  write,  and  nobody  need  write,  a  new  life  of  John 
Churchill. 

Among  the  views  which  may  possibly  be  taken  of 
the  facts  just  related,  there  are  at  least  two  views  which 
most  emphatically  may  not  be  taken  by  anyone  whos© 
object  is  truth,  and  whose  view-point  is  that  furnished 
by  a  tolerably  observant  acquaintance  with  history  and 
human  nature.  When  the  excellent  Coxe  says  that 
1  in  revolutions  it  is  common  to  find  the  most  up- 
right characters  maligned  and  the  purest  principles 
misrepresented :  from  this  fate  Lord  Churchill  did  not 
escape,'  he  is  speaking  directly  of  the  absurd  charge 
against  Churchill  of  a  design  on  the  king's  person. 


28  MARLBOROUGH 

But  he  necessarily  implies  that  his  hero's  character 
was  of  the  most  upright  and  his  principles  the  purest, 
and  it  is  by  no  means  clear  that  the  remark  is  not 
meant  to  apply  to  the  whole  of  Churchill's  conduct 
at  the  time.  This,  of  course,  is  simple  nonsense.  The 
most  favourable  view  which  is  possible  for  reasonable 
beings  who  choose  to  take  the  facts  into  consideration 
will  leave  Marlborough's  character  and  his  principles 
at  more  than  one  time  of  his  life  very  far  from  upright 
or  pure.  At  this  particular  juncture  there  were,  no 
doubt,  various  courses  for  a  perfectly  upright  and  pure 
character  to  pursue.  But  there  was  at  least  one  course 
which  such  a  man  would  not  have  pursued.  He  would 
not  have  continued  in  James's  service  years  after  the 
king  had  undertaken  a  deliberate  crusade  against  those 
things  which  he  (Churchill)  held  dearest  in  church  and 
state;  he  would  not  have  commanded  the  king's 
troops  and  shared  the  king's  councils  months  after 
he  had  definitely  pledged  himself  to  obey  in  every 
respect  the  commands  of  one  whom  he  knew  to  be 
plotting  an  armed  attack  on  the  king ;  he  would  not 
have  gone  to  Salisbury  as  the  king's  lieutenant-general, 
ostensibly  to  attack  this  very  person  to  whom  he  had 
unreservedly  pledged  himself  months  before.  The 
charges  against  him  of  elaborate  seduction,  of  Judas- 
behaviour  at  the  council  after  Cornbury's  defection, 
and  the  like,  rest  on  the  dubious  if  not  worthless  evi- 
dence of  the  garbled  memoirs  of  James,  Macaulay's 
defence  of  which  is  sufficient  to  damn  them.  But  the 
open,  notorious,  undisputed  facts  are  incompatible  with 
talk  about  most  upright  characters  and  purest  prin- 
ciples. Characters  and  principles  deserving  these  epi- 


IN  THE  REIGN  OP  JAMES  II.  29 

thets  were  not  common  among  either  Jacobites  or 
Williamites.  All  the  adherents  of  the  Prince  of  Orange 
were  tainted  not  merely  with  formal  treason,  but  in  most 
cases  with  actual  and  indisputable  treachery.  Even 
Nottingham,  even  Sancroft,  on  the  other  side,  might 
have  had  some  little  difficulty  in  challenging  Coxe's  epi- 
thets. But  Churchill  ? — the  thing  is  absurd.  Excuses 
more  or  less  valid  may  be  found  for  a  man  who  plots 
secretly  for  months  against  his  king,  and  with  a  show 
of  unbroken  fidelity  intrigues  for  months  to  the  dis- 
advantage of  his  benefactor.  But  if  we  wish  to  escape 
sheer  absurdity  we  must  leave  such  words  as  c  purest 
and  most  upright'  out  of  the  dictionary  of  the  incident. 
I  do  not,  however,  know  that  the  passages  which 
have  been  and  will  be  quoted  in  reference  to  the  matter 
from  Marlborough's  most  eloquent  detractor  of  late  days 
show  a  mood  of  mind  much  more  philosophical,  or  an 
estimation  of  evidence  much  more  judicial  and  accurate, 
than  Dr.  Coxe's.  '  Marlborough's  life '  is  to  Macaulay 
'  a  prodigy  of  turpitude.'  There  was  { no  guilt  and  no 
disgrace  which  he  was  not  ready  to  incur.'  '  Infamy,' 
'  villainy,'  '  guilt,'  '  dishonour '  rain  from  the  fertile  pen, 
and  we  are  told  that  William  must  have  read  Churchill's 
letters  'with  a  cynical  smile.'  Perhaps;  but  it  does 
not  appear  that  a  cynical  smile  at  Churchill's  plotting 
against  his  master  sat  very  happily  on  the  face  of  a 
man  who  was  plotting  against  his  uncle,  father-in-law, 
ally,  and  friend.  This  little  oversight,  however,  is 
almost  inevitable  when  men  get  into  the  altitudes 
implied  by  such  phrases  as  those  just  quoted.  It  is 
closely  connected  with  another  much  wider  and  more 
important  oversight  of  the  same  kind  which  is  common 


3O  MARLBOROUGH 

to  Macaulay  and  to  all  who,  from  the  Whig  side,  heap 
terms  of  execration  upon  Marlborough.  I  cannot,  my- 
self, see  how  it  is  possible  that,  if  these  terms  are  allowed, 
the  splash  of  them  should  not  very  considerably  sully 
all  the  actors  in  the  Revolution  drama,  from  its  glorious 
and  immortal  leader  downwards.  All  these  actors, 
except  the  few  exiles  or  outlaws,  who  may  be  supposed 
to  have  had  open  war  declared  against  them,  and  to  be 
entitled  to  declare  open  war  in  turn,  are  tarred  with 
the  brush  not  merely,  as  said  above,  of  formal  treason 
but  of  positive  treachery.  Their  guilt  differs  merely 
in  degree  from  Churchill's,  and  in  some  cases  (I  am  not 
speaking  of  men  like  Sunderland)  it  approaches  very 
near  to  it.  Bishop  Compton,  a  signatory  of  the  famous 
invitation,  equivocated  and  dissembled  as  long  as 
Churchill,  and  finished  by  striking,  almost  at  the  same 
moment,  a  blow  nearly  as  damaging  and  even  more 
cruel.  He  had,  moreover,  asserted  the  duty  of  abso- 
lute non-resistance  as  Churchill  never  had  done;  as, 
if  all  tales  are  true,  he  had  expressly  refused  to  do. 
Danby's  action  is  universally  ascribed  to  desire  of  power 
and  place ;  Russell  and  Sidney  had,  like  Churchill, 
been  James's  servants,  and  are  said  (still  by  their 
defenders)  to  have  acted  in  revenge  of  private  wrongs ; 
Lumley  was  afraid  of  James's  displeasure  because  he  had 
left  the  Roman  for  the  Anglican  communion  j  Devonshire 
had  30,OOOZ.  to  gain  by  driving  James  from  the  throne ; 
Shrewsbury  had  been  turned  out  of  his  appointments 
and  had  a  grudge  against  the  Government.  These 
things  are  not  taken  from  Jacobite  libels,  but  from  the 
Williamiad  of  Lord  Macaulay.  Of  course,  if  all  these 
persons  were  animated  by  a  sincere  belief  that  nothing 


IN  THE  REIGN  OF  JAMES  II.  3 1 

but  the  armed  advent  of  the  Prince  of  Orange  could 
save  the  religion,  the  constitution  and  the  general  well- 
being  of  their  country,  they  were,  on  any  but  absolute 
non-resistance  principles,  more  than  justified ;  and  what- 
ever private  motives  they  may  have  had,  whatever 
dubious  means  they  may  have  resorted  to,  fall  out  of 
sight.  But  the  excuse  which  is  good  for  them  is  equally 
good  for  the  fact,  if  not  for  the  manner,  of  Churchill's 
desertion.  No  moralist  will  contend  that  a  man  should 
put  private  benefits  before  his  country's  welfare  and  his 
religious  duties.  That  Churchill  sighed  as  a  servant, 
but  acted  as  a  patriot  and  a  churchman,  is,  from  this 
particular  point  of  view  (the  point  of  view  which  sees 
nothing  but  the  inestimable  blessings  of  the  Revolution), 
all  the  more  to  his  credit.  I  take  this  view  myself  as 
little  as  I  take  Archdeacon  Coxe's ;  but  those  who  do 
take  it  seem  to  be  as  mistaken  as  he  is,  and,  what  is 
more,  to  be  inconsistently  mistaken. 

Again,  the  accusation  that  Marlborough  acted  from 
mere  self-interest — an  accusation  which  Sarah  herself 
formulated  long    afterwards   very   obligingly  for  her 
husband's  enemies  in  the  words,  *  it  was  evident  to  all    / 
the  world  that,  as  things  were  carried  on  by  King  James,  / 
everybody  sooner  or  later  must  be  ruined  who  would 
not  become  a  Roman  Catholic ' — is  an  awkward  one  in 
two  ways;  for  it  obliges  those  who  adopt  it  to  admit 
that  this  perjured,  infamous  villain,  who  cared  for  nothing 
but   self-interest,  did  care  for  one  thing  much  more,  v- 
and  that  was  his  religion.     And  it  has  to  be  set  against 
Marlborough's  equally  bold  and  adroit  putting  of  the 
other  side  against  this  view.     He,  as  it  has  been  seen, 
declared  that  he  was  acting  against  his  interest ;  and, 


32  MARLBOROUGH 

though  nobody  will  accept  this  unconditionally,  it  is  an 
arguable  view.  If  he  had  received  no  very  great  coun- 
tenance from^  James  recently,  he  had  received  no  marks 
of  displeasure.  It  was  certain  that  military  men  would 
be  more  and  more  in  request  as  the  king  leant  more  and 
more  on  a  standing  army.  The  advantage  of  keeping 
a  few  Anglicans  in  favour  might  be  thought  likely  to 
commend  itself  even  to  James ;  and  Churchill's  duties, 
being  purely  executive,  were  not  likely  to  bring  him 
into  a  position  of  inextricable  difficulty.  On  the  other 
hand,  Anne,  when  James  was  once  out  of  the  way,  was 
an  insecure  and  a  distant  source  of  profit.  As  events 
proved,  Marlborough  had  to  wait  nearly  fifteen  years 
before  deriving  much  benefit  from  his  desertion  of  the 
king.  If  Mary  had  lived  to  the  ordinary  term  he  would 
have  been  dead  before  her,  and  if  she  had  had  children 
he  was  nowhere.  That  William  personally  should 
favour  him  was  very  unlikely.  In  other  words,  he  was 
throwing  away  almost  a  certainty  for  a  remote  and 
weak  possibility.  I  do  not  think  that  this  argument 
proves  his  character  to  be  the  most  upright  and  his 
principles  to  be  the  purest,  but  I  say  that,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  those  who  argue  that  self-interest  was 
his  only  or  chief  motive,  it  is  a  very  powerful  argument. 
Having  thus  put  aside  some  inadmissible  views  of 
the  situation,  let  us  try  if  we  cannot  take  an  admissible 
one.  In  order  to  do  this  it  is  necessary,  of  course,  to 
lay  down  certain  postulates.  We  cannot,  in  arguing  on 
human  conduct,  argue  as  we  should  argue  on  the  rela- 
tions of  x  and  y.  We  must  begin  by  excluding,  or  at 
least  by  regarding  with  the  utmost  distrust,  all  super- 
latives. In  the  intellectual  sphere,  or  in  those  spheres 


IN  THE  REIGN  OF  JAMES  II.  33 

which  correspond  to  the  intellectual,  superlatives  and 
the  wide  distinctions  of  colour  which  they  indicate  are 
indeed  in  place.  Between  Newton  or  Beiitley  and  the 
man  who  can  just  struggle  through  a  Cambridge  poll 
degree  the  difference  may  not  improperly  be  expressed 
in  the  terms  which  another  illustrious  fellow  of  Trinity 
was  so  fond  of  employing.  So  it  is  between  Shakespeare 
and  Kirke  White,  between  Raphael  and  the  average 
contributor  to  the  Dudley  Gallery,'  between  Marlborough 
and  Braddock,  between  Pitt  or  Burke  and  the  favourite 
candidates  of  contemporary  caucuses  on  both  sides. 
But  the  differences  of  conduct  are  not  to  be  expressed 
in  this  crude  fashion.  It  may  be  very  much  doubted 
whether  there  are  any  unmitigated  villains  or  impeccable 
angels.  It  is  quite  certain  that,  when  we  find  a  man 
possessing  some  undoubted  virtues,  we  had  better  pause 
a  long  time  before  charging  him  with  other  unredeemed 
vices.  The  ordinary  whitewashing  of  the  villains  of 
history  fails  not  so  much  because  it  denies  their  un- 
relieved blackness  as  because  it  tries  to  make  them 
spotlessly  white.  Every  now.  and  then,  it  may  be,  one 
comes  across  a  character  which  seems  to  have  no  re- 
deeming features — a  character  which  has  neither  love, 
nor  heroism,  nor  decency  of  conduct,  nor  splendour  of 
exploits.  No  one  pretends  that  Marlborough  was  among 
these.  It  is  at  least  worth  while  to  inquire  whether 
there  is  any  more  ground  for  thinking  that  he  was 
among  those  whose  supposed  glaring  contrasts  of  cha- 
racter amuse  the  minds  of  children  and  point  the  morals 
of  fools. 

The  chief  instrument  for  inquiring  into  the  character 
of  celebrated  persons  is  one  which  those  who  like  to 


34  MARLBOROUGH 

take  extreme  views,  seeing  its  efficiency,  have  agreed  to 
cry  down  as  an  unfair  instrument.  It  is  useless,  we 
are  often  told,  to  urge  that  every  man  must  be  judged 
by  the  moral  standard  of  his  time.  There  is  no  reply  to 
this,  except  that  in  this  case  there  is  no  use  in  attempting 
to  judge  a  man  at  all.  In  contradiction  to  some  critics, 
it  must  always  be  maintained  by  every  capable  student 
of  history  that,  before  using  ethical  differences  about  a 
man,  we  must  not  only  discover  the  moral  standard  of 
his  time,  but  we  must  discover  his  own  special  attitude 
towards  that  moral  standard.  To  establish  this  there  is 
no  need  to  enter  into  casuistical  arguments.  Every 
time  furnishes  instances  which  are  more  convincing  as 
to  the  impossibility  of  sweeping  judgments  in  morality 
than  folios  of  controversy. 

In  reference  to  Marlborough,  again,  there  is  one 
consideration  which  needs  special  attention.  A  man 
who  urged  at  the  present  day  a  fear  for  the  Church  of 
England  as  a  justification  for  such  acts  as  Marlborough 
committed  just  before  the  Revolution  would  probably 
be  a  hypocrite,  except  that  no  one  with  the  brains  to  be 
a  hypocrite  would  now  urge  this.  With  the  abolition 
of  the  identification  of  orthodoxy,  real  or  feigned,  and 
political  or  worldly  prosperity,  the  temptation  to  such 
an  act  and  the  explanation  of  it  have  simultaneously 
vanished.  Tests  nowadays  are  regarded  as  immoral 
things,  and  (by  a  retirement  of  morality  which,  perhaps, 
leaves  those  who  avail  themselves  of  it  little  room  to 
gird  at  Churchill)  holders  even  of  church  preferments 
are  regarded  as  doing  something  rather  creditable  when 
they  use  rectories,  deaneries,  headships  of  colleges, 
as  places  of  vantage  whence  to  apply  leverage  for  the 


IN  THE  REIGN  OF  JAMES  II.  35 

overthrow  of  Christianity  and  the  Church.  In  Marl- 
borough's  time  it  was  different,  and  Marlborough's 
bitterest  re  viler  has,  as  we  have  seen,  admitted,  partly 
because  he  could  not  help  it  and  partly  because  it  pointed 
an  antithesis,  that  Marlborough  was  not  less  unwilling, 
if  he  was  not  more  unwilling,  to  give  up  his  religion 
than  to  give  up  his  places.  But,  morality  being  necessary 
to  man,  we  have  tightened  as  well  as  relaxed,  and  the 
tightening  as  well  as  the  relaxing  has  been  adverse  to 
Marlborough.  We  doubt,  or  do  not  doubt,  whether  his 
pretended  attachment  to  the  Protestant  religion  was  an 
hypocrisy;  we  are  quite  sure  that  he  could  not  have 
plotted  against  James,  have  caballed  against  William, 
have  cheated  the  revenue  and  his  soldiers,  have  nego- 
tiated with  the  Chevalier,  if  he  had  not  been  a  villain. 
Here  we  make  exactly  the  same  mistake.  A  man  who 
to-day  did  what  Marlborough  did  (the  argument  is 
Macaulay's  own,  though  he  took  good  care  only  to 
apply  it  when  it  suited),  what  not  only  Marlborough, 
but  such  plain,  straightforward  men  as  Cornbury, 
Grafton,  and  Ormond  did  in  November  1688,  would 
probably  be  an  abandoned  scoundrel.  So  would  one 
who  did  what  not  only  Marlborough,  but  Shrewsbury  and 
Russell  did  during  William's  reign.  So  would  one  who 
did  what  scores,  hundreds,  thousands  of  British  officers 
in  civil  and  military  positions  of  trust  did  in  regard  to 
public  money  up  to  times  within  the  memory  of  men 
living.  And  it  may  be  added  that  probably  no  single 
man  who  would  do  these  deeds  to-day  would  hesitate,  as 
Marlborough  hesitated,  to  change  his  religion,  while 
hundreds  of  men  would  call  themselves  Roman  Catholics 
or  anything  else,  if  fashion  or  interest  bid  them  do  so. 


36  MARLBOROUGH 

It  is  idle  to  call  these  truisms.  Perhaps  they  are,  but 
they  are  also  truths,  and  until  they  are  recognised  as 
truths  there  is  no  hope  of  judging  such  a  character  as 
Marlborough's. 

When  they  are  recognised  there  is  some  such  hope. 
We  take  Maryborough  as  we  find  him,  and  the  ideas  of 
the  time  as  we  find  them.  We  see  a  man  with  a  de- 
and  strong  religious  faith  bound  up  with  fidelity 

a  certain  form  of  church  doctrine  and  government ; 
with,  in  all  probability,  a  less  definite  but  still  strong 
attachment  to  the  English  constitution,  construed  not 
Whiggishly,  but  as  moderate  Cavaliers  like  Hyde  con- 
strued it ;  with  a  brain  of  extraordinary  subtlety  and 
power  of  combination  and  foresight ;  with  an  accidental 
but  strong  hold  on  one  probable  source  of  worldly  pro- 
sperity ;  and  with  an  intense  resolve  to  prosper.  He  finds 
himself  attached  to  a  king  who  is  deliberately  violating 
some  of  his  cherished  convictions  in  politics  and  religion. 
He  sees  that  this  course  of  conduct,  though  it  has  not 
hitherto  touched  himself,  threatens  the  worldly  pro- 
sperity of  everyone  who,  holding  such  convictions,  re- 
fuses to  abandon  them ;  and  that  the  king's  tenure  of 
power  is,  owing  to  that  course  of  conduct,  becoming  every 
day  more  problematical.  The  whole  tenor  of  the  man's 
own  life  and  thoughts,  the  main  if  not  the  whole  prac- 
tice of  the  age  in  which  he  lives,  cause  him  to  regard 
these  things  as  conditions  of  a  game  which  he  has  to 
play  so  as  to  win,  or  at  any  rate  save  it.  The  celebrated 
addition  to  the  celebrated  adage  that '  All  is  fair  in  love, 
war,  and  politics,'  exactly  expresses  his  state  of  mind. 
We  still  admit  that  nearly  everything  is  fair  in  war, 
and  that  a  great  deal  is  fair  in  love.  In  regard  td 


IN  THE  REIGN  OP  JAMES  II.  37 

politics,  I  am  not  sure  that  our  practice  has  changed  so 
much  as  our  theory.  Maryborough,  at  any  rate,  obviously 
held  that  considerations  of  nice  private  honour  did  not 
enter  into  the  political  game.  The  often-quoted  words 
about  putting  his  honour  in  the  prince's  hands  show 
this  clearly ;  for  a  man  who  puts  his  honour  in  some- 
body else's  hands  practically  leaves  it  out  of  the  ques- 
tion. For  this,  and  for  all  that  it  implies,  Marlborough 
can  receive  no  admiration :  he  may  receive  a  great 
deal  of  disapproval  in  that  he  went  farther  in  this 
purely  *  playing  to  win '  view  of  the  political  game 
than  the  best  men  in  his  own  age  approved.  But  there 
must  always  be  for  his  action  the  excuse  that  it  was 
not  a  deliberate  defiance  of  laws  which  the  actor  recog- 
nised. The  defence  is  not  a  very  strong  one  even 
when  it  covers,  and  it  will  not  cover  at  all  some  acts  of 
Marlborough's  that  we  shall  have  to  discuss  hereafter, 
but  it  has  a  certain  value. 


394889 


38  MARLBOROUGH 


CHAPTER  IV. 

UNDER  WILLIAM   OF  ORANGE. 

WHOSOEVER  wishes  to  understand  the  conduct  of  any 
prominent  Englishman  during  the  reign  of  William 
and  Mary,  it  is  before  all  things  necessary  that  he 
should  recognise  the  singular  topsyturviness  (if  a  col- 
loquialism may  be  permitted  where  dignified  English 
refuses  an  equivalent)  of  the  political  situation.  Nothing 
like  it  has  ever  occurred  since  in  England;  nothing 
quite  like  it  has  occurred  during  the  numerous  revolu- 
tions of  continental  countries.  It  is  customary  for 
admirers  of  what  used  to  be  called  Revolution  Principles 
(the  term  has  recently  acquired  a  far  different  meaning) 
to  extol  the  dignity  and  decency  of  the  proceedings 
which  turned  out  James  II.  They  are  quite  justified 
in  a  sense,  but  that  very  sense  explains,  though  it  does 
not  excuse  or  justify,  the  extraordinary  tergiversations 
and  vacillations  which  for  many  years  distinguished 
both  national  feeling  and  private  conduct.  The  Con- 
vention parliament,  no  doubt,  observed  all  constitutional 
forms  that  were  in  its  power  with  anxious  care,  and 
based  its  arguments  on  precedent  with  elaborate  de- 
cency. But  the  merest  child  in  constitutional  lore 
could  not  but  perceive  that  it  had  no  constitutional 
standing  whatever.  That  its  constituencies  were  the 


UNDER  WILLIAM  OP  ORANGE  39 

constituencies  recognised  by  the  law  mattered  abso- 
lutely nothing,  for  they  were  not  legally  summoned 
to  exercise  their  functions ;  there  was  no  authority  to 
sanction  or  verify  their  powers ;  and  their  acts,  when 
completed,  lacked  the  assent  even  of  a  king  de  facto 
until  they  had  themselves  made  that  king.  The  tie, 
therefore,  that  bound  post-revolution  to  prae-revolution 
constitutionalities  was  a  tie  of  unexceptionable  character 
save  in  two  points  ;  there  was,  unfortunately,  a  breach  of 
continuity  at  both  ends  of  it. 

But  if  matters  were  so  unsatisfactory  for  the  mere 
formalist,  they  were  not  much  better  for  the  advanced 
Whig,  who  thought  forms  forms  only,  and  accepted  to 
the  full  the  doctrine  of  the  inherent  and  inextinguishable 
sovereignty  of  the  people.  It  was  perfectly  well  known, 
and  has  been  admitted  by  historians  of  the  most  unques- 
tioned fidelity  to  the  Revolution  settlement,  that  as  soon 
as  the  immediate  pressure  of  James's  tyranny  (all  the 
more  galling  because  it  was  a  tyranny  of  worry  rather 
than  a  tyranny  of  positive  persecution)  was  removed,  a 
majority — probably  a  very  large  majority — of  the  English 
nation  preferred  their  ancient  kings,  and  continued  to 
prefer  them  for  many  years.  The  two  forces  which 
kept  the  settlement  settled  were  the  personal  indis- 
pensableness  of  William  and  the  personal  unacceptable- 
ness  of  James.  The  force  which  had  first  established 
it  was  undoubtedly,  however  indiscreet  it  may  have 
been  in  Burnet  to  say  so  publicly,  conquest  and  nothing 
but  conquest.  William's  '  Swiss,  Swedes,  and  Branden- 
burgers '  in  the  first  place,  and  in  England ;  the  failure 
of  Dundee's  incompetent  lieutenants  to  avail  themselves 
of  Killiecrankie  in  Scotland ;  Newton  Butler,  London- 


4O  MARLBOROUGH 

deny,  and  the  Boyne  in  Ireland,  were  the  real  title- 
deeds  which  William  and  Mary  had  to  show,  and  this 
kind  of  title-deed  Englishmen  have  never  been  very 
well  content  to  recognise.  Yet,  again,  the  easy-going 
person  who  cared  nothing  about  legitimacy  or  the  con- 
stitutional status  of  the  Convention,  who  very  willingly 
blinded  his  eyes  to  the  Orange  Conquest  and  did  not 
trouble  himself  much  about  the  relative  majority  of 
Jacobites  and  Williamites  in  the  country,  could  not 
disguise  from  himself  that  the  settlement  was  in  the 
highest  degree  insecure.  He  had,  if  he  was  a  man 
fairly  advanced  in  life,  seen  half-a-dozen  different  go- 
vernments in  England — governments  different  in  origin, 
in  form,  in  everything  except  a  certain  similarity  of 
the  journey-work  of  administration.  He  could  have  no 
security  that  he  should  not  see  yet  another  change — that 
the  rex  de  facto  might  not  become  the  exul  de  facto,  and 
vice  versd.  To  put  the  thing  in  a  nutshell,  an  enormous 
majority  of  Englishmen  would  have  infinitely  preferred 
James  if  he  would  have  made  himself  in  any  way 
tolerable,  and  only  tolerated  William  because  they  could 
not  do  without  him.  With  such  a  state  of  feeling  ex- 
tending from  the  highest  to  the  lowest ;  with  an  exciting 
and  mainly  unfavourable  course  of  foreign  and  domestic 
affairs,  and  most  of  all  with  the  lax  political  traditions 
which  half  a  century  of  revolution  inevitably  brings 
about ;  with  the  exiled  king  plentifully  supplied  with 
money  and  the  king  de  facto  frequently  in  straits  for 
it ;  with  James  a  countryman  and  William  a  foreigner ; 
with  James  far  enough  off  for  his  personal  shortcomings 
to  be  forgotten  and  with  William's  disagreeable  per- 
sonality constantly  on  the  spot — all  things  may  be  said 


UNDER  WILLIAM  OF  ORANGE  41 

to  have  been  prepared  for  a  very  ugly  spectacle  of 
political  misconduct.  The  spectacle  was  duly  presented, 
and  before  discussing  Marlborough's  part  in  it,  it  will 
be  best,  as  before,  to  recite  impartially  what  the  facts  of 
that  conduct  were. 

It  has  been  said  that  Marlborough l  was  not  very 
prominent  in  the  proceedings  which  immediately  followed 
the  Revolution ;  indeed,  a  less  keen  intelligence  than  his 
would  have  perceived  the  desirableness  of  taking  no 
forward  part  in  merely  civil  politics ;  and  it  must  be  re- 
garded as  a  mistake  on  his  part  that  he  not  only  voted 
but  spoke  for  the  abortive  Abjuration  Bill  of  May 
1690.  He  had  in  the  preceding  year  done  much  less 
questionable  service  in  his  proper  profession.  During 
the  first  campaign  of  the  renewed  war  against  France 
he  commanded  an  English  brigade  under  the  Prince  of 
Waldeck  in  Flanders,  and  was  chiefly  concerned  in  the 
sharp  skirmish  or  battle  of  Walcourt  on  August  5, 1689. 
The  French  attacked  his  outposts  and  were  repulsed 
with  heavy  relative  loss  in  men  and  guns.  Here 
Marlborough  displayed  the  mixture  of  caution  and 

1  He  is  now  properly  so  called,  having  been  created  Earl  of 
Marlborough  two  days  before  the  coronation  of  William  and  Mary. 
He  had  already  been  made  a  Privy  Councillor  and  Lord  of  the  Bed- 
chamber. Domestic  details  as  to  Marlborough  and  his  family  are 
at  no  time  very  plentiful.  He  still  resided  at  Holywell  for  the  most 
part,  and  when  in  town,  apparently  with  his  wife,  in  Anne's  apart- 
ments at  the  Palace.  Besides  Henrietta  already  mentioned,  he  had 
two  sons — John,  afterwards  Marquess  of  Blandford,  who  died  when 
a  boy ;  Charles,  who  died  still  younger ;  and  three  daughters — Anne, 
the  ancestress  of  the  present  lines  of  Marlborough  and  Spencer; 
Elizabeth,  who  married  the  first  Duke  of  Bridgwater ;  and  Mary,  who 
married  the  Duke  of  Montagu.  All  these  were  born  before  the  death 
of  William.  Anne  and  Elizabeth  died  before  their  father. 


42  MARLBOROUGH 

boldness  (the  latter  predominating)  in  which  even 
among  great  generals  he  was  distinguished,  meeting 
Humieres'  advance  with  a  flank  attack  as  well  as  with 
a  stubborn  resistance  in  front.  William  observed,  in  a 
letter  to  him  :  '  It  is  to  you  that  this  advantage  is  prin- 
cipally owing ; '  and  considering  that  Maryborough  held 
but  a  brigade  command,  the  praise  is,  especially  for 
that  age  of  etiquette,  very  high.  Coxe  has  expressed 
his  surprise  that  Marlborough  was  not  after  this  em- 
ployed either  in  the  continental  campaign  of  the  next 
year  or  (at  first)  in  Ireland,  and  has  explained  the  latter 
circumstance  by  a  quite  unnecessary  surmise  of  chival- 
rous unwillingness  on  Marlborough's  part  to  serve  against 
his  old  master.  The  archdeacon,  however,  made  the 
difficulty  for  himself  by  not  observing  the  chronology 
of  a  very  different  affair,  in  which  Lady  Marlborough 
directly,  and  her  husband  indirectly,  were  engaged. 
This  was  the  question  of  the  Princess  Anne's  establish- 
ment, which  was  vexed  during  the  whole  of  the  year 
1689,  and  only  settled  at  its  close,  the  settlement, 
moreover,  being  very  disagreeable  to  the  feelings  of 
William  and  Mary.  It  is  not  improbable  that  Marl- 
borough's  support  of  the  Abjuration  Bill  was  an  attempt 
to  recover  William's  favour;  but  if  so,  it  was  a  maladroit 
one. 

Anne's  settled  income  in  her  father's  time  was 
80,000£.  a  year,  but  after  his  abdication  or  expulsion 
she  stood  next  in  order  of  succession  to  the  reigning 
sovereigns,  and  it  was  not  perhaps  unreasonable  to 
expect  a  certain  augmentation.  The  exact  course  of 
the  family  quarrel  between  Anne  and  her  sister  and 
brother-in-law  is  very  differently  related,  and  probably, 


UNDER  WILLIAM  OF  ORANGE  43 

like  all  family  quarrels,  lent  itself  very  well  to  such 
difference  of  relation.  The  partisans  of  Anne  say  that 
William  grudged  her  even  the  30,OOOL,  strongly  op- 
posed any  increase,  and  was  only  forced  to  consent  to  the 
final  arrangement  under  which  she  received  50,OOOZ., 
with  a  parliamentary  guarantee,  by  the  friendly  ex- 
ertions of  the  Marlboroughs  and  her  other  supporters. 
The  partisans  of  William  say  that  the  thing  was 
sprung  upon  him  and  upon  Mary,  that  a  parliamentary 
intrigue  was  started  before  he  had  even  the  chance 
of  gratifying  or  of  knowing  his  sister-in-law's  desires, 
and  that  he  was  only  hurt  at  the  notion  of  his  gene- 
rosity or  his  good  faith  being  doubted.  It  is  certain 
that  the  affair  caused  great  heartburning  between  the 
sisters,  and  between  the  king  and  queen  and  the 
Churchills.  Anne  rewarded  Lady  Marlborough's  ex- 
ertions with  a  pension  of  1,OOOZ.  a  year,  which  Sarah 
represents  herself  as  refusing,  and  as  only  being  per- 
suaded to  accept  with  the  utmost  difficulty.  Macaulay 
says  that  Marlborough  himself  was  unaffected  in  Wil- 
liam's estimation  by  this  transaction ;  but  that  may  be 
very  much  doubted.  However  this  may  have  been, 
Marlborough  was  not,  as  has  been  said,  employed  on 
the  Continent  in  1690,  nor  did  he  serve  in  the  Boyne 
campaign.  But  he  was  one  of  the  Council  of  Nine  left 
to  assist  Mary  in  King  William's  absence,  and  during 
the  autumn  of  the  year  he  was  first  the  proposer  and 
then  the  executor  of  a  very  important  military  diversion. 
The  scares  and  disgraces  of  Beachy  Head  and  Teign- 
mouth  had  not  only  produced  no  serious  harm  but  had 
called  forth  a  great  deal  of  patriotic  and  anti-Gallican 
feeling.  Marlborough,  in  his  place  in  council,  suggested 


44  MARLBOROUGH 

the  despatch  of  an  English  fleet  with  5,000  men 
to  reduce  the  great  seaports  of  the  south  of  Ireland, 
which  were  in  French  hands,  and  formed  the  channel 
of  communication  with  Prance.  The  council,  except 
Nottingham,  opposed  this,  and  perhaps  excusably,  for 
it  might  well  seem  to  a  less  bold  and  commanding  in- 
telligence than  Marlborough's,  that  to  denude  the  king- 
dom of  more  ships  and  troops  when  its  shores  had  just 
been  menaced,  and  actually  ravaged  with  impunity,  was 
rash.  But  William,  when  consulted,  at  once  approved 
the  plan,  and  Maryborough  himself  executed  it.  He  was 
not  long  in  making  his  arrangements,  and  set  sail  from 
Portsmouth  exactly  as  William  reached  England,  his 
exploit  at  the  Boyne  a  little  tarnished  by  his  ill-success 
at  Limerick.  Marlborough's  campaign,  on  the  other 
hand,  was,  though  short,  a  model  one.  It  was  the  first 
occasion  on  which  he  had  an  entirely  independent  com- 
mand, and  even  this  was  challenged  by  the  Duke  of 
Wurtemberg,  who  commanded  a  detachment  of  William's 
army  at  Cork.  The  Duke  claimed  precedence,  and 
Marlborough  not  only  consented  to  a  partition  of  com- 
mand day  and  day  about  (an  ostensibly  dangerous 
experiment),  but  propitiated  his  vain  and  punctilious 
colleague  or  subordinate  by  giving  '  Wurtemberg '  as 
the  word  of  command.  Cork  was  taken  in  two  days 
after  a  sharp  cannonade,  the  carrying  of  several  out- 
works by  storm,  and  the  passage  of  a  marsh,  which  was 
thought  the  safeguard  of  the  city,  by  the  English  troops. 
Here  Grafton,  Marlborough's  comrade  in  the  Monmouth 
campaign,  in  the  ride  from  Salisbury,  and  as  a  volunteer 
in  this  expedition,  fell  ill.  The  town  capitulated  and 
was  treated  with  lenity,  though  Marlborough  could  not 

i 


UNDER  WILLIAM  OF  ORANGE  45 

at  once  establish  complete  order.  From  Cork  he  marched, 
without  losing  a  moment,  to  Kinsale,  surrounded  it,  ex- 
tinguished the  flames  which  the  garrison  had  kindled 
in  the  town,  carried  the  Old  Fort,  as  one  of  the  two 
citadels  was  called,  by  escalade,  and  laid  siege  in  form 
to  the  other,  the  New  Fort.  This  soon  capitulated,  the 
garrison  being  allowed  to  retire  to  Limerick;  and  Kinsale, 
the  chief  port  of  communication  with  France,  and  full 
of  stores,,  was  in  the  hands  of  the  English.  Maryborough 
was  back  in  London  after  little  more  than  a  month's 
absence,  having  achieved  what  deserves  to  be  called  a 
pattern  campaign  in  little.  William's  acknowledgment 
was  handsome  but  characteristically  qualified :  '  No  one,' 
he  said, '  ivho  had  seen  so  little  service  as  MarlborougJi 
was  so  fit  for  command.'  The  general  thus  eulogised 
returned  to  Ireland  and  held  the  chief  command  there 
during  the  winter  of  1690-91,  but  he  engaged  in  no 
active  military  operations.  Indeed,  this  brief  and  brilliant 
performance  was,  except  the  campaign  of  Walcourt,  the 
only  active  military  operation  in  which  he  was  engaged 
during  the  reign. 

It  cannot  be  said  that  William  was  to  blame  for  this 
non-employment  of  the  most  brilliant  soldier  among  his 
English  subjects,  as  he  was  already  known  to  be;  of  the 
greatest  soldier  in  Europe,  as  he  was  before  very  long 
to  prove  himself.  Indeed,  Marlborough  accompanied 
William  to  the  Continent  during  the  campaign  of  1691, 
performed  some  routine  military  duties,  and  attracted  a 
remarkable  compliment  from  the  Prince  of  Vaudemont, 
William's  cousin  and  a  Dutch  general  of  high  standing 
and  ability.  Among  the  English  leaders,  he  said,  Kirke, 
Lanier,  Mackay,  Talmash  had  various  good  qualities,  but 
3 


46  MARLBOROUGH 

in  Marlborough  there  was '  something  inexpressible,'  and 
he  could  not  fail  to  do  great  actions.  William  is  said  to 
have  acquiesced ;  indeed,  though  he  himself  was  a  con- 
stantly unfortunate  general,  his  military  talents  made  it 
impossible  that  he  should  not  recognise  Maryborough's 
extraordinary  qualities,  for  many  as  were  William's 
faults,  jealousy  of  genius  was  not  one  of  them.  It  is 
probable  that,  had  he  known  what  Marlborough  was 
doing  in  secret,  he  would  have  less  willingly  assented 
to  Vaudemont's  eulogy. 

Communication  with  James  on  the  part  of  leading 
Englishmen  who  had  taken  a  share  in  the  Revolution 
began  almost  immediately  after  it.  Shrewsbury,  a  Whig, 
and  one  of  the  Seven,  had  entered  into  such  communica- 
tion not  much  more  than  a  year  after  James  had  fled, 
and  others  followed.  But  the  most  important  move- 
ments took  place  in  1691.  Russell,  also  one  of  the 
Seven,  a  prominent  Whig,  and  one  who  had  been  gorged 
with  plunder  by  the  Revolution  Government,  took  the 
bait  offered  by  Jacobite  emissaries.  So  did  Godolphin, 
whose  motto  indeed  was  that  of  the  Marquis  of  Win- 
chester of  the  preceding  century  (not  the  hero  of  Basing), 
'  Willow  not  oak.'  These  men  were  approached  and 
consented.  Marlborough  volunteered.  Macaulay  has, 
in  his  usual  picturesque  fashion,  and  with  less  than  his 
usual  unfairness,  told  the  story  of  Marlborough's  over- 
tures through  Colonel  Edward  Sackville.  There  cer- 
tainly seems  to  have  been  nothing  wanting  to  at  least 
the  self-abasement  of  Marlborough's  apology.  Nor  did 
he  fail  to  give  pledges  of  sincerity.  He  sent  James  the 
plan  of  the  campaign  and  the  state  of  the  English 
troops,  he  warned  Jacobites  of  intended  warrants,  he 


UNDER  WILLTAM  OF  ORANGE  47 

proposed  or  at  least  hinted  at  a  purpose  to  bring  over 
the  army  bodily.  Finally,  he  got  from  James,  the  im- 
placable James,  an  autograph  promise  of  pardon.  It  is 
the  greatest  possible  tribute  to  Marlborough's  almost 
superhuman  abilities  that,  though  immediately  after 
these  transactions  he  was  in  a  position,  as  above  related, 
to  fulfil,  or  try.  to  fulfil,  his  part  in  them,  he  evaded 
the  pledge  of  desertion  by  a  transparent  excuse,  and 
was  not  cast  out  of  James's  good  graces.  But  he  did 
something  almost  as  great  as  the  bringing  over  of 
the  English  army :  he  procured  from  Anne  a  written 
submission  to  her  father ;  in  other  words,  a  resignation 
of  her  claims  as  next  heir  to  William  and  Mary,  who, 
all  things  considered,  were  not  likely  to  be  succeeded 
by  heirs  of  their  body. 

If  a  passage  of  James's  memoirs  is  not  an  audacious 
forgery  or  a  complete  mistake,  it  must  be  admitted  that 
Macaulay  has  given  the  true  account  of  the  manner  in 
which  Marlborough  proposed  to  carry  out  his  promises. 
But,  with  characteristic  love  of  overcharging  his  case,  he 
has  attributed  to  Marlborough  the  very  motive  and 
purpose  of  which  James,  in  the  same  passage,  acquits 
him,  and  for  which  thero  is  no  evidence  except  James's 
acquittal.  What  is  certain  is,  that  on  January  10, 1692,  / 
Marlborough  was  dismissed  from  all  his  offices.  Nobody 
quite  knew  the  cause,  and  the  best-informed  persons 
told  the  most  contradictory  stories.  James's  version  is 
that  Marlborough  had  devised  an  address  of  parliament 
to  William  to  dismiss  all  foreigners  from  the  civil  and 
military  service  of  the  Crown,  an  address  which  certainly 
expressed  the  known  temper  of  the  nation.  If  William 
agreed,  he  became  helpless ;  if  he  refused,  an  open  breach 


48  MARLBOROUGH 

would  take  place  between  him  and  Parliament;  the 
army  was  to  declare  for  the  latter  and  James  was  to 
come  in.  Much  progress  had  been  made  in  the  design 
when,  says  James,  '  some  indiscreet  though  faithful 
subjects  of  mine,  thinking  to  serve  me,  and  imagining 
that  Lord  Churchill  was  acting  not  for  me  but  for  the 
Princess  of  Denmark,  discovered  the  whole  to  Bentinck,' 
who,  it  may  be  added,  was  Marlborough's  personal 
enemy,  and  had  been  described  by  him  with  very  great 
truth  as  '  a  wooden  fellow.5  Macaulay  accepts  the  plot, 
and  he  also  accepts  the  intention  to  utilise  it  for  Anne's 
exaltation.  This,  in  the  first  place,  is  an  offence  against 
the  law  of  evidence  (for  if  James  is  to  be  believed  in  the 
one  case  he  is  to  be  believed  in  the  other) ;  and,  in  the 
second  place,  it  overlooks  the  fact  that  Anne  had  already 
made  her  written  submission  to  her  father.  It  is  pos- 
sible to  exaggerate  Anne's  stupidity,  it  is  not  possible 
to  exaggerate  her  conscientiousness. 

Marlborough,  however,  was  simply  dismissed,  the 
character  of  the  information  against  him  not  comporting 
with  legal  proceedings,  even  if  William  had  not  well 
known  the  danger  of  such.  In  what  followed,  however, 
even  the  faithful  Macaulay  cannot  acquit  the  king  and 
queen  of  injudicious  action.  It  was,  of  course,  within 
William's  power  to  dismiss  his  servants  without  cause 
assigned,  and  if  the  facts  are  as  stated  by  James,  nobody 
can  very  much  blame  him  for  cashiering  Marlborough. 
But  when,  either  of  her  own  notion  or  at  his  bidding, 
Mary  proceeded  to  insist  that  Anne  should  dismiss  Lady 
Marlborough,  and  on  her  refusal  sent  a  message  by  the 
Lord  Chamberlain  ordering  Lady  Marlborough  to  quit 
the  palace,  she  not  only  behaved  rudely,  and  in  an  un- 


UNDER  WILLIAM  OF  ORANGE  49 

sisterly  fashion,  but  made  a  gross  blunder.  Anne  im- 
mediately quitted  the  palace  and  established  herself 
at  Berkeley  House.  Minor  insults  were,  it  is  said, 
put  upon  her  by  order  of  the  Court,  and  whether  this 
was  so  or  not  it  is  clear  that  the  mistake  both  justified 
and  embittered  the  Princess's  party  more  than  any 
exercise  of  Marlborough's  celebrated  talents  for  in- 
triguing could  have  done. 

The  mistakes  of  his  enemies  were  destined  in  more  j 
ways  than  one  to  serve  him.  Hardly  had  public  opinion 
been  inclined  towards  him  by  his  apparently  causeless 
dismissal,  and  by  the  rudeness  of  the  queen  towards 
his  patroness,  than  Fuller's  false  plot  brought  odium  on 
the  anti- Jacobites.  Fuller's  plot  was  followed  in  a 
month  or  two  by  Young's,  in  which  Marlborough's 
extraordinary  good  luck  brought  it  about  that  he  was 
falsely  accused,  and  with  Sprat,  Bishop  of  Rochester, 
bore  the  brunt  of  a  plot  differing  not  very  much  from 
the  very  designs  of  which,  though  it  was  not  publicly 
known,  he  was  certainly  guilty.  Young,  a  man  of  the 
worst  character,  but  a  clever  forger,  devised  an  associa- 
tion for  seizing  the  Prince  of  Orange  dead  or  alive. 
This  association  was  signed,  or  rather  purported  to  be 
so,  by  Sprat,  Marlborough,  Cornbury,  Bancroft,  and 
Salisbury,  the  last  a  Roman  Catholic,  and  one  who  might 
be  thought  to  resent  some  very  rough  treatment  by  the 
Whigs  shortly  after  the  Revolution.  On  the  informa- 
tion given,  Marlborough  was  arrested  and  sent  to  the 
Tower,  but  the  clumsy  management  of  the  plot  by 
Young's  confederate,  and  the  cool  and  successful  defence 
of  Sprat,  soon  showed  its  utter  falsity,  and  Marlborough 
was  set  at  liberty.  It  was  impossible  that  in  public 


5O  MARLBOROUGH 

estimation  this  affair  should  not  be  connected  with  his 
disgrace,  and  the  certainty  that  he  had  been  unjustly 
accused  in  the  one  instance  made  it  seem  not  improb- 
able that  he  had  been  unjustly  treated  in  the  other. 

This  was  in  April,  1692,  and  for  the  rest  of  the 
year  we  hear  little  of  Maryborough,  except  that  in 
August  he  was  beset  by  highwaymen  between  London 
and  St.  Albans,  and  robbed  of  five  hundred  guineas, 
which,  there  is  no  doubt,  annoyed  him  very  much. 
He  had,  on  June  23,  been  struck  out  of  the  Privy 
Council  with  Halifax  and  Shrewsbury,  and  (by  a  very 
arbitrary  stretch  of  power,  which  in  James  would  have 
met  with  the  severest  reprobation)  his  recognisances  and 
those  of  his  sureties  in  the  Young  matter  were  refused 
to  be  discharged  for  months  after  the  discovery  of  the 
falsity  of  Young's  accusation.  The  whole  matter  formed 
the  subject  of  more  than  one  debate,  and  the  House  of 
Lords  passed  a  declaration  against  similar  arrests  in 
future.  But  the  resentment  of  William,  which,  indeed, 
the  information  given  to  Bentinck  justified  only  too  well, 
continued  unabated  for  some  time,  perhaps  till  after  the 
death  of  Mary,  at  the  end  of  1694.  During  the  interval 
Marlborough  had  unfortunately  continued  to  deserve 
fully  the  remark  which  William  is  said  to  have  made  to 
Shrewsbury  on  one  occasion,  when  the  disgraced  general 
offered  his  services  through  that  channel :  '  I  do  not 
think,'  he  said,  '  that  it  would  be  for  the  good  of  my 
service  to  entrust  the  command  of  my  troops  to  Lord 
Marlborough.'  At  this  very  time,  indeed,  though 
William  did  not  know  it,  Marlborough  had  been  guilty 
of  the  basest  act  of  his  whole  career — of  an  act 
for  which  it  is  difficult  to  forgive  him,  even  after  the 


UNDER  WILLIAM  OF  ORANGE  51 

largest  allowances  are  made  for  the  considerations  set 
forth  at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter  and  the  end  of 
the  last.  This  act  was  the  betraying  to  James — that  is 
to  say,  to  France — of  the  expedition  to  Brest  under 
Talmash.1  That  Talmash  himself  was  Marlborough's 
nearest  rival  in  military  talent  has  been  used  as  an 
aggravation  of  his  guilt.  But,  that  guilt  needs  no 
aggravation.  It  was  shared  by  others ;  but  that  does 
not  help  it  out;  and  it  must  be  admitted  that  even 
the  shield  which  has  on  it  the  names  of  Blenheim 
and  Ramillies  is  indelibly  disgraced  by  another  name, 
which  is  also  written  there — the  name  of  Camaret 
Bay. 

This  history  of  this  crime,  which  Coxe,  though  dis- 
approving of  it,  dismisses  with  characteristic  euphemism 
as  one  of  the  various  expedients  resorted  to  by  Marl- 
borough  and  others  to  'regain  the  goodwill  of  their 
former  sovereign,  that  their  demerits  might  be  over- 
looked in  the  event  of  a  restoration,'  is  as  follows :  In 
the  spring  of  1694  the  French  plan  of  campaign 
included  an  extensive  series  of  naval  operations  in  the 
Mediterranean,  and  the  greater  part  of  the  French  fleet 
was  sent  from  Brest  southward  through  the  straits,  to 
act  against  Barcelona  and  the  Catalonian  coast.  The 
English  fleet  was  to  follow,  and  at  the  same  time  it  was 
resolved  that  a  squadron,  with  a  large  body  of  troops 
on  board,  under  Talmash,  should  meanwhile  attack 

1  This  usual  spelling  of  the  name  of  a  brave  and  very  unfortu- 
nate leader  perhaps  disguises  from  some  readers  the  fact  that  he 
was  of  the  family  of  the  Tollemaches  of  Helmingham  in  Suffolk 
and  Peckforton  in  Cheshire — a  family,  despite  their  French-looking 
name,  among  the  oldest  in  England,  and  most  worthily  represented 
at  the  present  day. 


52  MARLBOROUGH 

Brest,  which  was  left  comparatively  defenceless.  But 
the  immediate  destination  of  this  force  was  kept 
a  secret,  and  for  the  success  of  its  undertaking  it 
was  absolutely  necessary  that  it  should  remain  one. 
Marlborough  was  at  this  time  in  disgrace,  and  had  no 
official  information,  but  he  had  abundant  access  to 
sources  of  such  information,  and,  discovering  the  plan, 
he  wrote  straight  to  James  to  warn  him  of  it,  with 
exact  details  of  the  force  to  be  employed,  its  destination 
and  its  purpose.  The  result  is  only  too  well  known. 
Orders  were  sent  from  Paris  to  put  Brest  into  a  com- 
plete state  of  defence.  Vauban  himself  carried  them 
out,  and  large  bodies  of  troops  were  mustered  to  man 
the  new  works.  Adverse  winds  delayed  the  English 
fleet,  and  when  it  at  last  arrived,  under  Berkeley  as 
admiral  and  Talmash  as  general,  the  French  prepara- 
tions were  complete.  The  leaders,  it  must  be  confessed, 
did  their  best  to  complete  Marlborough's  treachery  by 
their  own  misconduct.  They  ignored  the  result  of  a 
perilous  reconnaissance  made  by  the  youhg  Marquis  of 
Carmarthen  (Danby's  son)  in  his  yacht;  they  perse- 
vered in  attacking,  despite  the  clearest  evidence  that 
the  enemy  were  forewarned  and  fully  prepared;  they 
landed  men  in  open  boats  under  the  fire  of  batteries 
which  the  ships  had  not  silenced  and  were  not  able  to 
silence;  and  they  had  to  retreat  from  the  shore  of 
Camaret  Bay,  where  the  spot  is  still  called  'Mort 
Anglaise,'  with  the  loss  of  more  than  a  thousand  men, 
including  Talmash,  who  was  mortally  wounded.  An 
enterprise  conducted  with  such  rashness  might  in  any 
case  not  have  succeeded,  but  it  was  Marlborough's 
work  that  it  was  foredoomed  to  failure.  His  guilt  will 


UNDER  WILLIAM  OF  ORANGE  53 

scarcely  be  thought  to  be  much  diminished  by  the  fact 
that  Godolphin  shared  it. 

He  had  done  other  ill  services  to  William,  some  of 
which,  however,  could  hardly  be  called  more  than  fair 
party  blows  openly  dealt.  In  the  summer  of  1692  he 
had  prevailed  on  the  Lords  to  address  William,  praying 
that  all  English  generals  should  rank  as  senior  to 
generals  in  the  Dutch  service,  whatever  the  age  and 
^^^  rank  of  the  latter.  He  formally  protested  against  the 
^>  throwing  out  of  the  Place  Bill  in  the  next  session.  He 
supported  against  the  Government  the  Bill  for  the 
regulation  of  trials  in  cases  of  high  treason,  and  in  fact 
he  was  an  active  and  prominent  member  of  what  may 
almost  be  called  the  regular  Opposition.  His  irregular 
opposition  also  continued,  and  was,  if  anything,  stimu- 
lated by  James's  appointment,  as  his  Secretary  of 
State,  of  the  Earl  of  Middleton,  the  most  popular  of 
the  extreme  Jacobites,  the  friend  of  Dryden  and 
Etherege,  and  one  of  the  last  politicians  of  his  genera- 
tion who  combined  the  jovial  good  humour  and  keen 
wit  which  had  distinguished  Charles  IT.  with  industry, 
ability,  and  a  respectable  if  not  quite  unblemished 
character.  Yet  immediately  after  the  disaster  of 
Camaret,  as  has  been  said,  Marlborough  offered  his 
services  to  William. 

For  the  restoration  to  favour  which  followed  Mary's 
death  there  were  in  all  probability  several  reasons. 
Sunderland,  who  was  closely  connected  with  the  Marl- 
boroughs,  had  now  acquired  great  influence  over  William. 
The  king  never  seems  to  have  felt  the  same  personal 
dislike  to  Marlborough  that  his  wife  had  felt  to  Marl- 
borough's  wife.  It  was  both  indecent  and  inconvenient 


54  MARLBOROUGH 

that  he  should  continue  an  open  quarrel  with  the  next 
heir  to  the  throne,  and  a  reconciliation  with  Anne 
meant  a  reconciliation  with  the  Churchills.  This  recon- 
ciliation was  not  at  first  very  cordial,  nor  was  Marl- 
borough  immediately  restored  to  office ;  but  he  ceased 
from  1694  to  be  openly  in  opposition. 

That  nearly  all  the  most  untoward  circumstances  of 
his  life  turned  to  Marlborough's  advantage  may  be 
attributed  to  luck,  or  to  good  management,  or  to  both, 
according  to  the  taste  and  fancy  of  the  judge.  The 
fact  is  remarkable,  and  it  was  never  more  conspicuously 
illustrated  than  in  the  result  of  the  Assassination  plot, 
or  rather  of  that  aftergust  of  the  plot  which  blew  off 
the  head  of  Sir  John  Fenwick.  With  the  Assassination 
plot  itself  no  one  has  ever  asserted  or  insinuated  that 
Maryborough  was  concerned,  and  it  is  therefore  unneces- 
sary to  give  an  account  of  it.  His  best  friends  and  his 
worst  enemies  agree  fully,  that,  his  temper,  if  not  his 
principles,  disinclined  him  from  such  a  deed ;  and  his 
worst  enemies,  even  more  readily  than  his  best  friends, 
will  acquit  him  of  the  suspicion  of  having  been  con- 
cerned in  the  machinations  of  a  gang  of  mostly  obscure 
desperadoes,  whose  undertaking,  even  if  carried  out, 
was  by  no  means  certain  to  be  carried  out  successfully, 
while  its  betrayal  by  one  or  other  of  them  was  so  likely 
as  to  be  practically  sure.  Nor  did  even  Fenwick  accuse 
him  of  any  such  crime.  He  simply  indicated  in  the 
confession,  by  which  he  hoped  to  save  himself  when 
arrested,  such  of  Marlborough's  transactions  with  James 
as  he  knew — transactions  which,  as  a  whole,  were  already 
known,  and  known  on  better  evidence  to  William. 
Lest  anything  should  bo  wanting  to  Murlborough's 


UNDER  WILLIAM  OF  ORANGE  55 

chances,  the  feather-headedness  of  Peterborough  (then 
Monmouth)  completed  the  appearance  of  a  cabal  to 
expose  deeds  which  William  already  knew,  and  had 
passed  over,  if  he  had  actually  not  condoned  them.  The 
situation  was  such  that  a  man  of  far  inferior  abilities  to 
Marlborough,  if  he  had  only  a  little  courage,  must  have 
got  the  better  of  it,  and  Marlborough  did  so  triumphantly. 
He  knew  the  king  would  not  produce  his  own  secret  in- 
formation ;  and  in  his  place  in  Parliament  he  contented 
himself  with  the  assertion,  no  doubt  true,  that  he  had 
no  communication  whatever  with  Fenwick.  In  all  the 
divisions  on  the  Bill  of  Attainder  he  voted  against  Sir 
John,  and,  assuming  the  fairness  of  that  way  of  pro- 
ceeding, it  is  scarcely  reasonable  to  find  fault  with  him. 
Nor  does  even  Macaulay  do  so.  For  Fenwick,  without 
any  provocation,  had  aimed  at  Marlborough's  ruin,  if 
not  at  his  death.,  and  Fenwick,  as  Marlborough  had  very 
good  means  of  knowing,  was  at  least  an  accessory  to 
a  murderous  plot  with  which  Marlborough  had  had 
nothing  to  do.  The  imaginary  person  of  untainted  , 
honour  and  immaculate  principles  whom  Coxe  biogra- 
phises  would  no  doubt  have  abstained  from  voting.  [ 
But  that  person,  as  we  have  seen  and  shall  see  amply,  \ 
was  not  Marlborough. 

The  effect  of  Fenwick's  futile,  though  not  exactly 
false,  charges  and  of  their  rejection  could  not  but  be 
favourable  to  Marlborough.  But  it  was  long  before  he 
reaped  the  full  reward  of  his  astuteness.  The  saying 
which  is  recorded  of  William  about  the  time  of  the 
Assassination  plot,  *  If  I  had  been  a  private  gentleman 
my  lord  Marlborough  and  I  must  have  measured  swords,' 
refers  only,  no  doubt,  to  that  rather  fantastic  assump- 


56  MARLBOROUGH 

tion  of  his  wife's  private  grudges  and  quarrels  which 
William  found  compatible  with  very  cavalier  treatment 
of  her,  and  very  questionable  fidelity  to  her.  But  it 
was  not  till  two  years  later  that  any  signal  mark  of 
favour  was  bestowed  on  Marlborough,  and  even  then 
the  employments  given  to  the  man,  who,  had  he  been 
present,  would  most  probably  have  turned  Steinkirk  and 
Landen  into  victories,  were  civil.  But  they  were  very 
honourable  and  important.  He  was  made  governor  of 
the  Duke  of  Gloucester,  Anne's  son,  and  in  all  pro- 
bability the  future  King  of  England ;  he  was  resworn 
of  the  Privy  Council,  and  when  William  left  the  king- 
dom he  was  a  member  of  the  Board  of  Regency. 
Macaulay  pooh-poohs  the  explanation  of  this  to  be  found 
in  the  fact  that  the  Dutch  camarilla  influence  prepon- 
derant with  William  was  now  not  Bentinck's  but 
Keppel's.  Impartial  judges  will  hardly  doubt  that  this 
explanation  is  partly  true. 

At  any  rate,  and  however  obtained,  this  favour  was 
not  again  forfeited.  Marlborough  did  not  absolutely 
break  with  St.  Germains,  but  his  communications  with 
it  became  infrequent  and  unimportant.  He  who  had 
been  the  soul  of  the  movement -against  the  foreign 
soldiery  voted  for  the  retention  of  William's  Dutch 
Guards.  The  death  of  his  pupil  in  1700  did  not  affect 
his  position,  and  the  marriage  of  his  second  daughter 
Anne  to  Lord  Spencer,  Sunderland's  eldest  son,  opened 
a  connection  for  Marlborough  with  the  Whigs,  to  whom 
William,  after  some  attempts  to  be  impartial  and  some 
to  govern  by  aid  of  the  moderate  Tories,  inclined.  But 
he  aroused  the  watchful  jealousy  of  the  king  slightly 
by  a  parliamentary  interference  with  Prince  George  of 


UNDER  WILLIAM  OF  ORANGE  57 

Denmark's  money  affairs,  and  though  he  used  his  in- 
fluence against  the  Tory  attack  on  Burnet  in  1700,  he 
voted  for  the  Resumption  Bill,  which  offended  William 
almost  more  than  the  dismissal  of  the  Guards.  He, 
however,  proposed  to  lessen  the  operation  of  the  Bill  in 
the  Lords,  and  did  not  vote  in  the  final  division.  Here 
his  conduct  occasioned  a  coldness  on  William's  part,  but 
it  did  not  last.  The  last  Parliament  of  the  reign  was 
Tory,  and  the  Ministry  was  almost  wholly  so,  so  that 
Marlborough  had  less  difficulty  in  maintaining  his 
position,  and  on  William's  beginning  his  last  campaign 
he  was  at  last  promoted  to  something  like  the  place 
he  deserved.  He  was  charged  both  with  diplomatic  and 
military  duties,  and  was  especially  instrumental  in  con- 
ciliating to  the  Grand  Alliance  the  minor  but  still 
important  powers  of  Sweden  and  Prussia  in  the  ferment 
which  followed  the  recognition  of  the  Prince  of  Wales 
by  Louis.  Godolphin  quitted  office,  and  Marlborough, 
whose  long  familiarity  with  him  had  now  passed  into 
something  like  the  complete  partnership  which  the  next 
reign  saw,  appears  to  have  been  much  chagrined  at  this. 
But  he  himself  lost  apparently  nothing  of  so  much 
confidence  as  he  had  succeeded  in  re-establishing  in 
William's  mind,  and  when  the  king  died  one  of  his 
last  recommendations  is  said  to  have  been  in  Marl- 
borough's  favour. 

Thus,  then,  we  see  Marlborough  taking  a  chief,  if  not 
the  chief,  part  in  the  expulsion  of  James ;  voluntarily 
opening  communications  with  James  when  in  the  re- 
ceipt of  great  honours  and  profits  from  William ;  en- 
gaging apparently  in  an  elaborate  and  perhaps  a  double- 
edged  plot ;  disgraced  by  William  ;  continuing  his  offers 


5  8  MA  RLBO  ROUGH 

of  shameful  service  to  James,  and  in  one  instance  doing 
actual  service  of  a  kind  which  has  stamped  him  with 
indelible  infamy ;  working  with  extreme  ability  on  the 
feelings  of  Anne,  and  guiding  those  feelings  more  and 
more  towards  peaceful  intercourse  with  William  as  Anne 
herself  became  more  and  more  certain  of  succession ; 
received  back  again  into  favour ;  and  at  last,  even  under 
William's  own  reign,  within  reach  of,  if  not  actually  en- 
joying, the  position  due  to  his  wonderful  and  manifold 
talents.  The  mere  recital  suffices  to  display  those 
talents,  but  a  few  words  more,  even  after  what  has  been 
said  at  the  opening  of  the  chapter,  may  be  needed  to 
discuss  the  moral  aspect  of  Marlborough's  action.  He 
won  or  saved  game  after  game,  but  did  he  play  fair  ? 

With  respect  to  one  part  of  his  conduct,  the  business 
of  Camaret  Bay,  it  can  only  be  answered  that  he 
played  so  foul  that  the  foulness  is  very  nearly  incredible. 
He  never  (unless  the  unproved  story  about  the  reasons 
of  his  slowness  in  relieving  Webb  at  Wynendael  be 
accepted)  repeated  the  offence,  but  once  was  enough, 
and  too  much.  For  it  was  not  as  if  James  had  com- 
manded in  person  at  Brest,  as  he  did  after  a  fashion  at 
La  Hogue.  It  was  not  as  if  Marlborough  were  carrying 
out  his  own  offer  to  James  some  years  earlier,  and 
endeavouring  to  bring  an  English  army  over  to  its 
rightful  king.  On  the  contrary,  an  English  fleet  and 
an  English  army  were  attacking  a  French  town  defended 
by  Frenchmen.  The  repulse  of  Berkeley  and  Talmash 
could  do  hardly  the  most  indirect  good  to  James ;  it 
must  cost  the  lives  of  many  brave  Englishmen.  As  it 
seems  to  me,  this  is  the  one  act  at  once  certain  and  un- 
pardonable which  is  alleged  against  Marlborough.  He 


UNDER  WILLIAM  OF  ORANGE  59 

may  have  deserted  James  out  of  conscientious  scruples;  it  \ 
is  not  only  possible,  but  highly  probable,  that  he  himself 
regarded  his  playing  fast  and  loose  with  his  allegiance  to 
the  two  kings  as  an  inevitable  result  of  the  anomalous 
state  of  things  introduced  by  the  Revolution — a  state 
of  things  of  which  one  sample  may  be  given  in  the 
notorious  fact  that  Parliament  distinctly  declined  to 
pronounce  William  the  only  rightful  and  lawful  king  of 
England.  In  all  transactions  with  the  Chevalier  sub- 
sequent to  William's  death,  except  when  those  trans- 
actions risked  the  lives  of  his  soldiers  and  countrymen, 
Marlborough  had  a  plausible  and  even  a  good  defence. 
He  would  have  said  that  it  was  his  business  to  reconcile 
Anne  to  her  brother,  and  that  he  had  no  design  either 
against  his  mistress  or  his  country,  but  merely  wished 
to  pacify  the  conscience  of  one  and  allay  the  distractions 
of  the  other.  It  might  have  been  false  but  it  might 
have  been  true.  At  any  rate,  this  was  the  view  actually 
taken  by  countless  men  of  honour  and  good  Englishmen, 
who,  if  Marlborough  had  been  as  he  once  had  been, 
a  Tory  leader,  in  the  last  few  years  of  Queen  Anne, 
would  pretty  certainly  have  placed  James  III.  on  the 
throne.  When  the  extraordinary  distraction  of  motives 
and  interests  which  then  prevailed  is  fairly  understood, 
Marlborough's  general  conduct  will  hardly  appear  the 
prodigy  of  villany  which  men  like  Macaulay  strive  to 
make  it  out  to  be.  That  it  was  the  conduct  of  a  man 
of  strict  and  punctilious  honour  it  would,  of  course,  be 
simply  absurd  to  assert.  But  strict  and  punctilious 
honour  was  very  rare,  or  rather  was  of  a  very  peculiar 
cast,  in  those  days.  How  did  the  vast  majority  of  the 
English  clergy  reconcile  themselves  to  the  oaths  ?  How 


60  MARLBOROUGH 

did  Nottingham,  a  man  of  unquestioned  probity  and 
of  the  strictest  Tory  principles,  reconcile  himself  not 
merely  to  submit  to  William  but  to  serve  him  ?  Now- 
adays a  man  who  quits  one  set  of  political  opinions  and 
takes  up  another  is  looked  upon  a  little  askance,  though 
only  crackbrained  fanatics  on  either  side  would  say  that 
the  holding  of  either  set  was  a  matter  of  conscience,  or 
the  holding  of  the  other  a  thing  wrong  in  itself.  In 
those  days  men  seem  to  have  easily  reconciled  them- 
selves to  holding  opinions  which  the  other  side,  and 
they  themselves  before  they  held  them,  had  considered 
morally  and  religiously  pernicious.  All  depends  upon 
the  standard. 

But  no  standard  of  any  time  will  justify  the  affair  of 
the  Brest  treachery.  As  a  soldier  and  as  an  Englishman 
no  less  than  as  a  man  of  honour  Marlborough  should 
have  recoiled  in  horror  from  such  an  act.  He  did  not 
recoil  from  it,  and  the  consequence  is  that  if  every  other 
act  of  his  life  had  been  blameless  he  would  still  bear  the 
indelible  brand  of  this  treacherous  baseness.1 

1  It  will  be  observed  that  no  attempt  is  made,  in  the  words  of  an 
in  part  very  singular  phrase  of  the  late  Dr.  Burton's,  to  '  test  the  evi- 
dence for  the  charge  against  the  young  officer  of  having  revealed  to 
the  Jacobites  the  expedition  against  Brest.'  The  '  young  officer,'  it 
may  be  observed,  was  forty-four,  and  had  been  a  young  officer  very 
nearly  thirty  years.  To  enter,  in  a  book  like  the  present,  on  an 
elaborate  examination  of  the  historical  value  of  what  Macaulay  calls 
'the  archives  of  the  House  of  Stuart,' or  of  the  question  whether 
Marlborough  betrayed  a  secret  or  officiously  volunteered  information 
which  was  generally  known,  would  be  out  of  place.  It  will  be 
sufficient  for  the  plain  man  that  so  thoroughgoing  a  defender  as 
Coxe  does  not  attempt  to  deny  the  fact  of  the  communication,  but 
merely  tries  to  palliate  the  act  and  minimise  its  importance. 


CHAPTER  V. 

FIRST  PERIOD   OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF — BLENHEIM. 

THE  history  of  Marlborough's  campaigns  as  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  English  forces,  during  the  greatest  series 
of  military  operations  (save  one)  in  which  England 
has  ever  been  engaged,1  is,  of  course,  the  most  brilliant 

1  Many  questions  in  regard  to  Marlborough's  life  have  been  more 
debated,  but  few  are  less  settled  than  the  question  of  the  exact 
numbers  of  English  troops  properly  so  called,  as  distinguished  from 
foreign  troops  in  English  pay,  with  which  he  won  his  victories.  The 
data  on  the  subject  are  neither  numerous  nor  clear,  and  they  are 
further  complicated  by  the  invariable  and  exasperating  habit  of 
counting  by  battalions  and  squadrons — units  variable  even  at  the 
beginning  of  a  campaign,  and  almost  incalculable  towards  the 
middle  and  end  of  it.  The  convention  executed  before  William's  death 
fixed  forty  thousand  men  as  the  English  contingent,  and  after  the 
first  campaign  Parliament  voted  ten  thousand  more ;  but  the  majority 
of  these  were  subsidised  only.  The  most  assured  facts  are  as  follows  : 
At  Blenheim  Marlborough  had  fourteen  battalions  and  fourteen 
squadrons  of  English  troops,  and  as  at  the  beginning  of  a  campaign  it 
was  usual  to  make  the  battalion  up  to  five  hundred  and  the  squadron 
up  to  one  hundred  and  twenty  men,  this  would  give  seven  thousand 
foot  and  nearly  seventeen  hundred  horse.  It  seems  from  various  testi- 
monies not  decisive,  but  fairly  sufficient,  that  the  cadres  were  pretty 
full  at  Blenheim,  and  this  would  give  about  nine  thousand  men  as 
the  contingent  of  British  blood  which  fought  there.  The  loss  here 
and  elsewhere  must  have  been  great,  for,  as  we  shall  see,  Marl- 
borough  at  the  end  of  the  campaign  estimated  his  fourteen  English 


62  MARLBOROUGH 

and  certainly  not  the  least  interesting  chapter  of  his  life. 
It  exhibits  his  greatest  qualities  in  circumstances  which, 
for  a  time  at  least,  were  almost  uniformly  favourable  to 
their  display ;  for  the  jealousies  and  stupidities  on  his 
own  side  with  which  Marlborough  had  to  contend 
brought  out  his  moral  and  intellectual  capacities  no  less 
than  the  dispositions  of  the  enemy.  Even  in  this  period 
his  defects  are  also  manifest,  though,  with  one  or  two 
exceptions,  nothing  is  laid  to  his  charge  that  can  even 
approach  in  enormity  the  desertion  of  his  early  patron 
or  the  treachery  of  Camaret  Bay.  In  the  account  that 
follows,  the  purpose  of  this  series,  no  less  than  the 
dimensions  allowed  to  its  volumes,  excludes  minute 
description  of  military  operations  or  dilation  on  the 
general  political  history  of  Europe.  The  former  may  be 
found  at  length — at  a  length,  perhaps,  greater  than  is 
either  agreeable  or  profitable  to  civilian  readers — in 
numerous  books  ;  knowledge  of  the  latter  may  be  pre- 
supposed, except  where  some  special  statement  of  fact 
is  necessary  to  illustrate  the  real  object  of  these  pages — 
the  character  and  genius  of  Marlborough. 

In  no  historical  instance,  perhaps,  have  circumstances 

battalions  as  not  more  than  enough  to  make  seven  full  ones.  On 
the  other  hand,  at  the  extreme  end  of  the  war,  when  Ormond,  in 
obedience  to  orders,  separated  from  the  allies,  but  when  almost  all 
the  foreign  auxiliaries  stayed  behind,  he  is  said  to  have  taken  with 
him  twelve  thousand  British  troops.  As  these  numbers,  which  seem 
to  be  tolerably  precise  and  trustworthy,  date  from  the  beginning  and 
the  end  of  the  war  respectively,  and  as  the  English  troops  present 
at  Blenheim  are  not  likely  to  have  represented  the  whole  force  made 
up  from  England  in  the  spring  of  that  year,  we  may  take  it  that,  as 
a  rule,  there  were  between  ten  and  twelve  thousand  Englishmen  born 
in  Marlborough's  armies,  besides,  no  doubt,  a  considerable  propor- 
tion of  staff  officers  and  officers  serving  with  the  auxiliaries. 


PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEP     63 

combined  to  give  a  man  of  great  genius,  long  cramped 
by  want  of  opportunity,  so  perfect  an  occasion  as  was 
offered  to  Marlborough  by  the  accession  of  Anne.  His 
wife's  dominion  over  the  queen's  spirit  was,  of  course, 
the  most  important  single  factor  in  the  problem  of  his 
success,  but  it  was  by  no  means  the  only  important  one. 
Had  Anne  had  for  husband  any  other  man  than  George 
of  Denmark,  Marlborough  would  probably  have  been 
hampered  with  the  annoyance,  if  not  the  actual  inter- 
ference, of  a  nominal  superior  in  the  field.  But  Est  il 
possible  ?  was  contented,  if  not  entirely  contented,  with 
the  title  of  generalissimo  and  residence  at  home,  leaving 
that  of  captain-general,  with  complete  control  abroad,  to 
Marlborough.  No  English  soldier  (for  Ginkel's  experience 
and  merit  were  not  likely  to  make  any  Englishman  for- 
get that  he  was  Dutch,  or  Euvigny's  that  he  was  French) 
approached  Marlborough  in  military  reputation.  But  it 
was  even  more  important  that  he  had,  after  a  long  period 
of  distrust,  been  completely  restored  to  William's  confi- 
dence before  his  death,  had  been  intimately  engaged  in 
the  literary  and  diplomatic  preparations  of  the  king's 
last  days,  and,  so  to  speak,  held  all  the  threads  already 
in  his  hand.  Add  to  this  the  facts  that  the  unwisdom 
or  the  chivalry  of  Louis  had,  by  his  recognition  of  the 
Prince  of  Wales,  complicated  the  quarrel  of  the  Spanish 
Succession  with  what  was,  or  seemed,  an  irreconcilable 
provocation  of  England,  and  that  consequently  a  war  on 
the  greatest  scale  was  inevitable,  that  the  French  finances 
were  approaching  disorder,  their  best  generals  and  ad- 
ministrators dead  or  not  come  to  maturity,  their  people 
wearied  of  forty  years  of  war  and  taxation,  and  their 
nobility  disgusted  by  the  Pharisaism  of  the  Court ;  add 


64  MARLBOROUGH 

all  these  things,  and  some  glimpse  of  the  chances  which 
Marlborough  had  in  his  favour  must  be  obtained. 
Against  him  he  had  the  almost  unbroken  prestige  of  the 
French  arms;  their  troops,  more  homogeneous,  better 
equipped,  better  officered,  and  under  more  complete  and 
absolute  control  of  the  directing  spirit  than  any  army  of 
Europe ;  the  jealousies  and  intrigues  of  the  allies  ;  the 
unquiet  state  of  English  parties ;  the  inevitable  draw- 
backs  of  parliamentary  government.  The  following 
chapters  will  show  how  he  dealt  with  these  elements  of 
success  and  failure,  and  how  they  dealt  with  him. 

War  was  declared  against  France  and  Spain  by  Eng- 
land on  May  4,  1702,  and  Marlborough,  who  since  the 
queen's  accession  had  visited  Holland  to  arrange  pre- 
.  liminaries,  departed  for  the  Hague  on  the  15th  of  the 
same  month.1  Thanks  to  Heinsius,  he  soon  obtained 
the  all-important  commandership-in-chief  of  the  Dutch 

1  A  passage  from  his  first  letter  to  Sarah  has  often  been  quoted, 
but  is  too  characteristic  and  too  certainly  sincere  to  be  omitted. 
Marlborough,  be  it  remembered,  was  fifty-two  years  old,  and  was 
nearly  entitled  to  celebrate  his  silver  wedding  with  the  f.prmncrgT^ 
who  made  herself  so  attractive  : — '  It  is  impossible  to  express  with 
•what  a  heavy  heart  I  parted  with  you  when  I  was  by  the  water's 
side.  I  could  have  given  my  life  to  come  back,  though  I  knew  my 
own  weakness  so  much  that  I  durst  not,  for  I  knew  I  should  have 
exposed  myself  to  the  company.  I  did  for  a  great  while,  with  a 
perspective  glass,  look  upon  the  cliffs,  in  hopes  I  might  have  had 
one  sight  of  you.  We  are  now  out  of  sight  of  Margate,  and  I  have 
neither  soul  nor  spirits,  but  I  do  at  this  moment  suffer  so  much  that 
nothing  but  being  with  you  can  recompense  it.  If  you  will  be 
sensible  of  what  I  now  feel,  you  will  endeavour  ever  to  be  easy  to 
me,  and  then  I  shall  be  most  happy :  for  it  is  you  only  that  can  give 
me  true  content.  I  pray  God  to  make  you  and  yours  happy :  and  if 
I  could  contribute  anything  to  it  with  the  utmost  hazard  of  my  life, 
I  should  be  glad  to  do  it.' 


FIRST  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF    65 

forces,  but  not  without  raising  several  jealousies,  among 
others  that  of  Prince  George.  The  war  was  begun  with 
vigour  in  Flanders,  but  except  the  capture  of  Venloo, 
which  was  mainly  brought  about  by  the  gallant  storm 
of  an  outlying  fort  under  Cutts,  the  operations  of  the 
campaigns  of  1702  were  chiefly  confined  to  the  end- 
less marching  and  counter-marching  characteristic  of 
the  old  school  of  warfare,  and  for  which  Flanders  had 
been,  partly  by  nature  and  partly  by  art,  turned  into  an 
elaborate  parade-ground.  This  comparative  futility, 
indeed,  was  not  Marlborough's  fault.  The  slackness,  not 
to  say  disobedience  of  the  Dutch  generals  and  of  the 
deputies  who,  according  to  a  fatal  Dutch  habit,  accom- 
panied him  to  represent  the  States,  prevented  a  general 
engagement,  under  favourable  circumstances,  at  Helch- 
teren  on  August  23,  and  gave  the  enemy  an  opportunity, 
which  they  promptly  took,  of  retiring  from  a  very 
dangerous  situation.  But  the  capture  of  Venloo  was 
followed  by  that  of  Liege  and  other  places,  and  the 
balance  of  the  campaign  was  distinctly  in  favour  of  the 
allies.  It  was  nearly  redressed  by  an  accident  which 
happened  after  both  armies  had  gone  into  winter 
quarters.  Marlborough  left  Maestricht  on  November  3, 
and  proceeded  by  boat  down  the  Meuse.  The  greater  part 
of  his  escort  lost  their  way,  and  his  boat  was  surprised 
by  a  scouting-party  of  the  garrison  of  Guelder.  He  had 
no  pass,  but  by  a  very  singular  chance  a  servant  with 
him  had  an  old  pass,  granted  to  his  brother  General 
Churchill,  and  the  captors,  unaware  of  the  value  of  their 
prize,  and  pacified  with  some  money,  detained  only  the 
soldiers  on  board  the  boat,  and  let  Marlborough  and  his 


66  MARLBOROUGH 

companions,  the  deputies,  go.1  He  w.as  cordially  received 
at  the  Hague,  and  the  achievements  of  the  campaign, 
which  contrasted  favourably  with  the  results  of  Ormond 
and  Rooke's  contemporary  expedition  to  the  Spanish 
coast,  gave  some  colour  to  his  promotion  in  the  peerage 
as  Marquess  of  Blandford  and  Duke  of  Marlborough, 
which  took  place  on  December  14.  He  also  received 
a  large  pension,  but  details  of  this  and  of  other  civil 
and  political  events  of  his  career  are  reserved  for  a 
future  chapter. 

The  winter  of  1 702-3  was  made  memorable  to  Marl- 
borough  by  the  death  of  his  only  surviving  son,  a  blow 
equally  severe  to  his  ambition  and  to  his  strong  family 
affections.  It  was,  no  doubt,  fortunate  that  the  cam- 
paign of  the  next  year  opened  early  and  called  for  all 
his  energies.  The  Marquess  of  Blandford,  who  after 
passing  through  Eton  had  gone  to  finish  his  education 
at  Cambridge,  died  there,  on  February  20,  of  small- pox, 
and  in  little  more  than  a  fortnight  Marlborough  was 
facing  a  formidable  combination  in  the  Netherlands. 

The  chief  French  effort  was  indeed  intended  to  be 
made  in  a  quarter  other  than  that  where  Marlborough 
commanded,  by  a  combined  movement  from  Italy  and 
through  the  Black  Forest  upon  Austria  proper,  but 
there  was  no  intention  of  quiescence  in  the  Netherlands, 
or  even  of  confining  the  French  operations  to  the  de- 
fensive. Villeroy,  who  commanded,  had  instructions  to 
recover  the  fortified  places  on  the  Meuse  which  Marl- 
borough  had  taken  the  year  before,  and  to  threaten  the 

1  Marlborongh  observes  characteristically,  in  a  letter  to  Sarah, 
'  He  [the  servant,  whose  name,  it  seems,  was  Qell]  has  cost  me  CO/. 
»  year  ever  since.' 


F/J?ST  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF    67 

Dutch  at  home.  Marlborough,  who  easily  perceived  this 
design,  perceived  also  the  means  of  frustrating  it.  Had 
he  been  allowed,  he  would,  after  putting  the  Rhine-Mouse 
frontier  in  a  state  of  defence,  have  riposted  by  a 
counter  attack  in  French  Flanders,  which  would  have 
effectually  stopped  Villeroy ;  but  the  Dutch,  as  usual, 
were  alarmed  at  anything  like  a  bold  policy,  and  obliged 
him  to  confine  himself  to  the  reduction  of  Bonn,  which 
they  thought  threatening,  and  to  the  defence  of  the 
Meuse.  He  carried  Bonn  on  May  15,  and  then  resumed 
his  purpose  of  operating  aggressively  in  the  west,  re- 
ducing Antwerp  and  Ostend,  and  so  penetrating  into 
France.  This  was  the  first  large  design  that  Marl- 
borough  had  had  opportunity  to  form,  and  it  was  to  be 
carried  out  not  merely  by  operations  in  Flanders  but  by 
a  descent  from  England  on  Dieppe ;  but  the  insubordi- 
nation and  self-seeking  of  the  Dutch  commanders  once 
more  foiled  him.  Cohorn,  whose  great  abilities  as  an 
engineer  were  accompanied  by  no  small  defects  both  as 
a  general  and  a  man,  first  went  wool-gathering  into 
West  Flanders,  nominally  to  make  a  diversion,  but,  as 
Marlborough  hints,  really  for  the  sake  of  plunder ;  then, 
being  detailed  with  other  Dutch  generals  to  attack 
Antwerp,  he  kept  touch  and  time  so  badly  that  one  of 
these  generals,  Opdam,  was  surprised  by  a  greatly 
superior  French  force  and  his  division  dispersed.  Marl- 
borough's  remark,  made  in  a  letter  on  first  hearing  the 
rumour  of  this  disaster,  is  characteristic  of  his  restrained 
but  often  striking  style :  '  Since  I  sealed  this  letter  we 
have  a  report  from  Breda  that  Opdam  is  beaten.  I 
pray  God  it  be  not  so :  for  he  is  very  capable  of  having 
it  happen  to  him.' 


68  MARLBOROUGH 

Finally,  these  egregious  commanders  fell  to  a  violent 
quarrel  among  themselves,  and  when  at  last  Marl- 
borough,  after  immense  efforts,  had  succeeded  in  bring- 
ing matters  nearly  to  a  crisis,  a  council  of  war  refused 
to  fight.  He  succeeded,  indeed,  in  taking  Huy,  Limburg 
and  Guelder,  and  thus  strengthening  the  Dutch  frontier 
against  attack;  but  every  bolder  counsel  during  the 
summer  and  autumn  was  systematically  opposed  by  the 
deputies.  He  had,  however,  the  satisfaction  of  being 
largely  instrumental,  by  his  private  diplomacy  (which 
was  always  a  most  important  feature  in  his  conduct  of 
affairs)  in  detaching  the  Duke  of  Savoy  from  the  French 
alliance,  and  so  ruining  the  grand  combination  against 
Austria  above  referred  to.  He  returned  to  England  on 
November  10,  and  is  said  to  have  been  so  much  dis- 
gusted, not  only  with  the  Dutch  (for  the  English 
Ministers  most  imprudently  gave  the  States  some  real 
excuse  for  complaint  by  withdrawing  a  portion  of  the 
English  forces),  that  he  seriously  thought  of  throwing 
up  the  command.  When  it  is  remembered  that  in  two 
whole  campaigns,  with  splendid  opportunities  apparent, 
he  had  been  able  to  do  nothing  but  reduce  a  few  petty 
fortresses,  owing  to  the  obstinacy  and  folly  of  the  Dutch, 
there  is  some  reason  for  believing  him  sincere. 

The  moment  of  his  triumph  was,  however,  approach- 
ing, being,  as  usually  happens  in  such  cases,  a  moment 
of  such  danger  that  the  folly  on  his  own  side  was  for  a 
moment  overawed.  The  defection  of  the  Duke  of  Savoy 
had  spoilt  the  French  combination  for  the  year,  but 
towards  the  close  of  the  campaign  great  compensating 
advantages  had  been  obtained  by  France.  The  Hun- 
garian insurrection  on  one  side,  and  the  growing  power 


FIRST  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF    69 

and  successes  of  the  Elector  of  Bavaria  on  the  other, 
put  the  Emperor  in  the  greatest  jeopardy,  and  after 
detaching  the  forces  necessary  to  hold  the  French  army 
in  check  on  the  Italian  side  it  appeared  impossible  that 
the  Imperialists  should  make  head  against  the  invasion 
threatened  for  the  beginning  of  1704.  In  the  very 
earliest  days  of  that  year  Marlborough  not  only  con- 
ceived, after  correspondence  with  Prince  Eugene  of 
Savoy,1  the  ablest  general  of  the  Empire,  but  (which  was 
more  difficult)  carried  into  execution,  despite  the  factious- 
ness of  the  English  Ministry  and  Parliament  and  the 
timidity  and  jealousy  of  the  Dutch,  a  counter-scheme. 
The  plan  was  simple  enough,  and  it  was  executed  by 
degrees  which  made  it  look  even  simpler.  Restricting 
the  operations  in  the  Netherlands  proper  to  the  defensive, 
and  leaving  them  to  be  carried  on  by  the  Dutch  troops 
only,  Marlborough  proposed  himself,  with  the  English 
troops  and  some  of  the  subsidised  allies,  to  operate  on 
the  Moselle.  He  obtained  supplies  and  reinforcements 
from  the  English  Parliament,  subsidies  and  payment  of 
arrears  from  the  States  in  a  visit  to  the  Hague  which 
he  made  in  January,  and  during  the  first  three  months 
of  the  year  he  laboured  incessantly  to  carry  out  the 
design,  which  was  really  for  a  series  of  operations  far 
bolder  than  a  mere  excursion  into  the  Palatinate.  He 
left  England  a  second  time  on  April  19,  completed  his 

1  The  reader  may  be  reminded  that  the  mother  of  this  great 
general,  who  on  his  father's  side  inherited  the  blood  of  the  reigning 
houses  of  France  and  Savoy,  was  Olympe  Mancini,  one  of  Mazarin's 
nieces.  She  was  deeply  compromised  in  the  '  affair  of  the  poisons ' 
(1679),  for  which  La  Voisin  was  executed,  and  had  to  fly  from  France. 
Resentment  at  this  disgrace,  much  more  than  the  legendary  refusal 
of  a  commission  by  Louis,  determined  Eugene's  hatred  of  the  French. 
4 


7o  MARLBOROUGH 

arrangements  with  all  the  speed  he  could,  and  exactly 
a  month  later  broke  up  his  camp,  which  had  been  formed 
near  the  Meuse,  and  began  the  campaign  to  be  known 
as  that  of  Blenheim.  It  was  in  vain  that  Auverquerque,1 
who  had  been  left  to  command  the  Dutch,  tried  almost 
immediately  to  lure  him  back  by  rumours  of  movements 
on  Villeroy's  part,  and  that  the  Margrave  of  Baden, 
who  was  commanding  the  Imperialists  at  Stollhoffen, 
asked  for  support  there.  Marlborough  knew  that 
Villeroy  would  follow  his  own  false  trail  to  the  Moselle, 
and  held  on  his  way.  Then  he  moved  to  Coblentz, 
thence  to  Mayence.  and  after  a  short  delay  made  for  the 
Upper  Danube.  The  enemy  had  all  this  time  no  idea  of 
his  actual  design,  and  were  so  much  puzzled  by  it  that, 
but  for  the  mismanagement  of  the  Margrave  of  Baden, 
the  Elector  of  Bavaria  and  Marsin  (the  French  general 
who  was  acting  with  him  in  his  own  dominions)  might 
probably  have  been  beaten  before  Tallard  (the  com- 
mander of  the  proposed  French  invasion  of  the  Empire) 
could  have  joined  them.  Marlborough,  however,  never 
received  much  real  assistance  during  his  campaigns 
from  any  foreign  general  except  Eugene,  and  he  had  to 
do  all  the  work  of  this  campaign  himself.  His  combina- 
tions for  the  union  of  a  formidable  army  under  his  own 
command  from  the  different  allied  states  of  Germany 
were  carried  out  with  perfect  accuracy.  Even  after 
Louis  of  Baden's  blunder  he  had  in  the  last  days  of  June 
got  together  a  most  formidable  force  to  attack  the  Elector. 
The  point  of  importance  which  the  enemy  had  already 

?  Often  also  spelt  'Overkirk.'  The  Margrave  of  Baden,  just 
below,  is  indifferently  called  by  historians  Margrave,  Prince,  or 
Prince  Louis  of  Baden. 


FIRST  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF    71 

perceived  and  guarded  was  the  town  of  Donauwerth, 
situated  where  a  spur  of  hills  touches  the  Danube, 
commanding  the  main  road  across  the  river,  and  form- 
ing in  an  unusually  real  sense  the  key  of  Bavaria  from 
the  north.  The  Elector  and  Marsin  occupied,  with  the 
main  body  of  their  forces,  a  position  about  half-way 
between  Donauwerth  and  Ulm  at  the  other  extremity 
of  the  spur  of  hills  above  mentioned ;  but  they  had 
posted  at  Donauwerth  itself,  on  a  strong  eminence  called 
the  Schellenberg,  a  force  of  nearly  thirteen  thousand 
men  of  all  arms  under  Count  D'Arco.  Their  position 
being  entrenched  and  defended  by  morasses,  and  the 
intervening  ground  hilly  and  difficult,  Bavaria  seemed 
to  be  sufficiently  guarded  till  succour  could  arrive  from 
Tallard  and  Villeroy.  Everything  depended  on  rapidity, 
and  Marlborough  took  advantage  of  the  very  question- 
able but  then  common  system  of  alternate  days  of  com- 
mand to  '  rush  '  Donauwerth.  The  scheme  necessitated 
a  forced  march  of  two  days,  and  an  attack  on  the  strong 
position  of  the  Schellenberg  after  a  hard  morning's 
marching.  It  may  be  doubted  whether  any  general 
but  Marlborough  would  at  that  time  have  attempted 
such  a  feat,  and  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  '  irregu- 
larity '  of  it  greatly  assisted  his  plans.  In  mere  numbers 
he  had  the  advantage,  but  the  assailants  of  the  Schellen- 
berg had  to  storm  entrenched  works  under  a  heavy  fire 
at  the  close  of  a  day's  work,  and  as  the  assault  was  not 
begun  till  six  o'clock  a  steady  resistance  had  every 
chance  of  maintaining  the  place  till  night,  and  so  giving 
the  Elector  time  to  come  up.  The  defence  was,  in  fact, 
obstinate,  and  the  loss  of  the  allies  very  heavy,  amount- 
ing to  1,500  killed  and  4,000  wounded ;  but  the  Schellen- 


72  MARLBOROUGH 

berg  was  carried  by  the  obstinate  bravery  of  the  English 
and  Dutch  troops,  and  the  whole  occupying  force, 
except  3,000  men,  slain,  wounded,  taken  or  dispersed. 
The  town  of  Donauwerth  was  shortly  afterwards  aban- 
doned, and  the  Elector  withdrew  to  Augsburg.  The  first 
line  of  the  Bavarian  defence  was,  in  fact,  completely 
broken.  But  this  success  was  not  achieved  without  great 
jealousy  on  the  part  of  Marlborough's  colleague,  the 
Margrave  of  Baden,  who  had  had  the  easier  part  of  the 
work,  and  it  is  remarkable  that  with  him  only  of  all  his 
colleagues  does  Marlborough  seem  to  have  somewhat  lost 
his  temper.  The  German  morgue  of  the  Prince  of 
Baden,  who,  no  doubt,  despised  a  mere  English  subject, 
had  probably  something  to  do  with  this,  and  something 
also  to  do  with  the  steadiness  with  which  Marlborough 
shortly  afterwards  refused  the  rank  of  Prince  of  the 
Empire  until  Leopold  accompanied  it  with  a  solid  if  not 
very  extensive  fief,  such  as  would  put  him  finally  beyond 
danger  of  similar  awkwardnesses. 

All  this  time  Eugene,  a  very  different  colleague  and 
partner  from  the  Margrave,  was  holding  Tallard  and 
Villeroy  in  check  in  the  famous  lines  of  Stollhoffen, 
opposite  Fort  Louis,  on  the  German  side  of  the  Rhine  — 
a  position  which  for  more  than  a  century  was  the  chief 
point  of  observation  of  German  armies  against  France. 
French  critics  have  exclaimed  against  the  inaction 
which  allowed  this  position  to  be  maintained  against  a 
far  superior  force ;  for  Tallard  and  Villeroy  had  G0,000 
men  to  the  prince's  15,000.  But  it  seems  to  be  for- 
gotten that  this  is  a  singularly  lame  excuse  in  the  first 
place,  and  (in  the  second)  that  it  is  by  no  means  certain 
that  offensive  action  would  not  have  been  a  mere  antici- 


F/RST  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF    73 

pation  of  the  disaster  of  Blenheim.  For  the  lines  of 
Stollhoffen,  a  complicated  system  of  entrenchments, 
dykes,  sluices,  hill-forts  and  the  like,  were,  in  the  hands 
of  such  a  general  as  Eugene,  practically  impregnable, 
though  three  years  later  Villars,  the  best  captain  of 
France,  succeeded  in  breaking  them  when  under  the 
incapable  guardianship  of  the  Margrave  of  Baden. 

However  this  may  be,  Eugene  maintained  his  posi- 
tion, and  the  news  of  the  Schellenberg  fight,  and  of  the 
subsequent  passage  of  the  Loch  by  the  allies,  made  it 
necessary  for  the  French  to  change  their,  plan.  Tallard 
set  out  to  relieve  or  reinforce  the  Elector,  Villeroy  re- 
mained to  prosecute  the  campaign  on  the  Rhine.  No 
time  was  to  be  lost,  and  in  hopes  of  detaching  the 
Elector,  who  since  the  Schellenberg  had  been  constantly 
driven  back,  negotiations  were  opened  by  Marlborough. 
They  were  listened  to  for  a  moment,  but  faithful  to  the 
long  alliance  of  Bavaria  with  France,  and  encouraged 
by  the  news  of  Tallard's  advance,  the  Elector  finally 
rejected  them.  Then  a  step  was  taken  which  has 
sometimes  been  urged  as  a  crime  against  Marlborough. 
The  part  of  Bavaria  occupied  by  the  allies  was  given  up 
to  plunder  and  devastation.  Marlborough,  whose  worst 
enemies  allow  him  to  have  been  perfectly  free  from 
cruelty,  deplores  this  in  his  letters  to  his  wife,  and  there 
is  no  reason  to  suspect  him  of  hypocrisy.  But  it  was 
the  well-understood  custom  of  the  time,  and,  as  designed 
to  force  the  Elector  to  accommodation,  stands  in  a  com* 
pletely  different  category  from  the  repeated  devastations 
of  the  Palatinate  by  the  French — devastations  under- 
taken either  in  revenge,  in  pure  wantonness,  or  for  the 
purpose  of  depriving  the  enemy  of  a  place  of  sojourn. 


74  MARLBOROUGH 

While  this  was  going  on,  the  two  armies  of  Tallard 
and  Eugene  were  on  their  way  to  the  scene  of  action. 
Tallard  had  nearly  thirty-five  thousand  men,  Eugene, 
relieved  at  Stollhoffen  and  slightly  reinforced  from  the 
interior  of  Germany,  not  above  half  the  number,  while 
there  was  the  further  difficulty  that  the  important  for- 
tress of  Ingolstadt  still  held  out.  This  made  the  posi- 
tion of  the  allies  in  Bavaria,  now  that  the  Elector  was 
likely  once  more  to  have  an  army  capable  of  meeting 
them  in  the  field,  far  from  safe.  Whether,  as  has 
sometimes  been  held,  the  advantage  of  getting  rid  of 
the  Margrave  of  Baden  overcame  all  other  considera- 
tions in  the  minds  of  Marlborough  and  Eugene,  who 
met  to  consult,  though  Eugene's  troops  had  not  yet 
crossed  the  Danube ;  or  whether  the  garrison  of  Ingol- 
stadt and  the  town  itself  were  judged  worthy  of  such  a 
sacrifice,  need  not  be  determined.  It  is  sufficient  to  say 
that  the  Margrave,  with  about  fifteen  thousand  men,  was 
left  to  besiege  Ingolstadt,  and  that  Marlborough  with 
the  rest  hurried  to  join  Eugene's  troops  who  had  re- 
mained beyond  the  Danube.  The  French  and  Bavarians 
were  at  Hochstadt,  near  to  the  Elector's  old  position  at 
Dillingen  and  Lauingen,  where  they  purposed  to  join 
Tallard.  Both  junctions  were  effected,  Tallard  meeting 
the  Elector  and  Marsin  at  Dillingen  and  advancing 
beyond  Hochstadt  to  the  position  of  Blenheim,  while 
Maryborough's  troops  crossed  at  Merxheim  and  Donau- 
werth,  advanced  up  the  stream  to  the  Kessel  rivulet, 
and  then  joining  Eugene's  troops,  which  had  fallen  back 
from  Hochstadt,  took  up  a  position  along  the  Nebel 
facing  the  French.  Their  rear  rested  partly  on  the 
outskirts  of  the  spur  of  wooded  hills  above  referred  to 


FIRST  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF    75 

as  impinging  on  the  Danube  between  Dillingen  and 
Donauwerth.  On  looking  at  the  plans  of  the  ground  it 
is  impossible  not  to  see  that  the  allied  position,  though 
a  capital  one  to  conquer  in,  was  a  very  bad  one  in 
which  to  be  beaten.  The  Danube,  deep,  broad,  and 
with  marshy  banks,  on  the  left,  the  woody  hills  on  the 
right,  the  narrow  pass  of  Dapflieim  on  the  rear,  might 
have  frightened  generals  who  thought  of  securing  their 
retreat,  and  it  seems  certainly  to  have  been  Tallard's 
idea  that  Marlborough,  having  safely  joined  Eugene's 
small  force,  intended  to  march  off  to  the  right  by 
Neresheim  to  Nordlingen.  This  expectation,  recorded 
by  Tallard  himself,  throws  much  light  on  what  followed. 
As  for  the  forces  engaged,  the  usual  discrepancies  exist, 
and  are  aggravated  by  the  fashion  (then  universal)  of 
reckoning,  not  by  numbers  or  states,  but  by  battalions 
and  squadrons,  which,  of  course,  could  not  be  main- 
tained at  a  uniform  strength.  The  most  trustworthy 
estimates  put  the  allied  forces  at  about  fifty-two  thousand 
men,  the  French  and  Bavarians  at  about  fifty-six  thou- 
sand, the  former  being  somewhat  stronger  in  cavalry, 
the  latter  in  artillery.  The  material  on  both  sides  was 
good,  but  the  French  had  the  advantage  in  this  respect, 
their  army  including  at  least  forty  thousand  veteran 
French  soldiers  whose  regiments  had  scarcely  known 
defeat  for  half  a  century. 

The  mistake  of  the  French  generals  is  said  to  have 
been  confirmed  by  dint  of  the  common  ruse  of  allowing 
prisoners,  carefully  instructed  in  the  same  information, 
to  fall  into  their  hands,  and  the  forward  movement  of 
the  allied  troops  on  the  morning  of  August  13  was 
assisted  by  misty  weather.  The  movement,  however, 


76  MARLBOROUGH 

soon  became  unmistakable,  and,  though  the  complete 
misapprehension  of  the  enemy's  intentions  could  not 
but  produce  an  unfavourable  effect,  Tallard  and  his 
colleagues  were  ready  with  their  order  of  battle.  It 
proved  an  unfortunate  one,  but  the  critic  who  has  read 
much  military  history  cannot  help  perceiving  that  it 
might  easily  have  proved  successful.  The  right  and  left 
of  the  position,  the  former  consisting  of  the  village  of 
Blenheim,  or  Blindheim,  and  resting  on  the  Danube, 
the  latter  of  the  village  of 'Lutzingen,  and  resting  on  the 
wooded  uplands,  were  very  strongly  occupied.  The 
centre  was  weaker,  and  it  was,  in  fact,  this  weakness 
that  lost  the  day.  But  the  Nebel  river  or  rivulet  was 
surrounded  with  such  marshy  ground  that  Tallard 
apparently  thought  it  impassable  or  difficult  to  pass, 
and  he  probably  imagined  that  no  general  would  dare 
to  expose  himself  to  an  attack  on  both  sides,  from 
Blenheim  and  from  Lutzingen,  if  he  did  pass  it.  He 
found  his  mistake,  but  it  is  not  certain  that  he  would 
have  found  it  against  any  generals  save  those  who 
combined  daring  and  circumspection  in  such  an  extra- 
ordinary degree  as  Marlborough  and  Eugene.  It  ought 
also  to  be  reckoned  to  Tallard's  credit  that  he  summoned, 
though  without  success,  reinforcements  from  Marsin 
and  the  left  as  soon  as  he  saw  the  enemy's  dispositions. 
Those  dispositions,  for  a  force  inferior  in  number 
and  attacking  a  strong  position,  were  singularly  bold. 
Marlborough  made  no  attempt  to  execute  the  usual 
manoeuvre  of  an  assailant  and  to  decline,  or  amuse,  one 
part  of  the  defence  while  he  threw  his  whole  strength 
on  the  other.  Eugene  was  to  attack,  and,  if  possible, 
outflank  the  Elector  and  Marsin  ;  four  brigades  of  in- 


FIRST  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF    77 

fantry  and  one  of  cavalry,  chiefly  English,  under  Cutts, 
were  to  attack  the  village  of  Blenheim,  which  was  en- 
trenched, palisaded,  defended  by  a  strong  artillery,  and 
occupied  by  at  least  thirteen  thousand  men,  the  very  flower 
of  the  French  army.  In  the  midst,  under  the  immediate 
command  of  General  Churchill  and  of  Marlborough 
himself,  the  main  body  of  the  allies,  including  fully 
seventy  squadrons  of  cavalry,  who,  to  the  surprise  of  the 
tacticians  of  the  time,  were  ranged  between  the  first  and 
second  infantry  lines,  were  to  cross  the  Nebel  and  break 
the  French  centre.  The  attack  could  not  begin  seriously 
till  Eugene  was  in  position,  and  as  he  had  a  detour  to 
make  and  difficult  ground  to  get  through,  this  did  not 
occur  till  midday,  the  interval  being  spent  in  the  usual 
cannonading.  As  soon  as  Eugene  was  in  his  place, 
Blenheim  and  the  lino  of  the  Nebel  were  attacked 
simultaneously. 

The  battle  was  none  of  those  which  are  won  at 
once,  and  the  first  attack  on  Blenheim  seemed  to  justify 
Tallard's  dispositions.  Notwithstanding  the  utmost 
gallantry  on  the  part  of  Cutts  and  his  troops,  it  was 
repulsed  with  heavy  loss,  though  with  no  disorder  on 
the  English  side,  and  had  for  the  moment  to  be  sus- 
pended. Nor  was  the  centre  attack  at  first  much  more 
promising.  The  enemy  promptly  brought  their  guns  to 
bear  on  the  troops  as  they  crossed  the  swampy  ground, 
and  though  the  crossing  was  successfully  effected,  two 
assaults  of  the  French,  the  first  made  by  Zurlauben's 
cavalry,  the  second  by  the  famous  Irish  brigade,  were 
very  destructive,  and  the  latter  was  nearly  successful, 
requiring  Marlborough's  own  presence  and  vigorous 
action  to  rally  the  troops.  Meanwhile,  Eugene  on  his 


78  MARLDOROUGH 

side  had  quite  as  Lard  work,  and  one  charge  of  the 
French  cavalry  in  particular  nearly  prevented  the  cross- 
ing of  the  Nebel,  while  shortly  afterwards  the  whole 
of  Eugene's  horse  were  on  the  point  of  being  routed. 
But  the  prince  rallied  his  .troops  and  made  good  his 
ground.  Maryborough  too,  after  about  four  hours'  fight- 
ing, had  completely  established  himself  on  the  French 
bank  of  the  Nebel,  and  at  five  o'clock  moved  upon 
Tallard's  weak  centre.  If  Tallard  could  have  brought 
up  the  strong  and  now  almost  idle  garrison  of  Blenheim 
it  might  have  gone  hard  with  the  allies,  and  there  is 
some  dispute  on  the  point  why  this  was  not  done.  His 
enemies  accused  him  of  having  lost  his  head :  others 
say  that  the  orders  were  actually  given  but  intercepted 
or  not  obeyed.  At  any  rate  the  moment  passed,  and 
Maryborough,  with  the  great  body  of  cavalry  above 
mentioned,  charged  and  completely  broke  the  French 
centre.  It  never  rallied,  many  of  its  component  troops 
were  pushed  into  the  Danube,  others  cut  down,  others 
hopelessly  dispersed,  many,  with  Tallard  himself,  taken. 
Marsin  and  the  Elector  waged  a  somewhat  more  equal 
fight  with  Eugene,  and  it  is  said  that  a  mistake  helped 
them  in  their  withdrawal.  But  the  French  left,  thus 
escaping,  was  the  only  part  of  the  army  that  remained 
together.  The  right,  in  Blenheim,  though  it  must  have 
been  impossible  for  them  except  by  a  miracle  to  recover 
the  day,  might  possibly  have  also  escaped.  For  Marl- 
borough's  troops  were  weary  and  in  part  dispersed  after 
the  fugitives  ;  Eugene  had  enough  to  do  with  watching 
the  retreat  of  Marsin  and  the  Elector ;  and  as  at  the 
end  of  the  day  the  Blenheim  garrison  consisted  of  nearly 
eleven  thousand  choice  troops  of  all  arms,  it  may  certainly 


FIRST  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF    79 

seem  that  they  might  have  cut  their  way  through.  But 
they  had  no  commander,  Clereinbault,  their  general, 
having  in  some  incomprehensible  fashion  got  himself 
drowned.  Marlborough  rapidly  got  artillery  into  posi- 
tion, and  at  last  the  whole  force  surrendered  at  discre- 
tion, an  event  which  surprised  the  French  at  the  time 
and  has  vexed  their  historians  since  beyond  all  the  rest  of 
the  disaster.  It  was,  as  a  disaster,  sufficiently  complete. 
Of  an  army  estimated,  as  above,  at  56,000  men  the 
Elector  and  Marsin  had  not  more  than  16,000  remaining 
with  the  colours.  The  victors,  as  the  attacking  party, 
lost  very  heavily  also,  their  killed  and  wounded  being 
put  as  high  as  12,000.  But  some  of  the  captured 
regiments,  which  were  composed  of  Germans,  came 
over  bodily,  and  a  large  number  of  other  prisoners  also 
enlisted. 

Such  is  a  brief  account  of  the  battle  which,  after 
nearly  fifty  years,  destroyed  the  prestige  of  the  French 
army,  and  to  a  great  extent  its  personnel,  and  which 
after  nearly  three  centuries  gave  the  English  name 
the  lustre  of  a  great  continental  victory.  It  has  been 
said  that  military  critics,  always  prone  to  follow  the 
result,  have  perhaps  blamed  Tallard  too  much,  but  it  is 
hardly  possible  to  give  Marlborough  too  much  credit. 
A  little  less  audacity  in  the  attack  of  Blenheim  would 
probably  have  set  free  its  garrison  to  act  in  the  centre ; 
a  little  more  obstinacy  in  continuing  the  attack  would 
have  lost  the  time  and  means  necessary  to  break  through 
Tallard's  forces.  It  is  in  this  flexibility  of  plan  and 
adaptation  of  expedients  to  circumstances  that  general- 
ship above  all  consists.  But  nothing  can  be  more  certain 
than  that,  with  a  less  staunch  and  dashing  comrade 


So  MARLBOROUGH 

than  Eugene,  victory  would  have  been,  if  not  impossible, 
hardly  possible  for  Marlborough.  Eugene  was  twice 
pressed  almost  as  hard  by  the  French  left  as  Tallard  was 
by  Marlborough,  and  if  he  had  either  given  way  or 
called  on  the  English  for  succour,  a  drawn  battle  would 
probably  have  been  the  most  favourable  consequence. 
But  throughout  their  joint  campaigns  Eugene  and 
Marlborough  present  the  most  striking  example  to  be 
found  in  the  lives  of  great  generals  of  good  comrade- 
ship. They  seem  always  to  have  played  the  game 
with  the  spirit  and  the  confidence  of  two  good  partners 
at  whist,  each  of  whom  is  conscious  that  to  dis- 
regard his  partner's  play,  or  to  hesitate  at  sacrifices 
on  his  own  part,  is  as  foolish  as  it  is  unsportsmanlike. 
The  system  of  double  or  treble  commands  so  frequent 
in  the  seventeenth  and  early  eighteenth  centuries  is  un- 
doubtedly a  very  dangerous  one,  but  if  it  could  be 
always  carried  out  after  the  Marlborough  and  Eugene 
fashion  it  would  more  than  justify  itself.  For  the 
partners,  with  equal  loyalty  to  each  other,  possess 
necessarily  more  authority,  more  scope  for  independent 
action,  and  less  need  of  troublesome  reference  for  orders 
than  mere  generals  of  division,  while  in  case  of  mishap 
there  is  always  someone  to  fall  back  on.  The  reverse 
of  the  picture  was  shown  in  the  French  case,  for  it  is 
abundantly  clear  that  the  Elector  and  Marsin  were 
stronger  than  was  necessary  to  hold  Eugene  in  check, 
and  that  if  Marsin  had  complied  with  his  colleague's 
r<  <  juest  to  strengthen  the  centre,  or  even  if,  at  the  time  of 
the  great  irouee  at  five  o'clock,  his  right  had  been  more 
careful  of  supporting  Tallard  than  of  getting  itself  out 
of  harm's  way,  the  English-Imperialist  victory  would 


FIRST  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF    81 

have  been,  to  say  the  least,  much  less  complete.  The 
skill  which  Marlborough  showed  in  this  joint  generalship 
— an  ordeal  from  which  hardly  any  general  of  great 
merit  but  himself  and  Eugene  has  come  out  unscathed — 
makes  the  length  of  this  digression  on  a  particular  point 
excusable. 

The  results  of  the  battle  of  Blenheim  were  great. 
Bavaria,  except  a  few  strong  places,  was  unresistingly 
at  the  allies'  disposal;  the  war  was  transferred  from 
the  German  to  the  French  side  of  the  Rhine,  and  only 
the  stout  defence  of  Landau  prevented  Marlborough's 
cherished  plan  of  an  invasion  of  France  from  being  car- 
ried out  in  the  campaign  of  1704.  The  latter  half  of 
August  was  occupied  by  the  overrunning  of  the  open 
country  of  Bavaria,  and  by  the  arrangements  necessary 
for  reducing  Ulm,  the  most  important  place  left  to  the 
enemy,  for  the  obtaining  of  which  on  amicable  terms 
Marlborough  had  opened  negotiations  with  the  Electress. 
In  the  early  days  of  September  all  the  troops  that  could 
be  spared  both  from  Bavaria  and  from  the  lines  of 
Stollhoffen  rendezvoused  at  Philipsburg,  so  as  to  attack 
Landau,  a  place  always  of  the  highest  importance,  both 
as  guarding  the  approach  of  France  from  Germany  and 
as  exposing  Germany  to  invasion  from  France.  It 
seemed  not  impossible  that-Villeroy,  to  whom  the  com- 
mand had  now  been  committed,  might  fight  to  defend 
the  fortress,  and  Marlborough  gives  us  an  idea  of  the 
severe  work  his  army  had  undergone  by  saying  that  if 
he  comes  to  action  he  means  to  reduce  the  English, 
Danish,  and  Hessian  battalions  to  half  their  present 
number.  But  the  French  had  no  stomach  for  more 
work  in  the  field,  and  Villeroy  quickly  withdrew  from 


82  MARLBOROUGH 

between  the  allies  and  Landau,  a  proceeding  which,  in 
Marlborough's  own  words,  would  never  have  been 
adopted  'if  they  had  not  been  the  most  frightened 
people  in  the  world.'  The  garrison  of  Landau,  how- 
ever, showed  more  spirit,  and  the  Margrave  of  Baden, 
who  was  immediately  charged  with  the  siege  operations 
while  Eugene  and  Marlborough  covered  him,  could 
make  no  impression  on  it  till  the  end  of  November. 
Marlborough's  wishes  for  an  active  prosecution  of  the 
campaign  on  the  line  of  the  Moselle  were  also  thwarted 
by  the  timidity  of  the  allies ;  but  he  succeeded  in  gaining 
an  important  success  despite  these  drawbacks.  Leaving 
Eugene  to  cover  the  siege,  he  set  out  with  about  twelve 
thousand  men,  marched  through  the  hills  of  Wasgau  and 
the  Hochwald,  then  almost  a  desert,  to  Treres,  seized  it 
before  the  French  could  intercept  him  or  strengthen 
its  weak  garrison,  and  thus  provided  winter  quarters, 
which  he  very  much  wanted,  and  which  were  secured 
by  the  siege  and  capture  of  Traerbach.  Although  of 
no  great  note  in  ordinary  histories,  this  was  one  of  the 
boldest  of  Marlborough's  adventures,  and  he  uses 
language  both  of  apprehension  before  and  satisfaction 
after  its  completion  which  is  much  stronger  than  that 
applied  by  him  to  far  more  showy  undertakings.  A 
natural  fear  of  losing  the  laurels  of  Blenheim  counts, 
no  doubt,  for  something  in  this,  but  it  is  equally  clear 
that  he  depended  on  those  laurels  as  likely  to  frighten 
the  French  from  taking  advantage  of  his  audacity ;  and 
he  was  right. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

SECOND   PERIOD   OF  GENERALSHIP — RAMILLIES  AND 
OUDENARDE. 

AT  the  opening  of  the  campaign  of  1705,  Marlborough's 
fame  was  established  as  one  of  the  first  generals,  if  not 
the  first  general,  of  Europe.  His  operations  in  1702 
and  1703,  and  his  march  from  Holland  to  Bavaria  in 
1704,  had  not  contributed  to  this  less  than  the  victory 
of  Blenheim  in  the  general  estimation ;  for  in  the  one 
case  he  had  shown  himself  a  complete  master  of  the 
accepted  military  ideas  of  the  time,  and  in  the  other 
astonishingly  superior  to  them.  It  was  long  the  fashion 
to  speak  contemptuously  of  the  marching  and  counter- 
marching and  then  going  into  winter  quarters,  to  which 
Frederick  the  Great  in  some  measure  and  Napoleon 
finally  put  an  end.  This  contempt  ignores  the  simple 
fact  of  a  century  of  steady  road-making.  As  long  as, 
with  very  few  exceptions  (chiefly  consisting  of  old 
Roman  roads),  the  communications  of  Europe  were 
merely  tracks  across  ground  in  its  natural  condition — 
as  long  as  vast  tracts  of  country  were  uncultivated, 
undrained,  and  alternating  between  heath  and  morass, 
according  to  the  time  of  year  and  the  state  of  the  rain- 
gauge,  a  few  days  of  rain  or  snow  or  frost  made  it  a 
physical  impossibility  to  move  armies  which  had  become 


84  MARLBOROUGH 

nearly  as  much  encumbered  with  artillery  and  impedi- 
menta as  our  modern  armies,  but  which  were  totally 
destitute  of  our  means  of  communication.  As  always, 
this  impossibility  served  to  some  extent  as  a  reason  for 
exaggerating  it,  and  Marlborough's  transfer  of  opera- 
tions from  the  Netherlands  to  the  Upper  Danube  was 
the  first  brilliant  and  brilliantly  successful  effort  con- 
temnere  vana  that  Europe  had  seen.  The  effect  of  it 
was  heightened  by  the  proofs  he  had  given  of  his  com- 
plete ability  to  handle  troops  in  the  more  steady-going 
and  old-fashioned  manner.  It  is  true  that  he  had  not 
met  (and  never  did  meet  in  one  case)  the  best  generals 
of  the  French  army,  Catinat  and  Villars ;  it  was  true 
that  he  had  won  only  one  great  battle;  but  he  had 
given  his  proofs  sufficiently  and  finally  to  a  generation 
which  included  a  greater  proportional  number  of  fairly 
skilled  military  critics  than  perhaps  any  generation 
before  or  since. 

He  was  not  destined  to  a  similar  career  of  triumph 
in  1705,  or  indeed  in  any  subsequent  year,  though 
during  the  whole  of  his  tenure  of  command  his  faculties 
as  a  general  rather  increased  than  diminished.  But, 
the  master-blow  which  deprived  the  French  of  their 
military  supremacy  and  freed  the  House  of  Austria 
from  imminent  danger  once  delivered,  the  hampering 
influences  which  beset  the  Grand  Alliance  had  free  play. 
Of  these  influences  tlxe  English  part  will  be  dealt  with 
separately  and  continuously  ;  the  foreign  part  may  best 
be  handled  here.  It  may  be  observed  that  it  furnishes 
a  necessary  and,  in  my  opinion,  a  complete  justification 
for  the  peace  which,  violently  opposed  and  cried  down 
by  Marlborough's  own  party,  put  an  end  to  the  war 


SECOND  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF  85 

that  had  made  his  renown  nearly  ten  years  later.  I 
shall  endeavour  to  avoid  use  of  strong  language  in  this 
and  any  other  place  where  I  have  to  discuss  this  part  of 
the  subject.  All  French  and  some  English  authors 
have  pleased  themselves  with  denouncing  the  selfishness 
of  the  House  of  Austria  ;  most  English  and  some  French 
authors  the  selfishness  of  the  Dutch  ;  not  a  few  writers 
of  all  nations  the  factiousness  and  inconsistency  of  the 
English.  Let  us  clear  our  minds  of  cant.  In  the  first 
place,  and  as  it  more  specially  concerns  us,  the  selfish- 
ness of  the  Imperial  Court  does  not  seem  to  me  one  jot 
more  noteworthy  than  that  of  its  allies.  The  stupidest 
Aulic  councillor  knew  perfectly  well  that  England  was, 
to  say  the  least,  not  fighting  for  the  beaux  yeux  of  the 
Empire,  that  the  Dutch  were  very  anxious  to  snap  up 
whatever  trifles  might  be  sufficiently  unconsidered  by 
Austria  or  by  Spain,  that  the  various  miscellaneous  and 
stipendiary  allies,  from  Prussia  downwards,  were  chiefly 
anxious  to  aggrandise  themselves  at  the  expense  of  the 
Holy  Roman  realm.  The  Dutch,  the  English,  and  the 
allies  were  conscious  of  corresponding  truths,  and  the 
fact  explains  at  once  the  head  which  France  was  able 
to  make,  and  the  limited,  delayed,  and  chequered  success 
of  Marlborough.  He  was  never  beaten,  being  in  that 
respect  unique  among  great  generals ;  but  it  was  cer- 
tainly not  the  fault  of  his  good  allies;  and  on  one 
memorable  occasion  scandal  has  not  hesitated  to  hint — 
though,  as  far  as  I  can  see,  without  any  justification — 
that  it  was  not  altogether  his  own. 

He  left  England  on  March  31  and  had  an  exceed- 
ingly bad  passage  to  Holland.  His  purpose  was  to 
utilise  the  operations  of  the  last  autumn  on  the  Moselle, 


86  MARLBOROUGH 

and  especially  the  possession  of  Treves  and  Traerbach 
as  places  of  arms  for  the  invasion  of  France  on  that 
side.  The  editor  of  Coxe  makes  a  singularly  feeble 
criticism  on  the  supposed  feebleness  of  this  plan  and  on 
the  waste  of  time  involved  in  the  siege  of  Saarlouis  and 
the  waiting  for  concentration  of  force.  Why  did  not 
Maryborough  act  like  Napoleon  ?  The  answer  is  partly 
given  in  the  remarks  already  made  on  the  entire  change 
introduced  by  good  and  numerous  roads,  and  partly 
by  the  very  obvious  reminder  that  Napoleon  was  sole 
master  of  his  armies.  Marlborough  had  to  propitiate 
a  score  of  jarring  interests  before  he  could  get  leave  for 
his  troops  to  march,  and  to  keep  them  propitiated  in 
order  that  he  might  feed  those  troops.  It  was  a  month 
before  he  could  reconcile  the  Dutch  to  operations  on 
the  Moselle  at  all ;  it  was  long  before  the  Austrian 
authorities  could  be  persuaded  not  to  confine  themselves 
to  the  suppression  of  the  Hungarian  insurrection  and 
to  act  with  vigour  on  the  Italian  and  German-French 
frontiers.  Moreover,  as  Eugene  was  to  return  to  Italy, 
Marlborough  had  the  pleasure  of  knowing  that  the 
Margrave  of  Baden,  the  Imperialist  commander  deputed 
to  work  with  him,  would  do  all  he  could  to  interfere  with 
his  projects. 

Louis  of  Baden  succeeded.  He  at  first  refused  to 
act  with  Marlborough  at  all,  then  alleged  his  Schel- 
lenberg  wound  as  a  pretext  for  delay,  and  at  last, 
visited  and  pressed  by  Marlborough  himself,  promised 
to  rendezvous  at  Troves.  This  promise  was  made  with, 
as  it  would  appear,  no  intention  whatever  of  keeping 
the  fides  germanica.  The  consequence  was  that  Marl- 
borough,  who  had  hoped  to  have  on  the  Moselle  an 


SECOND  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF  87 

army  of  90,000  men,  found  himself  obliged  to  open 
the  campaign  with  a  third  of  the  number,  and  never 
received  the  Margrave's  troops  at  all.  He  had,  moreover, 
opposed  to  him,  in  the  heavily-wooded  and  hilly  delta  of 
the  Moselle  and  the  Saar,  Villars,  the  ablest  general  of 
France,  with  a  force  superior  to  his ;  and  Villars  made 
such  good  use  of  the  fortified  camp  of  Sirk — a  position 
known  in  warfare  since  as  that  of  Rethel — that  Marl- 
borough,  disappointed  of  his  reinforcements  and  of  his 
transport,  could  make  no  impression  on  him.  Villars's  own 
account,  given  in  his  agreeable  Memoirs,  undoubtedly 
shows  the  gasconading  which  (in  singular  contrast  to 
Marlborough's  sober  fashion  of  recounting  his  own  ex- 
ploits) was  as  much  a  part  of  the  marshal's  character  as 
his  valour  and  his  military  genius.  He  blandly  doubles 
Marlborough's  troops  and  imports  the  Margrave  of 
Baden  on  to  the  scene.  However,  like  an  honest  boaster, 
he  supplies  the  means  of  correcting  his  own  boasts,  and 
admits  that  Marlborough  sent  him  a  message  to  say 
that  it  was  not  his  fault,  and  that  the  Prince  of  Baden 
had  broken  tryst.  Still,  it  is  unlikely  that  any  other 
French  general  would  have  made  this  head  against 
Marlborough,  and  Villars,  as  later  at  Malplaquet,  and 
still  later  at  Denain,  is  justly  entitled  to  the  credit  of 
having  stemmed  a  tide  of  victory. 

After  all,  it  was  not  Villars  who  was  the  chief  cause 
of  the  invasion  being  abandoned.  The  failure  of  the 
German  auxiliaries  had  enabled  the  French  to  strengthen 
their  Netherlands  army,  and  Villeroy,  who  was  by  no 
means  so  incapable  a  general  as  it  pleased  the  French 
to  represent  him  when  he  had  lost  Ramillies,  moved 
forward  on  the  Meuse  with  a  large  force,  took  Huy, 


88  MARLBOROUGH 

captured  the  town  of  Liege,  invested  the  citadel,  and 
held  Auverquerque  completely  in  check.  If  Villars 
had  been  as  completely  master  of  the  situation  as  he 
(no  doubt,  sincerely)  would  have  had  himself  thought, 
he  should  have  been  able  to  hold  Marlborough  while 
Villeroy  finished  Auverquerque.  But  no  general  in 
Europe  could  do  that.  Badly  off  as  he  was  for  trans- 
port, Marlborough  broke  up  his  camp  suddenly  and 
silently,  countermanded  his  reinforcements,  left  his 
heavy  stores  at  Treves,  frightened  Villeroy  from  Liege 
by  the  rumour  of  his  approach,  joined  Auverquerque 
on  July  3,  and  at  once  assumed  the  offensive.  As  if 
nothing  could  go  right  except  when  he  was  present, 
the  German  general  whom  he  had  left  to  protect  Treves 
and  Saarbruck  abandoned  both  with  large  magazines, 
and  some  of  the  chief  fruits  of  Blenheim  were  thus 
completely  lost. 

Marlborough,  however,  made  himself  amends  in 
Flanders  by  one  of  those  comparatively  bloodless  suc- 
cesses which,  even  more  than  his  four  great  battles, 
showed  his  mastery  of  war.  He  easily  retook  Huy, 
and  not  satisfied  with  this,  determined  to  attack  the 
great  lines  of  Brabant,  which  ran  in  a  series  of 
entrenchments,  ditches,  redoubts,  and  fortified  towns 
from  Namur  on  the  Meuse  to  Antwerp  on  the  Scheldt, 
and  which  made  the  invasion  of  France  in  that  quarter 
impossible,  while  they  furnished  at  once  a  cover  for 
Brussels  and  the  great  towns  of  Flanders,  and  a  camp 
from  which  the  French  could  sally  as  they  pleased. 
All  Marlborough's  operations  had  hitherto  been  carried 
on  to  the  outside  of  these  lines;  thenceforward  they 
were  all  carried  on  within  them. 


SECOND  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF  89 

The  attempt  was  the  bolder  in  that  Villeroy  held 
the  lines  with  70,000  men,  a  force  actually  larger  than 
Marlborough  could  bring  to  bear.  But  though  no 
general  was  ever  less  rash,  none  was  ever  more  perfectly 
bold.  The  point  which  was  selected  for  attack  was 
between  Tirlemont  and  Landen,  or  (taking  the  direction 
of  the  lines)  between  Leuwe  and  Hedelsheim.  This 
point,  the  march  to  which  led  over  the  very  field 
where  William  III.  and  Luxemburg  had  a  dozen  years 
earlier  fought  the  bloody  battle  of  Neerwinden,  was 
protected  by  a  small  but  difficult  stream,  the  Little 
Gheet.  The  attempt  was  made,  despite  the  objection  of 
some  of  the  Dutch  officers,  on  July  17,  and  was  com- 
pletely successful,  the  lines  being  forced,  the  French 
defeated,  and  a  large  number  of  prisoners  taken,  with 
very  small  loss  on  the  side  of  the  allies.  Marlborough 
himself  was  in  no  inconsiderable  danger,  being  for  a 
time  separated  from  his  troops.  Even  here,  however,  the 
inveterate  overcaution  or  jealousy,  or  both,  of  the  Dutch 
marred  his  success.  The  slowness  with  which  they 
brought  up  their  army  interfered  with  the  due  reaping 
of  the  fruits  of  victory :  a  few  days  later  their  hesitation 
balked  an  attempt  to  cross  the  river  Dyle ;  and  finally, 
on  August  18,  on  the  very  field  of  Waterloo,  prevented 
a  general  engagement  which  had  every  chance  of  proving 
a  brilliant  victory.  Marlborough  was  so  much  dis- 
tressed by  this  last  proceeding  that  he  again  threatened 
to  throw  up  the  command,  though  he  was  persuaded 
not  to  do  so ;  but  nothing  more  of  importance  happened 
in  the  military  way,  and  after  a  certain  amount  of 
marching  and  encamping  the  campaign  of  1705  closed. 
But  though  he  was  prevented  from  attacking  and,  as 


9O  MARLBOROUGH 

cannot  be  doubted,  from  obtaining  a  complete  victory, 
the  greater  part  of  the  lines  which  had  so  long  covered 
Brabant  was  demolished. 

The  early  winter  months  were  spent  by  Marlborough 
in  a  tour  to  the  German  capitals,  wherein  his  diplomatic 
abilities,  which  are  certainly  not  inferior  to  his  military 
powers,  were  exercised  with  success.  He  did  not  visit 
England  till  the  new  year,  when  the  treacherous 
amalgamation  of  Whigs  and  Tories,  which  for  a  short 
time  promoted  his  interests  but  was  finally  fatal  to  them, 
was  brought  about.  This,  however,  with  other  matters 
of  the  same  kind,  deserves  a  chapter  to  itself.  The 
diplomatic  tour  had  solid  results  of  a  kind  neither 
military  nor  diplomatic,  for  it  was  during  its  course  that 
the  barren  honour  of  an  unendowed  principality,  which 
Marlborough  had  been  offered  and  had  refused,  was 
exchanged  for  the  solid  gift  of  the  seigniory,  now 
made  a  principality,  of  Mindelheim.  This  he  accepted. 
Mindelheim  was  a  very  pretty  little  tiny  kickshaw  of  a 
principality ;  it  is  situated  on  the  western  frontier  of 
Bavaria,  somewhat  to  the  south  of  Ulm  and  Augsburg, 
and  about  equidistant  from  both,  its  chief  town  being 
at  present  a  station  on  the  railway  from  Munich  to 
Schaffhausen.  It  extended  (according  to  the  map  in 
Coxe's  atlas)  l  in  a  mulberry  shape  about  fifteen  miles  by 
twelve,  was  plentifully  diversified  with  wood  and  water, 
and  had  its  capital  (a  small  townlet  with  a  dilapidated 
castle)  exactly  in  the  middle.  Among  the  previous  holders 
the  only  ones  likely  to  have  much  interest  for  modern 
English  readers  are  the  Dukes  of  Teck  and  the  Fuggers. 

1  A  German  description  of  it  sent  to  Marlborough  gives  it  as  six 
leagues  in  length  and  from  three  to  four  in  breadth. 


SECOND  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF  91 

But  it  had  passed  into  the  possession  of  the  Bavarian 
house,  and  the  Emperor's  claim  to  dispose  of  it  was,  to 
say  the  least,  questionable,  though  a  certain  reversionary 
right  of  his  was  not  disputable.  Marlborough,  it  may 
seem,  would  have  been  wiser  to  imitate  the  shrewd  man 
of  business  who  stipulated  with  Cromwell,  much  to 
Cromwell's  disgust,  for  '  my  old  land ; '  but,  on  the  other 
hand,  he  may  have  thought  it  best  to  take  what  he 
could  get.  He  received  investiture  at  Innspruck,  the 
heavy  fees  being  mostly  remitted,  and  took  possession 
by  proxy,  Stepney,  the  English  minister  at  Vienna, 
being  his  representative.  The  necessary  ceremonies 
were  performed  on  the  spot  with  great  decency  in  the 
last  week  of  May,  in  the  presence  of  citizens  to  the 
number  of  250  and  peasants  to  the  number  of  1,500. 
John  Joseph,  Buron  von  Imhoff,  was  solemnly  sworn  as 
grand  bailiff,  with  full  powers  for  paying  bills  up  to  the 
limit  of  fifty  florins,  and  the  administration  as  a  whole 
was  estimated  to  cost  about  three  thousand  five  hundred 
florins,  or  between  four  and  five  hundred  pounds.  Marl- 
borough  was  supplicated  to  continue  a  pension  to  the  ill- 
endowed  convent  of  English  nuns,  and  his  representatives 
were  entertained  by  the  College  of  Jesuits,  which  had  '  a 
better  bottom,'  with  a  sort  of  opera  in  Latin,  celebrating 
his  Grace's  heroic  virtues.  Stepney  found  the  city  to 
consist  of  '  a  long,  clean,  well-built  street,  with  water 
running  through  it/  but  the  castle  was  decayed  and 
used  as  a  granary.  Further,  the  magistrates  '  surprised ' 
him  with  '  a  very  handsome  basin  and  ewer  worth  six 
hundred  florins,'  and  the  surprise  seems  not  to  have  been 
disagreeable.  The  principality  was  heritable  by  heirs 
general ;  the  territory,  like  other  fiefs  of  the  Empire, 


92  MARLBOROUGH 

went  to  male  issue  only  ;  but  it  produced  to  Marlborough 
for  some  years  about  two  thousand  English  pounds 
yearly,  which,  if  small  for  an  English  duke  to  take,  was 
not  small  for  a  German  emperor  to  give.  It  is  worth 
while  to  insist,  in  view  of  the  perpetual  charge  made 
against  Marlborough's  avarice,  that  this  acquisition  was 
really  a  benefit  to  the  allies  generally  and  to  England 
particularly,  as  raising  the  English  general  to  a 
theoretical  as  well  as  real  equality  with  the  German 
princes,  who  were  constantly  tempted  to  dispute  his 
rank.  Is  it  not  within  the  memory  of  living  men  that 
a  dignitary  of  the  Papal  Court  slighted  a  petition  of 
English  Roman  Catholics  because,  as  he  complained, 
there  were  *  no  signatures  of  princes  '  ? 

The  campaign  of  1706  was  begun  unusually  late  by 
Marlborough,  his  long  stay  on  the  Continent  in  the 
winter  and  his  English  political  business  detaining  him 
in  London  till  the  end  of  April,  and  when  he  finally 
landed  at  the  Hague  his  plans  were  still  coloured  by  the 
remembrance  of  the  gratuitous  and  intolerable  hindrances 
which  he  had  met  with  from  his  allies.  He  knew  (and 
everyone  who  has  studied  the  facts  must  know)  that  in 
all  human  probability  he  would,  but  for  the  Margrave  of 
Baden,  have  penetrated  the  heart  of  France  (just  as  the 
Germans  in  1870  penetrated  it)  in  the  early  summer  of 
the  preceding  year  ;  that,  but  for  the  sluggish  dulness  of 
the  Dutch  deputies  and  the  venomous  jealousy  of  the 
Dutch  generals,  he  would  have  driven  the  French  out  of 
Brabant  in  the  late  summer.  Accordingly  he  had  made 
up  his  mind  to  operate  with  Eugene  in  Italy,  which, 
if  he  had  done,  there  would  probably  have  been  seen 
what  has  not  been  seen  for  nearly  two  thousand  years — 


SECOND  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF  93 

a  successful  invasion  of  France  from  the  south-east. 
But  the  kings  of  Prussia  and  Denmark,  and  others  of 
the  allies  whom  Marlborough  thought  he  had  propitiated, 
were  as  recalcitrant  as  the  Dutch,  and  the  vigorous 
action  of  Villars  against  the  Margrave  of  Baden  made 
the  States-General  more  than  ever  reluctant  to  lose  their 
sword  and  shield.  So  Marlborough  was  condemned  to 
action  on  his  old  line  of  the  Dyle,  and  this  time  fortune 
was  less  unkind  to  him.  Secret  overtures  were  made 
which  induced  him  to  threaten  Namur,  and  as  Namur 
was  of  all  posts  in  the  Low  Countries  that  to  which  the 
French  attached  most  importance,  both  on  sentimental 
and  strategical  grounds,  Villeroy  was  ordered  to  abandon 
the  defensive  policy  which  he  had  for  nearly  two  years 
been  forced  to  maintain,  and  to  fight  at  all  hazards. 
Accordingly  the  tedious  operations  which  had  for  so 
long  been  pursued  in  this  quarter  were  exchanged  at 
once  for  a  vigorous  offensive  and  defensive,  and  the  two 
generals,  Villeroy  with  rather  more  than  sixty  thousand 
men,  Marlborough  with  that  number  or  a  little  less,  came 
to  blows  at  Ramillies  (a  few  miles  only  from  the  spot 
where  the  lines  had  been  forced  the  year  before)  on 
May  23,  1706,  or  scarcely  more  than  a  week  after  the 
campaign  had  begun.  Here,  as  before,  the  result  is 
assigned  by  the  French  to  the  fault  of  the  general. 
Villeroy,  who  had  with  him  the  unfortunate  Elector  of 
Bavaria,  should,  they  say,  have  waited  for  Marsin,  who 
was  detached  by  Villars  to  reinforce  him,  and  he 
should  not  have  taken  up  the  position  which  he 
actually  did.  But  it  does  not  seem  to  be  denied  that 
Villeroy  was  actually  stronger  than  his  assailants  ;  it  is 
forgotten  that  his  orders  to  cover  Namur  left  him 
5 


94  MARLBOROUGH 

hardly  master  of  the  time  of  fighting  a  battle ;  and  as 
for  the  position,  it  was  certainly  one  which,  in  the  hands 
of  Villars  or  of  Marlborough,  would  have  been  nearly 
impregnable.  It  consisted  of  a  semicircular  range  of 
high  ground  above  the  source  of  the  three  rivers 
Mehaigne,  Great  Gheet  and  Little  Gheet,  defended  not 
merely  by  the  slope  of  the  ground  but  by  marshes  in 
the  bottom.  It  had  the  drawbacks  common  to  almost 
all  positions  of  the  kind,  that  the  defences  constituted  of 
themselves  as  great  a  hindrance  to  advance  on  the  one 
part  as  on  the  other,  and  that,  the  chord  being  shorter 
than  the  arc,  the  assailants  could  throw  the  weight  of 
their  attack  on  a  given  part  quicker  than  the  defenders 
could  concentrate  their  defence.  For  this  reason  the  lines 
of  Brabant  had  been  thrown  outside  of  it.  But  those 
who  urge  this  fact  against  Villeroy  forget  that  those 
lines  had  been  already  lost  and  demolished,  and  that  he 
had  to  make  the  best  of  what  he  had. 

The  salient  points  of  the  position  were  the  villages  of 
Tavi6res  on  the  extreme  French  right,  of  Offuz  on  the 
middle  left,  and  of  Autreglise  or  Anderkirk  on  the  ex- 
treme left  :  in  front  of  both  of  these  last  ran  a  morass. 
The  village  of  Ramillies  was  in  the  centre,  and  behind 
it,  on  the  crest  of  the  upland,  rose  a  tumulus  called  the 
Tomb  of  Ottomond,  close  to  which,  from  the  allied  left, 
a  causeway,  named  after  Queen  Brunehault,  led  straight 
upwards.  Opposite  Autr6glise  was  the  village  of  Foulz, 
which  was  part  of  the  allied  position. 

The  battle  itself  was  one  completely  of  generalship, 
and  of  generalship  as  simple  as  it  was  masterly.  It  was 
in  defending  his  position,  not  in  taking  it  up,  that 
Villeroy  lost  the  battle.  An  elaborate  feint  against  the 


SECOND  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF  95 

French  general's  morass-covered  left  drew  reinforce- 
ments from  his  right.  Then  Marlborough  (and  this  was 
undoubtedly  the  master-stroke)  affected  to  draw  his 
troops  back  to  the  high  ground  of  Foulz  for  a  fresh 
attack,  and  in  reality  detached  great  part  of  them  behind 
the  crest  to  support  his  own  left,  which  at  once  '  rushed ' 
Tavi£res,  the  causeway  and  the  village  of  Eamillies.  At 
this  latter  point  there  was  very  hard  fighting,  and  Marl- 
borough  himself  was  in  some  danger ;  but  the  French 
centre  was  completely  cut  through,  the  right  at  Tavieres 
had  already  been  stormed  and  broken,  the  troops  which 
had  been  left  to  maintain  the  appearance  of  an  attack  on 
the  French  left  forced  their  way  through  the  morass  and 
beat  the  enemy,  who  had  been  weakened  again  by  a 
tardy  counter-movement  of  Villeroy's  when  he  found  the 
real  direction  of  Marlborough's  assault,  and  all  divisions 
of  the  French  army  being  thus  driven  in,  the  pursuit 
was  urged  home  with  such  vigour  that  the  French  and 
Bavarians  broke  wholesale,  and  the  entire  army  literally 
took  to  its  heels  and  fled  to  Louvain  and  Brussels, 
abandoning  guns,  baggage,  colours,  almost  in  a  mass. 
Thirteen  thousand  of  the  French  and  Bavarians  were 
killed,  wounded,  and  taken,  and  the  loss  of  the  allies, 
who  had  been  throughout  the  attacking  party,  was  not 
less  than  four  thousand  men.  The  entire  credit  of  the 
dispositions  belonged  to  Marlborough,  but  his  Dutch 
colleague  Auverquerque,  an  excellent  soldier  and  a  loyal 
comrade,  though  afraid  of  responsibility  and  destitute  of 
initiative,  deserves  much  of  the  credit  of  the  execution. 
Indeed  the  Dutch,  who  bore  the  burden  of  the  attack  on 
Ramillies,  had  the  credit  of  the  day's  fighting  on  the 
allied  side,  as  the  Bavarian  horse  had  on  that  of  the 


96  MARLBOROUGH 

French.  In  hardly  any  of  Marlborough's  operations 
had  he  his  hands  so  free  as  at  Ramillies,  and  in  none  did 
he  carry  off  a  completer  victory ;  not  even  Frederick  or 
Napoleon,  despite  the  far  greater  facility  of  physical 
movement  and  the  irresponsible  freedom  of  action  which 
each  had,  ever  improved  a  success  so  thoroughly.  The 
strong  places  of  Flanders  fell  before  the  allied  army  like 
ripe  fruit.  Brussels  surrendered  and  was  occupied  on 
the  fourth  day  after  the  battle,  May  28.  Louvain  and 
Malines  had  fallen  already.  The  French  garrison  pre- 
cipitately left  Ghent,  and  the  duke  entered  it  on  June  2. 
Oudenarde  came  in  next  day,  Antwerp  was  summoned, 
expelled  the  French  part  of  its  garrison,  and  capitulated 
on  September  7.  And  a  vigorous  siege  in  less  than  a 
month  reduced  Ostend,  reputed  one  of  the  strongest 
places  in  Europe.  In  six  weeks  from  the  battle  of 
Ramillies  not  a  French  soldier  remained  in  a  district 
which  the  day  before  that  battle  had  been  occupied  by  a 
network  of  the  strongest  fortresses  and  a  field  army  of 
80,000  men.  The  strong  places  on  the  Lys  and  the 
Dender,  tributaries  of  the  Scheldt,  gave  more  trouble,  and 
Menin,  a  small  but  very  important  position,  cost  nearly 
half  the  loss  of  Ramillies  before  it  could  be  taken.  But 
it  fell,  as  well  as  Dendermonde  and  Ath,  and  nothing 
but  the  recrudescence  of  Dutch  obstruction  prevented 
Marlborough  from  finishing  the  campaign  with  the 
taking  of  Mons,  almost  the  last  place  of  any  import- 
ance held  by  the  French  north  of  their  own  frontier,  as 
that  frontier  is  now  understood. 

But  the  difficulties  of  all  generals  are  said  to  begin 
on  the  morrow  of  victory,  and  certainly  the  saying  was 
true  in  Marlborough's  case,  as  no  one  knew  better  than 


SECOND  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF  97 

himself.  Esquire  South  and  Nick  Frog  (to  anticipate 
the  nomenclature  of  Arbuthnot's  immortal  satire)  were 
heartily  agreed  in  driving  out  Lewis  Baboon,  but  no 
sooner  had  Lewis  Baboon  been  driven  out  than  the  old 
quarrel  about  the  division  of  the  conquered  or  recovered 
territory  began.  The  Dutch  were,  before  all  things,  set 
on  a  strong  barrier  or  zone  of  territory,  studded  with  for- 
tresses in  their  own  keeping,  between  themselves  and 
France  :  the  Emperor  naturally  objected  to  the  aliena- 
tion of  the  Spanish- Austrian  Netherlands.  The  barrier 
disputes  were  for  years  the  greatest  difficulty  which 
Maryborough  had  to  contend  with  abroad,  and  the  main 
theme  of  the  objections  to  the  war  made"by  the  adverse 
party  at  home.  For  nothing  so  much  as  these  disputes 
brought  out  the  fact,  in  itself  a  hardly  disputable  one, 
that  the  war  was  more  and  more  being  waged  not  for 
any  English  interest  but  for  the  interests  of  Dutchmen 
and  Germans,  each  of  whom  wished  to  overreach  the 
other,  with  England's  aid  and  at  her  expense. 

It  was  in  the  main  due,  no  doubt,  to  these  jealousies 
and  hesitations,  strengthened  by  the  alarm  caused -by 
the  loss  of  the  battle  of  Almanza  in  Spain,  and  by  the 
threatened  invasion  of  Germany  under  Villars,  that  made 
the  campaign  of  1707  an  almost  wholly  inactive  one. 
Vendome,  who  had  succeeded  Yilleroy  as  the  Elector  of 
Bavaria's  colleague  in  the  Netherlands,  was  an  excellent 
general,  and  though  he  protested  his  intentions  of  fight- 
ing, it  may  be  doubted  whether  he  was  not  fully  con- 
scious of  the  ascendency  which  Marlborough  had  obtained 
over  the  morale  of  the  French,  always  disposed  to  yield 
to  a  general  who  has  twice  or  thrice  thoroughly  beaten 
them.  At  any  rate,  the  campaign  of  this  year  is 


pS  MARLBOROUGH 

almost  wholly  barren  of  any  military  operations  interest- 
ing to  anyone  but  the  mere  annalist  of  tactics.  When 
at  last,  after  nearly  two  months'  sojourn  in  the  camp  of 
Meldert,  Maryborough  moved  on  Genappe  and  Nivelle — 
a  move  which  made  it  necessary  for  the  French  to  retreat 
or  fight — they  chose  the  former  alternative,  and  they  re- 
peated it  when,  after  another  interval  of  forced  inaction, 
owing  to  heavy  August  rains,  he  again  threatened  a 
flank  movement.  Finally,  Vendome  fell  back  on  Lille, 
and  all  chance  of  active  operations  was  over  for  the  year. 
But  it  shows  Marlborough's  perfect  knowledge  of  the 
complicated  political  and  military  situations  with  which 
he  had  to  deal,  that  in  the  midst  of  the  disappointment 
and  worry  of  this  year  he  predicted  the  battle  of  Oude- 
narde  next  year.1  Looking  back  on  the  events,  it  is  of 
course  easy  enough  to  see  the  reason  of  his  confidence, 
but  it  was  not  equally  easy  for  him  to  be  confident.  On 
the  one  hand  the  Dutch,  and  to  a  less  degree  the  Germans, 
would  never  permit  decisive  action  on  his  part,  except 
under  that  immediate  pressure  of  fear  which  had  enabled 
him  to  win  both  Blenheim  and  Ramillies,  while  every- 
where else  (except  on  the  occasions  when  Eugene  was 
allowed  free  action  in  Italy)  the  dissensions  and  jealousies 
of  the  allied  commanders  prevented  the  chance  of  success. 
On  the  other  hand,  as  he  himself  remarks,  successes  in 
Spain  and  Italy  and  Germany  did  the  French  no  good 
BO  long  as  Marl  borough  was  constantly  at  hand,  on 

1  Aug.  15,  1707,  to  Qodolphin:  'As  they  will  not  venture,  they 
are  now  in  a  country  where  they  may  march  from  one  strong 
camp  to  another  and  so  end  the  campaign,  wliich  I  fear  they  will 
do.'  A  month  later,  to  the  same :  '  1  am  of  opinion  that  the 
war  will  Be  decided  in  this  country  by  a  battle  early  in  tlie  next 
campaign.' 


SECOND  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF  99 

the  most  vulnerable  part  of  their  own  frontier,  ready  to 
take  advantage  of  every  opportunity.  This  position 
must  have  secured  him  ultimate  success  but  for  the 
jealousies  of  the  allies  and  the  still  more  dangerous  in- 
trigues at  home,  which  in  this  very  year  entered  their 
most  dangerous  stage  with  the  establishment  of  Mrs. 
Masham's  influence  over  the  Queen.  But,  at  the  same 
time  that  it  made  his  prospect  of  success  in  the  end 
hopeful,  it  made  an  immediate  course  of  free  and  vic- 
torious action  (the  two  things  were  in  Marlborough's  case 
synonymous)  certain  to  be  intermixed  with  long  periods 
of  forced  inactivity. 

The  campaign  of  1708  had  not  long  begun  when  it 
was  seen  that  his  predictions  were  likely  to  be  verified. 
But  those  predictions  themselves  show  the  injustice  of 
the  attempt  usually  made  by  French  writers  to  throw 
the  blame  of  the  defeat  on  the  Duke  of  Burgundy, 
who,  representing  at  once  the  Royal  family  and  the 
Catholic-Methodism  which  was  now  powerful  at  Court, 
was  joined  with  Vendome  in  the  command.  Opera- 
tions did  not  begin  very  early,  for  it  was  an  in- 
separable disadvantage  of  Marlborough's  diplomatic 
abilities,  and  the  frequency  with  which  he  was  called 
upon  to  exert  them,  that  his  winter  diplomacy  should 
interfere  with  or  at  least  postpone  his  summer  warfare. 
In  the  present  year  he  was  unable  to  get  to  the  Hague 
before  May  9,  and  the  execution  of  his  orders  for  the  con- 
centration of  the  troops  was  delayed  by  drought  till  the 
end  of  the  month.  He  had,  and  knew  that  he  had,  his 
work  cut  out  for  him.  Not  that  he  was  afraid  of  the  Duke 
of  Burgundy.  '  I  hope,'  he  says,  in  one  of  his  curiously 
pregnant  sentences,  '  the  Duke  of  Burgundy  will  come. 


ioo  MARLBOROUGH 

Not  that  he  feared  overwhelming  numbers  on  the 
enemy's  side.  But  an  extensive  plan  of  communications 
with  the  towns  which  had  surrendered  after  Ramillies 
was  partly  known  to  be  in  course  of  prosecution  on  the 
French  side.  On  the  other  hand,  he  might  count  on 
little  interference  from  the  Dutch  deputies,  who,  as  usual 
when  the  States-General  were  alarmed,  had  instructions 
to  cease  troubling. 

Marlborough  had  originally  arranged  that  Eugene 
should  act  on  the  Moselle.  But,  long  before  it  actually 
occurred,  he  perceived  that  the  French,  working  on 
interior  lines,  would  be  able  to  reinforce  their  armies 
quicker  than  he  could.  It  thus  soon  became  clear 
that  Vendome  and  the  Duke  of  Burgundy  Avere  really 
much  stronger  than  himself,  and  intended,  if  possible, 
to  recover  the  line  of  the  Dyle.  He  sent  to  the  Prince 
of  Savoy  to  join  him  at  once.  Before  Eugene  could 
comply,  Vendome's  plan  seemed  to  be  meeting  with  some 
success.  A  rapid  counter-march  enabled  him  to  throw 
parties  out  to  Ghent  and  Bruges,  both  of  which  had 
been  previously  tampered  with,  and  both  surrendered. 
The  French  also  threatened  the  still  more  important 
post,  though  less  important  town,  of  Oudenarde.  There 
was  nothing  for  it  but  a  battle,  with  or  without  Eugene, 
and  it  was  fought  with  Eugene  but  without  Eugene's 
troops.  It  may  be  observed  that  the  insinuations  of 
Marlborough's  enemies  (which  may  be  found  cleverly 
put  in  '  Esmond,'  p.  241),  as  to  the  inaction  of  the  last 
campaign,  and  the  apparent  misfortunes  of  this  at  the 
beginning,  rest  upon  no  foundation  whatever,  and  are 
contradicted  by  every  consideration  of  reason,  and  by 
Marlborough's  own  statements,  made  long  before  Oude- 


SECOND  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF  101 

narde,  and  to  persons  whom  he  was  not  in  the  least 
likely  to  try  to  deceive.  He  seems  to  have  somewhat 
undervalued  the  extent  of  the  reinforcements  which 
Vendome  had  received  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign, 
he  was  unaware  of  the  full  extent  of  the  tampering  with 
Ghent,  though  he  had  discovered  and  frustrated  that 
with  Antwerp,  and  his  movements  were  hampered  by  the 
necessity  of  covering  Brussels.  Nor,  as  he  himself  had 
urgently  summoned  Eugene,  can  there  be  the  least  truth 
in  the  suggestion  that  it  was  Eugene,  not  Marlborough, 
who  determined  the  battle. 

The  exact  circumstances  which  led  to  that  battle 
appear  to  have  been  somewhat  mistaken  by  most  of 
Marlborough's  biographers,  including  Coxe,  and  owing 
to  this  mistake  they  have  given  some  colour  to  the 
insinuations  of  interested  blunders  or  inaction  on 
Marlborough's  part.  According  to  them  Marlborough, 
when  Oudenarde  was  threatened,  made  a  forward  march, 
cutting  off  the  enemy  from  their  base,  and  so  forced  the 
battle,  and  this  (after  his  backward  policy  immediately 
before)  might  to  unfriendly  witnesses  seem  to  have 
something  to  do  with  Eugene's  arrival.  But  anyone 
who  looks  at  the  memoirs  of  Berwick  J  will  see  that 
there  was  a  fully  sufficient  reason  for  Marlborough's 
action.  Berwick  was  not  at  Oudenarde  himself,  but  he 
had  a  good  deal  to  do  with  it.  He  had  been  command- 
ing on  the  Lauter  against  Eugene,  and  when  that  prince 
broke  up  from  Coblentz  to  join  Marlborough,  Berwick 
was  ordered  in  the  same  way  to  strengthen  Vendome 
and  the  Duke  of  Burgundy.  A  plan  was  made  between 
them  by  which  he  was  to  act  from  Mons,  and  Vendome 
1  Ed.  Midland  et  Poujoulat,  xxxii.  395,  396. 


IO2  MARLBOROUGH 

and  Burgundy  were  to  move  southward  to  join  Lira 
before  Eugene's  troops  could  get  up.  And  it  was  the 
danger  of  this  junction  and  the  march  to  execute  it  that 
gave  Marlborough  at  once  a  motive  and  an  opportunity 
for  fighting.  That  the  dissensions  of  the  French  generals 
helped  the  victory  is  not  denied,  though  the  question 
has  often  been  quite  unnecessarily  and  absurdly  compli- 
cated *  by  alleging  the  distrust  of  the  orthodox  party  and 
the  Duke  of  Burgundy  for  the  freethinking  libertine  Ven- 
dome.  With  the  utmost  rapidity  Marlborough  marched 
to  Lessines  and  secured  the  passage  of  the  Dender,  for 
which  the  French  generals  had  been  making  in  the 
execution  of  their  plans  with  Berwick.  He  then  advanced 
towards  Oudenarde.  The  battle  was  a  very  curious  one, 
and  though  Marlborough's  bold  attack  with  inferior 
forces  disconcerted  his  opponents,  it  could  hardly  have 
been  the  complete  victory  it  was  but  for  the  dissension 
of  the  French  commanders — a  dissension  of  which  the 
English  general  was  well  aware,  and  by  which  he  was 
determined  to  profit.  The  affair  began  by  a  kind  of 
race  for  the  possession  of  the  high  ground  above  Oude- 
narde. Both  armies  had  to  cross  the  Scheldt  to  gain 
this,  but  Marlborough's  vanguard  under  Cadogan  won 
the  race.  It  might  have  been  a  dangerous  winning,  for 
Cadogan  had  but  an  advanced  guard,  and  the  whole  of 
the  French  army  was  close  at  hand.  In  fact,  save  that 
Oudenarde  was  at  hand  to  retire  into  (which  made  all 
the  difference),  Marlborough's  movement  might  have 

1  Especially  by  Michclet  and  those  who  follow  him.  It  may  be 
noted  that  that  great  writer's  accounts  of  all  these  campaigns  and 
the  transactions  connected  with  him,  are  eminently  characteristic 
of  his  imaginative,  though  industrious,  method. 


SECOND  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF  103 

been  charged  with  rashness.  Vendome,  however,  was 
quite  aware  of  his  advantage,  and  gave  orders  to  attack 
— orders  immediately  countermanded  by  the  Duke  of 
Burgundy,  who  ordered  a  different  disposition,  though 
he,  like  Vendome,  was  resolved  to  fight.  But  the 
change  gave  Marlborough's  main  body  time  to  arrive 
and  form,  while  it  left  the  troops  which  Vendome  had 
sent  farthest  forward  so  exposed  that  Cadogan  was  able 
to  annihilate  a  whole  brigade.  The  general  battle  did 
not  begin  till  past  four  o'clock,  and  then  the  French 
commanders  again  interchanged  orders  and  counter- 
orders.  The  result  was  a  further  delay  of  the  action, 
which,  when  it  was  once  fully  engaged,  became  one  of 
the  most  confused  in  history.  Of  Blenheim,  of  Ramillies, 
of  Malplaquet,  it  is  possible  to  write  briefly  but  intel- 
ligibly and  certainly ;  of  Oudenarde,  without  an  elaborate 
plan,  only  a  succession  of  details  of  operations  conveying 
no  general  idea  can  be  given.  It  may  suffice  to  say 
that  the  hesitation  and  meddling  of  the  Duke  of  Bur- 
gundy allowed  the  English  cavalry  to  keep  the  whole 
French  left  inactive,  that  the  English  left  centre  en- 
gaged, overlapped,  and  completely  beat  the  French  right ; 
that  the  French  household  troops  fought  excellently  but 
in  vain  ;  and  that  only  the  darkness  and  the  fear  which 
the  allies  entertained  of  firing  on  their  own  troops  as 
they  closed  in  allowed  any  part  of  the  French  army  to 
retire  in  order.  It  is  said  to  have  lost  some  fifteen  thou- 
sand men  in  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners,  principally 
the  latter.  The  allies  lost  about  three  thousand  in  killed 
and  wounded,  there  having  been  very  heavy  fighting  at 
some  points,  although  no  general  resistance  on  the  part,  of 
the  French.  Marlborough's  letter  to  Godolphin  contains 


IO4  MARLBOROUGH 

the  memorable  words,  ' 1  did  give  them  too  much  advan- 
tage,' and  it  is  quite  certain  that  against  Villars  or 
Berwick  he  never  would  have  dared  to  fight  a  superior 
force  after  a  hard  day's  marching  on  the  part  of  his  own 
troops,  and,  as  far  as  can  be  seen,  with  little  artillery  to 
support  him.  But  this  is  the  only  battle  of  Marlborough's 
that  was  fought  in  front  of  a  fortified  town. 

There  was  no  time  lost  after  the  victory.  Little 
more  than  twenty-four  hours  had  passed  after  the  last 
gun  was  fired  when  the  siege  of  Lille,  the  great  bul- 
wark of  French  Flanders,  was  determined  on,  and 
before  forty-eight  hours  were  over  the  first  parallel,  so 
to  speak,  was  opened  by  the  capture  of  the  lines  of 
Comiues  only  an  hour  or  two  before  Berwick  and  La 
Mothe,  advancing  from  different  directions,  were  ready 
to  defend  them.  Meanwhile  Eugene  was  sent  to  bring 
np  his  own  troops  and  collect  materials  for  the  siege. 
As  Marlborough's  desire  first  to  secure  Ghent,  like  the 
events  before  Oudenarde,  has  been  twisted  into  an 
accusation  against  him,  it  may  be  well  briefly  to  consider 
the  situation. 

The  battle  of  Oudenarde  had  been  a  signal  victory, 
but  owing  to  the  late  hour  at  which  it  was  fought  it 
had  by  no  means  been  a  complete  one.  Marlborough 
in  his  letters  repeatedly  wishes  he  had  had  '  An  hour 
more  daylight,'  '  Two  hours  more  daylight,'  and  the  like, 
and  no  one  who  considers  the  circumstances  will  wonder 
either  at  this  wish  or  at  the  reluctance  to  undertake 
the  siege  of  the  strongest  fortress  in  the  marches  of 
Handera  which  accompanied  it.  Not  only  had  nightfall 
largely  reduced  the  otherwise  probable  numbers  of  killed, 
wounded,  and  prisoners  on  the  French  side,  but  it  had 


SECOND  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF  105 

enabled  the  fugitives,  who  were  at  first  in  utter  disorder 
(not  more  than  fifteen  or  sixteen  thousand  men  having 
accompanied  Vendome  in  military  order),  to  rally  round 
the  strong  places  of  Ghent  and  Bruges,  which  treachery 
had  just  made  theirs.  In  operating  against  Lille,  there- 
fore, Marlborough  had  behind  him  an  army  of  at  least 
fifty  or  sixty  thousand  men,  while  the  hostile  position 
of  Ghent  made  it  impossible  for  him  to  receive  supplies 
or  guns  by  water,  the  Scheldt  and  the  Lys  being  both 
commanded  by  the  enemy.  Further,  if  he  attacked 
Lille  he  had  to  reckon  with  Berwick,  who  had  a  very 
considerable  force  behind  that  town  resting  on  the 
strong  place  of  Mons,  from  which  he  could  at  any 
moment  advance  and  cut  the  communications  of  a  force 
besieging  Lille  from  the  Brussels  side.  We  know  from 
Berwick's  memoirs  that  he  himself  recommended  a  plan 
of  action  which,  if  it  had  been  boldly  carried  out,  would 
have  entirely  prevented  the  investment  of  Lille,  while 
Marlborough's  army  would  have  been  in  no  small 
danger.  This  was  that  Vendome  and  the  Duke  of 
Burgundy  should  advance  between  Marlborough  and 
Eugene  and  give  battle  to  the  prince,  who,  with  his 
Moselle  forces  (which  had  at  last  come  up),  was  escort- 
ing a  great  convoy  of  all  sorts  of  stores  to  the  army  in 
the  lines  of  Comines  or  Werwyk.  Berwick  himself  was 
to  answer  for  Marlborough's  troops.  The  uncle  and  the 
nephew  were  so  alike  in  military  genius  that  it  may  be 
taken  as  certain  that  Marlborough  foresaw  this  combi- 
nation in  which  the  advantage  of  position  and  numbers 
would  alike  have  been  on  the  side  of  the  enemy ;  but 
Vendome,  perhaps  disgusted  with  the  mishaps  of 
Oudenarde,  refused  to  budge  from  Ghent,  and  Eugene 


io6  MARLDOROUGH 

effected  his  junction  with  Marlborough  safely.  Tlie 
authorities  which  Coxe  and  other  biographers  follow 
represent  this  junction,  it  is  true,  as  the  result  of  pure 
generalship  on  the  part  of  Marlborough  and  Eugene,  and 
allege  that  Vendome  and  the  Duke  of  Burgundy  did 
actually  detach  a  force  to  intercept  it.  But  the  account 
in  the  memoirs l  of  Berwick,  though  briefer,  is  more 
.trustworthy,  and  it  is  in  fact  supported  by  the  numbers 
of  the  force  mentioned  in  the  opposite  story.  Vendome 
and  Burgundy  are  said  to  have  sent  18,000  men.  Now 
Eugene's  own  army  was  far  stronger  than  this,  and  if 
the  force  was  really  despatched  Eugene  had  nothing 
to  do  but  to  march  past  it.  It  can  scarcely  be  counted 
to  Marlborough's  discredit  that  he  hesitated  to  set  the 
main  hope  of  the  allies  on  a  cast  so  desperate  as  this 
would  have  been  if  Berwick's  plan  had  been  carried  out. 
As,  however,  Eugene  had  arrived,  the  siege  was 
determined  on,  and  the  immediate  investment  was  con- 
signed to  his  care,  Marlborough  retiring  on  the  Scheldt 
to  hinder  the  junction  of  Vendome  and  Berwick,  and 
to  superintend  the  passage  of  the  necessary  convoys  from 
Brussels  and  the  Netherlands.  Lille  was  garrisoned 
by  15,000  men  under  the  veteran  Marshal  Boufflers, 
perfectly  fortified  and  supplied  with  a  staff  of  the  best 
officers  in  the  French  service,  a  service  which  then  had 
no  rival  in  Europe  in  the  scientific  branches.  Although 
it  is  certain  that  Marlborough  had  originally,  as  any 
prudent  general  would  have  done,  preferred  the  plan  of 
recovering  Ghent  before  attacking  Lille,  there  is  not  in 
his  voluminous  private  letters,  and  certainly  not  in  his 
public  conduct  (with  one  exception,  to  be  dealt  with 
1  In  continuation  of  the  passage  cited  above. 


SJSCOND  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF  107 

immediately),  the  least  evidence  of  any  flinching  or 
underhand  dealing.  The  actual  siege  was  directed  by 
Eugene,  but  the  real  responsibility  rested  on  Marl- 
borough,  for  if  Berwick  and  Vendome  had  united  earlier, 
or  if  a  single  convoy  had  failed  to  get  through,  it  must 
at  once  have  been  raised. 

The  junction  of  the  two  French  armies  was  effected 
on  August  30,  Boufflers  having  been  hard  pushed  in 
the  last  days  of  that  month,  and  the  audacity  of  the 
siege  then  became  apparent.  Vendome  and  Berwick 
had  between  them  nearly  110,000  men,  independently 
of  the  garrison  of  Lille,  while  the  whole  force  at  the 
disposal  of  Maryborough  and  Eugene  for  service  in  the 
field  and  for  maintaining  the  investment  was  at  least 
10,000  men  weaker.  Marlborough,  however,  on  whom 
the  task  of  covering  entirely  rested,  was  quite  equal  to 
the  occasion.  He  had  already  chosen  a  position  on  the 
route  of  the  relieving  army  to  the  south  of  Lille,  had 
entrenched  it  strongly,  and  after  observing  their  march 
he  slipped  into  it  and  awaited  them.  Several  French 
authorities,  including  Chamillart,  the  minister  of  war, 
appear  to  have  been  anxious  for  an  attack,  which,  if 
delivered,  would  probably  have  finished  the  war  for  the 
French,  and  must  have  been  repulsed  with  ruinous  loss  ; 
indeed,  Marlborough  was  on  the  point  of  delivering  a 
counter-attack  which,  at  least  possibly,  would  have  had 
the  same  result;  but  here  the  Dutch  deputies,  long 
innocuous,  interfered.  The  design  of  relieving  Lille  by 
force  was,  however,  given  up,  and  Vendome  and  Berwick 
trusted  to  intercepting  the  necessary  supplies.  This 
was  not  a  vain  hope ;  the  town  was  very  strong,  was 
obstinately  defended,  and  was,  if  Marlborough  may  be 


io8  MARLBOROUGH 

trusted,  attacked,  as  far  as  engineering  went,  with  some 
slackness  by  the  allies.1  This  slackness  certainly  did 
not  extend  to  fighting,  a  succession  of  desperate  attacks 
being  made,  in  one  of  which  Eugene  himself  was 
wounded  and  2,000  of  the  besiegers  put  hors  de  combat. 
The  siege  of  Lille  indeed  occupies  the  position  of  a 
kind  of  minor  siege  of  Troy  with  some  of  Marlborough's 
biographers.  We  are  told  of  the  personages,  celebrated 
already,  or  soon  to  be  celebrated,  who  flocked  to  the  camp 
to  watch  the  expected  duel  between  the  sciences  of  mili- 
tary attack  and  defence ;  of  the  battles  for  the  salient 
points  of  the  surrounding  ground,  especially  a  certain 
chapel;  of  the  movements  and  counter-movements  of 
Vendome,  Berwick,  of  Marlborough;  of  the  gradual  draw- 
ing closer  of  the  investment,  and  of  the  desperate  hand- 
to-hand  fighting  which  followed.  It  may  be  more  parti- 
cularly noted  that  in  the  contest  just  referred  to,  where 
Eugene  was  wounded,  we  have  one  of  those  rare  pieces 
of  information  alluded  to  above  (Note,  p.  61),  where  the 
exact  number  of  English-born  troops  engaged  is  men- 
tioned. Five  thousand  Englishmen  took  part  in  Eugene's 
assault,  which  resulted  in  the  making  good  of  a  lodg- 
ment. The  severity  of  the  contest  is  best  shown  by 
the  fact  that  at  the  end  of  it  the  garrison  had  lost  eight 
thousand  men,  the  besiegers  fourteen  thousand.  The 
incident  most  striking  to  the  imagination  in  the  whole 
siege  was  perhaps  the  desperate  attempt  made  by  the 
French  to  get  powder  through  to  the  besieged  by  pack- 
ing it  in  bags  on  men's  backs.  It  would  bo,  of  course, 

1  Marlborough  frequently  complains  of  his  engineers.  He  seems 
to  have  been  chiefly,  if  not  wholly,  dependent  for  this  branch  of 
service  on  his  allies. 


SECOND  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF  109 

probable  at  any  time,  and  most  probable  in  those  days 
of  flintlocks,  that  the  powder  would  in  a  fight  explode 
with  certain  destruction  to  the  bearer,  and  this  actually 
happened  in  many  cases.  The  besieged  had  suffered 
greatly  for  want  of  provisions  and  ammunition,  but  the 
besiegers  themselves  were  not  much  better  off,  and  one 
crowning  attempt  to  cut  off  their  supplies  led  to  a  minia- 
ture battle  which,  both  for  the  gallantry  displayed  in 
it,  the  decisive  effect  it  had  on  the  siege,  and  the  curious 
suspicions  which  have  been  excited  by  its  circumstances, 
deserves  detailed  notice. 

During  the  war,  as  in  all  wars  between  France  and 
England  during  the  eighteenth  century,  there  was  con- 
gtant  talk  and  occasional  trial  of  descents  on  France 
which  had  never  been  successful.  In  this  year  a  certain 
General  Erie  had  been  wool-gathering  about  the  coasts 
of  Normandy  and  Brittany  with  no  result.  To  get 
some  good  out  of  him,  Marlborough  suggested  that 
Erie  should  occupy  Ostend  and  make  it  a  convenient 
entrepot  of  supplies  for  the  army  at  Lille.  His  advice 
was  followed ;  Erie  showed  some  ability  in  clearing  the 
neighbourhood  of  Ostend,  and  a  very  large  convoy  was 
got  together  there  to  meet  the  necessities  of  the  be- 
siegers. Nor  were  the  enemy  idle ;  Count  de  la  Mothe 
with  a  force  which,  by  Berwick's  testimony,  was  thirty- 
four  battalions  and  sixty-three  squadrons  strong  (Marl- 
borough  says  forty  battalions,  but  only  forty-six  squad- 
rons) was  detached  to  seize  the  convoy.  On  his  side, 
Marlborough  sent  first  a  force  of  foot  and  horse  under 
two  German  brigadiers,  then  General  Webb  with  twelve 
battalions  of  infantry  but  no  horse,  and  lastly,  Cadogan 
with  an  infantry  force  equal  to  Webb's  and  twenty-six 


no  MARLBOROUGH 

squadrons  of  caval  ry.  Only  1 50  men  of  these  latter  horse 
joined  Webb,  who  had  also  to  detach  a  considerable  force 
of  infantry  partly  to  occupy  points  of  vantage,  partly  to 
accompany  the  convoy,  and  it  was  with  not  half  La  Mothe's 
infantry  and  with  no  horse  at  all,  except  the  handful  just 
mentioned,  that  Webb  met  the  French  forces  in  front  of 
the  wood  of  Wynendael.  The  French,  however,  were 
badly  led  and  they  fought  worse,  while  Webb  posted  his 
men  with  great  skill  and  fought  them  with  dauntless 
courage.  La  Mothe  was  completely  defeated,  and  the 
convoy  had  filed  off  safely  behind  the  wood  when  Cadogan 
came  up  with  the  rest  of  his  cavalry.  La  Mothe  was  still 
so  superior  in  that  arm  that,  the  main  object  being  the 
security  of  the  convoy,  pursuit  was  not  attempted ;  but 
unquestionably  the  most  brilliant  of  the  minor  actions 
of  the  war  remained  to  the  credit  of  Webb,  and  the 
fate  of  Lille  was  practically  sealed.  All  readers  of 
*  Esmond '  know  what  followed.  Not  only  was  Marlbo- 
rough  accused,  with  some  justice,  of  imputing  the  merit 
of  the  action  as  much  to  his  favourite  Cadogan,  who  had 
been  a  mere  spectator  for  only  a  part  of  the  time,  as  to 
Webb,  who  had  borne  the  burden  and  heat  of  the  day,  but 
he  was  further  charged  with  having  been  bribed  by  the 
French  throughout  the  campaign,  with  having  winked  at 
the  capture  of  Ghent  and  Bruges,  with  objecting  to  the 
siege  of  Lille  from  corrupt  motives,  with  declining  battle 
more  than  once  when  he  might  have  given  it  with 
advantage,  and  finally,  with  having  sent  an  inadequate 
force,  under  a  general  personally  obnoxious  to  him,  to 
oppose  La  Mothe,  in  hopes  that  the  convoy  might  be 
cut  off  and  the  further  prosecution  of  the  siege  rendered 
impossible.  It  is  not  necessary  to  dwell  on  this  much. 


SECOND  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF  in 

That  Marlborough,  like  most  generals,  was  somewhat 
given  to  favouritism  is  undoubted,  and  the  language  in 
which  he  spoke  of  Cadogan  here,  though  not  at  all 
above  his  general  merits  (for  Cadogan  was  perhaps  the 
ablest  divisional  officer  in  the  English  army)  was  cer- 
tainly unfair  to  "Webb.  It  ought,  however,  to  be  said 
that  the  account  in  the  '  Gazette,'  of  which  Webb's 
friends  chiefly  complained,  is  not  traceable  to  Marl- 
borough,  and  that  he  speaks,  repeatedly,  very  highly 
of  Webb  in  his  letters  to  Godolphin,  urging  that  the 
queen  should  specially  compliment  him,  and  suggesting 
against  his  immediate  promotion  only  some  obstacle 
(which  seems  to  have  been  a  real  one)  arising  from  eti- 
quette towards  the  Dutch.  Certainly  no  one,  from  these 
letters,  would  infer  any  enmity  to  Webb.  With  the 
other  accusations  (which,  it  must  be  remembered,  have 
not  one  tittle  of  evidence  to  support  them)  a  very  short 
way  is  possible.  First,  let  anyone  read  Marlborough's 
letters — his  private  letters  to  confidential  friends — and 
then  say  whether  they  are  more  to  be  trusted  to  than 
these  baseless  rumours ;  next,  if  he  has  any  doubt  left,  let 
him  ask  himself  two  plain  questions :  Was  Marlborough, 
one  of  the  coolest-headed  men  in  Europe,  likely  to  risk 
his  vast  realised  fortune  at  the  bait  of  a  bribe,  the  re- 
ception of  which,  if  discovered — as  it  was  nearly  cer- 
tain to  be — would  have  utterly  ruined  him  ?  Was  he, 
whose  concern  for  his  military  reputation  was  second 
only  (if  it  was  second)  to  that  avarice  with  which  he  is 
charged  by  his  enemies,  and  that  family  affection  which 
they  allow,  likely  to  provoke  a  failure,  the  disgrace  of 
which  would  have  fallen  not  on  Webb,  not  on  Eugene, 
but  on  himself? 


H2  MARLBOROUGH 

The  believers  in  these  fantastic  stories  rejoiced  to 
think  that  Marlborough  was  baffled ;  he  certainly  was 
if  the  reduction  of  one  of  the  first  fortresses  in  Europe, 
mainly  owing  to  his  own  consummate  generalship, 
baffled  him.  The  battle  of  Wynendael  was  fought  on 
September  27,  and  though  Venddme  continued  his 
attempts  to  intercept  convoys,  and  succeeded  after  some 
time  in  storming  the  important  post  of  Leffinghen,  which 
secured  the  route  from  Ostend  and  Nieuport,  the  siege 
was  carried  to  extremities,  and,  on  October  22,  Boufflers 
beat  a  parley,  yielded  up  the  town,  and  retired  into 
the  citadel.  The  siege  of  this  latter  was  continued  for 
nearly  seven  weeks  more,  though  the  enemy  attempted 
a  new  method  of  relief,  the  Elector  of  Bavaria  march- 
ing upon  Brussels  with  15,000  men.  The  garrison, 
however,  were  faithful,  and  Marlborough  soon  obliged 
the  Elector  to  retreat  by  attacking  the  French  posts 
on  the  Scheldt  at  Oudenarde,  a  position  which  the 
enemy  had  been  fortifying  ever  since  the  battle,  and 
which  was  carried  on  November  26,  partly  by  fighting 
but  still  more  by  a  very  ingenious  series  of  feints  and 
false  offers  of  attack.  This  passage  of  the  Scheldt,  in 
effect,  decided  the  campaign  :  the  citadel  of  Lille  surren- 
dered on  December  8  ;  the  French,  unable  or  unwilling 
to  fight  through  the  winter,  went  into  quarters,  and 
Marlborough,  at  once  moving  against  Ghent,  forced  it  to 
capitulate  on  the  last  day  of  the  year.  Bruges  and  the 
minor  places  were  evacuated,  and  thus  this  long  and 
arduous  campaign,  in  which,  unfavourably  as  it  had 
begun,  Marlborough  had  shown  almost  more  genius 
than  in  any  other,  was  ended. 


CHAPTEE  TO. 

THIRD   PERIOD   OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF — MALPLAQUET 
AND   THE   PEACE. 

THE  unusually  long  and  arduous  campaign  of  1708,  as 
it  was  of  all  Maryborough's  campaigns  that  which  (in 
the  battle  of  Oudenarde,  the  covering  operations  of  the 
siege  of  Lille,  and  the  passage  of  the  Scheldt)  perhaps 
best  showed  his  military  genius,  so  it  was  the  last  in 
which  fortune  can  be  said  to  have  been  really  favourable 
to  him.  One  of  his  four  great  victories  had  yet  to  be 
gained :  but  it  was  gained  with  a  frightful  and  dispro- 
portionate loss  which  lent  some  colour  to  his  enemies' 
allegations.  The  sieges  and  manosuvrings  which  filled 
up  the  rest  of  the  campaigns  of  1709  and  the  two  fol- 
lowing years,  before  Marlborough  was  dismissed  at  the 
end  of  1711,  though  displaying  his  talents  to  the  full, 
were  of  a  comparatively  petty  and  uninteresting  cha- 
racter, the  general  being  hampered  not  merely  by  his 
old  foes  the  Dutch  deputies,  but  by  the  increasing 
strength  of  the  party  in  England  adverse  to  the  war. 
With  the  exception  of  the  '  soldier's  battle  '  of  Malpla- 
quet,  the  period  presents  but  little  of  military  interest 
to  any  but  a  professional  student,  and  it  will  be  passed 
over  here  with  more  rapidity  than  the  earlier  part  of 
Marlborough's  career  as  general.  Such  as  it  was  it  closed 


1 14  MARLBOROUGH 

that  career,  and  in  a  sense  may  be  said  to  have  closed 
Marlborough's  career  of  public  importance  altogether. 
Neither  in  the  further  operations  of  the  war  till  the 
Peace  of  Utrecht,  nor  in  the  stormy  politics  of  the  last 
months  of  Queen  Anne's  reign,  nor  even  in  the  events 
which  followed  the  accession  of  the  Elector  of  Hanover, 
did  he  take  any  share  commensurate  to  his  genius. 
From  a  head  he  became  a  figure-head,  nor  is  there 
any  quite  parallel  example  of  so  complete  a  fall.  The 
reason  for  it  will  be  more  apparent  when  we  have  sur- 
veyed the  long  and  tangled  course  of  English  political 
disputes  which  originally  brought  the  fall  about,  and  of 
which  Marlborough,  though  not  always  an  active  par- 
ticipator in  it,  owing  to  his  absence  abroad,  was  always  a 
keenly  interested  spectator.  Here  we  shall  sketch  his 
three  last  campaigns,  consider  rapidly  the  peace  of 
which  his  dismissal,  though  some  time  elapsed  between 
the  two  events,  was  the  certain  forerunner  and  in  a  way 
the  chief  cause,  and  then  dismiss  his  performances  in 
the  capacity  which  has  made  him  most  famous,  that  of 
military  leader. 

The  spring  of  1709  was  occupied  by  the  negotia- 
tions at  Gertruydenberg,  which  will  be  noticed  in  the 
next  chapter.  But  hostilities  were  resumed  before  the 
hopes  of  peace  were  finally  disconcerted.  Eugene  still 
continued  to  be  Marlborough's  colleague,  and  the  suc- 
cesses of  the  foregoing  year  had  so  strengthened  their 
army  that  they  were  enabled  to  take  the  field  with 
110,000  men,  the  largest  force  that  Marlborough  had 
ever  had  under  his  command.  On  the  other  hand 
Louis  had  at  length  had  the  wisdom  to  commit  the 
command  in  Flanders  to  Villars,  who  despite  his  gas- 


THIRD  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF  115 

conading  was  by  far  the  ablest  general  of  France,  except 
perhaps  Berwick,  and  tlie  only  one  who  had  inflicted 
even  a  colourable  check  on  Maryborough.  It  is  not 
easy  to  calculate  his  exact  force.  In  one  place  he  calls 
it  60,000  only,  but  as  he  estimates  Marlborough's  at 
130,000,  and  says  shortly  afterwards  that  he  had '  50,000 
less,'  it  is  evidently  fair  to  give  him  at  least  80,000. 
The  appalling  financial  disasters  of  France  are  allowed  to 
have  left  him  very  badly  supplied  with  provisions  and 
stores,  but  on  the  other  hand  he  himself  admits  that 
owing  to  the  agricultural  distress  he  was  supplied  with 
the  best  class  of  recruits  he  ever  saw.  He  had,  more- 
over, the  advantage  of  resting  upon  the  network  of 
fortresses,  all  the  work  of  Vauban's  skill,  which  lined 
French  Flanders  and  the  French  side  of  Hainault,  and 
as  the  Allies  were  bound  either  to  take  or  mask  these, 
while  he  could,  as  he  pleased,  draw  on  their  garrisons 
or  reinforce  them  if  they  were  attacked,  a  certain  in- 
feriority of  numbers  was  more  than  made  up  on  his 
side.  The  contest,  therefore,  was  not  an  unfair  one, 
though  it  is  greatly  to  Villars's  credit  that  he  made  it,  as 
he  did,  impossible  for  the  Allies  to  proceed  far  from  the 
frontier. 

The  operations  of  the  campaign  may  be  divided  into 
two  parts,  a  division  which  materially  helps  the  under- 
standing of  them.  The  first  consists  of  operations 
against  the  lines  of  La  Bassee,  held  by  Villars,  which 
operations,  either  intentionally  or  perforce  (for  Villars 
and  Marlborough  differ  on  this  point),  were  exchanged 
for  the  siege  of  Tournay.  The  second  consists  of  the 
siege  and  capture  of  Mons,  which  Villars  endeavoured  to 
interrupt  and  so  brought  about  the  battle  of  Malplaquet. 


n6  MARLBOROUGH 

In  the  first  part  of  the  operations,  the  French  general 
occupied  entrenchments  on  what  may  be  called  generally 
the  space  between  Arras  and  Valenciennes,  though  his 
actual  position  varied  according  to  the  movements  of  the 
enemy.  It  is  admitted  that  it  was  stronger  than  either 
Eugene  or  Marlborough  cared  to  attack,  though  Villars, 
in  his  own  peculiar  fashion  of  self-glorification,  declares 
that  they  might,  if  they  had  chosen,  have  beaten  him, 
forced  the  frontier,  and  pushed  on  to  the  gates  of  Paris. 
But  when  they  had  come  to  a  decision  and  changed  their 
plan  to  the  siege  of  Tournay,  Villars  held,  and  admits 
that  he  held,  the  mistaken  opinion  that  the  place  would 
occupy  them  for  the  rest  of  the  campaign.  The  fact 
that  he  had  just  before  weakened  the  garrison  by  draw- 
ing on  it,  pretty  plainly  shows  that  he  did  not  expect 
the  movement.  In  consequence  chiefly  of  this  weaken- 
ing and  of  the  insufficient  provisions,  the  town,  which 
Villars  was  not  alone  in  thinking  impregnable,  was  taken 
after  less  than  a  month's  siege.  Another  month,  which 
was  distinguished  by  desperate  subterranean  fighting  in 
the  mines  for  which  Tournay  was  famous,  carried  the 
citadel.  Villars  harassed  the  besiegers,  but  could 
neither  seriously  disturb  them  nor  avail  himself  of  their 
occupation  to  advance  into  the  Netherlands. 

But  before  Tournay  was  done  with,  the  designs  on 
Mons  were  begun,  and  the  very  day  that  the  first-named 
town  hung  out  the  white  flag  a  detachment  was  sent, 
with  supports  following  it,  to  operate  against  the  second. 
Villars  being  again  caught  napping,  the  important  lines 
of  the  Trouille,  which  were  part  of  his  defences  in  the 
direction  of  Mons,  were  surprised  and  made  good  by  the 
Prince  of  Hesse-Cassel,  thus  cutting  the  French  general 


THIRD  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF  117 

off  from  the  town.  It  was  so  weakly  defended  that 
Villars  could  not  entertain  any  hope  of  its  holding  out, 
and  as  the  loss  of  it  would  not  only  sacrifice  Hainault 
but  render  his  defence  of  France  itself  vulnerable,  he 
determined  to  fight  to  regain  if  possible  the  lines  of  the 
Trouille.  This  was  the  origin  of  the  battle  of  Mal- 
plaquet.  It  was  fought  with  as  nearly  as  possible 
equal  forces  on  both  sides,  the  French  being  slightly 
superior  in  cavalry,  the  Allies  rather  more  superior  in 
infantry.  But  Villars  had  by  this  time  been  enabled 
to  bring  his  recruits  (whose  good  quality  has  already 
been  noticed)  into  military  trim,  and  had  had  no  serious 
fighting,  while  Marlborough  and  Eugene  had  lost 
heavily  at  Tournay.  The  most  uncertain  part  of  the 
whole  matter  is  the  circumstances  which  made  the 
Allies  instead  of  Villars  the  actual  aggressors.  Eugene 
was  nearly  always  for  fighting,  but  why  Marlborough, 
who  never  lost  his  head,  should  have  preferred  to  attack 
an  immensely  strong  position  held  by  nearly  if  not 
quite  equal  numbers,  instead  of  letting  Villars,  as  he 
must  have  done  if  he  wished  to  save  Mons,  himself  attack, 
is  wholly  obscure.  He  even  allowed  Villars  time  to 
strengthen  a  position  which  was  already  strong.  Gene- 
rally speaking,  the  position  of  Malplaquet  consisted  of  a 
large  opening  or  trouee  between  the  woods  of  Taisniere 
and  Laniere.  Villars's  force  rested  on  and  occupied 
both  these,  and  was  besides  strongly  entrenched  and 
defended  with  cannon,  not  only  in  front  but  along  the 
flanks  in  the  woods.  Smaller  woods  in  front  and  behind 
the  main  plantations  were  also  occupied,  and  the  whole 
position  was  among  the  most  formidable  that  any  army 
has  had  to  attack.  There  was  hardly  any  manoeuvring, 
6 


n8  MARLBOROUGH 

and  the  only  movement  of  a  tactical  character  that  can 
be  said  to  have  had  much  influence  on  the  result,  was 
the  march  of  General  Withers  by  a  circuitous  course 
through  the  wood  of  Taisni&re,  which  partly  outflanked 
Villars's  left.  The  main  battle  consisted  of  desperate 
charges  into  the  woods  and  against  the  entrenchments, 
followed,  when  the  assailants  were  not  blown  to  pieces, 
by  hand-to-hand  fighting.  Villars  was  wounded  before 
the  engagement  had  lasted  very  long,  but  Marshal 
Boufflers,  who  had  voluntarily  come  to  serve  under  him 
though  his  senior,  conducted  the  battle  skilfully  enough, 
and  the  defeat  of  the  French,  which  was  complete,  can 
only  be  attributed  to  their  being  simply  fought  down 
by  the  siiperior  tenacity  and  dash  combined  of  the 
Allied  troops.  The  numbers  were  practically  equal, 
and  the  defenders  had  an  infinite  superiority  of  position. 
There  are  few  battles  in  history  of  which  it  can  so  cer- 
tainly be  said  that  the  best  men  won. 

The  carnage,  however,  was  tremendous,  especially 
among  the  veteran  Dutch  troops,  who  were  boldly,  but 
very  unskilfully,  led  by  the  Prince  of  Orange.  Very  few 
prisoners  were  taken,  the  French  making  off  in  good 
order,  and  the  allies  being  too  exhausted  to  pursue. 
But  the  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  has  been  put  as 
high  as  thirty-five  thousand  men  on  the  allied  side  and 
fourteen  thousand  on  the  French,  while  the  much  lower 
estimates  which  are  usually  accepted  and  which,  being 
taken  from  official  sources  on  both  sides,  seem  most 
probable,  are  twenty  thousand  and  eight  thousand 
respectively.  In  Marlborough's  own  words,  it  was  '  a 
very  murdering  battle.'  Mons  resisted  longer  than 
had  been  expected,  and  Berwick  made  one  attempt  to 


THIRD  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF  119 

relieve  it,  but  the  possession  of  the  lines  of  the  Trouille 
made  his  effort  hopeless,  and  the  place  surrendered  on 
October  18. 

The  cabal  against  Marlborough  assigned  two  not 
altogether  consistent  reasons  for  the  pushing  on  of  this 
bloody  battle.  One  was  that  the  general  wished  to 
make  his  own  reputation,  the  other  that  it  was  a 
'  political  battle,'  fought  to  get  the  Whig  ministry  out 
of  their  difficulties.  It  is  rather  an  unlucky  coincidence 
that  a  loan,  which  had  been  refused  before  the  battle, 
was  actually  granted  afterwards.  As  for  the  mere 
charge  of  vanity,  it  is  not  easily  sustainable,  or  rather  it 
would  apply  equally  to  all  commanders  at  all  times, 
whenever  they  have  fought  a  bloody  battle  under  dis- 
advantageous circumstances.  It  may,  however,  be 
observed  that  Marlborough's  own  remarks  about  this 
battle  are  rather  despondent  than  characterised  by  his 
usual  quiet  cheerfulness  after  victory ;  that  he  appears 
to  have  been  singularly  affected  by  the  carnage,  and 
that  he  represents  the  battle  as  especially  intended  to 
'  end  the  war.'  It  is  curious  that  he  says  he  is  pretty 
well  assured  that  this  will  be  his  last  battle;  and  so, 
though  he  continued  to  command  for  two  years  longer, 
and  was  engaged  in  many  operations  of  the  siege  and 
manoeuvring  kind,  it  was.  Malplaquet  was  the  last  of 
the  four  great  engagements  which  give  Marlborough's 
name  an  unique  position  in  the  roll  of  generals. 

The  blood  of  Malplaquet  did  not  bring  about  peace, 
and  when  peace  came  it  was  in  a  manner  very  disagree- 
able to  Marlborough  and  fatal  to  his  own  career.  The 
final  rupture  between  the  Queen  and  the  Duchess,  the 
fall  of  Marlborough's  ministerial  friends,  and  the  other 


I2O  MARLBOROUGH 

incidents  of  what  may  be  called  the  Home  campaign, 
will  be  dealt  with  separately  and  elsewhere.  It  is 
sufficient  here  to  say,  that  though  Marlborough  was  of 
course  on  very  different  terms  with  the  Tory  ministry 
from  those  on  which  he  was  with  his  friend  Godolphin 
and  his  son-in-law  Sunderland,  it  is  difficult  to  discover, 
even  from  the  narratives  of  those  most  devoted  to  him, 
that  he  had  any  serious  reason  to  complain  of  Harley 
and  St.  John  while  he  remained  at  the  head  of  the 
army.  That  something-  like  a  plot  was  formed  to  de- 
prive him  of  his  command,  and  that  the  charges  against 
him  would  never  have  been  urged  as  they  actually  were 
urged,  except  with  a  deliberate  purpose  of  getting  -rid 
of  him,  is  very  true.  But  it  is  no  less  true  that  Marl- 
borough,  however  he  may  have  wished  for  a  peace  con- 
cluded by  his  own  friends  and  on  his  own  terms,  was 
an  obstacle,  and  as  long  as  he  was  at  the  head  of  the 
army  an  insuperable  obstacle,  to  the  conclusion  of  a 
peace  between  a  Tory  ministry  and  Louis  XIV.  It  is 
also  true  that  though  his  last  two  campaigns  showed  no 
lack  of  military  genius  (there  is  some  ground  for  the 
claims  of  his  partisans  that  his  last  or  tenth  campaign, 
that  of  1711,  was  among  the  most  brilliant  he  ever 
fought  in  a  purely  military  view),  no  one  who  looks  at 
their  results,  can  wonder  that  men  to  whom  the  affairs 
of  England  were  committed  should  have  thought  that 
the  game  was  hardly  worth  the  candle.  Indeed  the 
whole  series  of  these  events  looks  as  if  the  Dutch  appe- 
tite for  a  '  barrier,'  or  the  mere  routine  habit  of  attack- 
ing and  taking  towns,  had  blinded  Marlborough  to  the 
impolicy  of  what  Lord  Poulett  afterwards  bluntly 
called  '  knocking  his  men's  heads  against  stone  walls.' 


THIRD  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF  121 

In  1710,  though  Marlborough  and  Eugene  were  working 
together  with  a  vast  army,  and  though  for  half  the  year 
at  least  the  Whigs  were  still  in  power,  the  capture  of 
Douay,  Bethune,  Aire,  and  St.  Venant,  at  a  great  cost  of 
men,  alone  rewarded  the  allies,  while  the  indefatigable 
industry  of  Villars  constructed  an  interior  line  of 
defence  more  formidable  than  ever.  In  1711,  in  a  com- 
plicated series  of  operations  round  Arras,  Marlborough, 
who  was  now  alone,  Eugene  having  been  recalled  to 
Vienna,  completely  outgeneralled  Villars,  and  broke 
through  his  lines.  But  he  did  not  fight,  and  the  sole 
result  of  the  campaign  was  the  capture  of  Bouchain  at 
the  cost  of  some  sixteen  thousand  men,  while  no  serious 
impression  was  made  on  the  French  system  of  defence. 
The  fact  simply  was,  that  with  the  general  communica- 
tions of  European  countries  in  the  state  which  they  were 
at  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century,  it  was  either 
physically  impossible  to  break  through  such  defences  as 
the  fortresses  of  Artois  and  Picardy  then  presented,  or 
else  it  demanded,  as  has  been  suggested  in  a  former 
chapter,  the  authority  of  an  autocratic  monarch  and 
the  genius  of  a  great  general  rolled  into  one.  It  has 
been  said  that  the  capture  of  Bouchain,  a  second-rate 
fortress,  cost  the  allies  16,000  men;  Lille  had  cost 
14,000;  Tournay  a  number  not  exactly  mentioned,  but 
very  large  ;  the  petty  place  of  Aire  7,000.  How  many, 
malcontent  Englishmen  might  well  ask  themselves, 
would  it  cost  before  Arras,  Cambrai,  Hesdin,  Calais, 
Namur,  and  all  tEe  rest  of  the  fortresses  that  studded 
the  country,  could  be  expected  to  fall  ?  In  the  '  short 
views '  that  historians  are  obliged  to  give,  and  readers 
of  history  to  take,  the  effect  of  these  tedious,  bloody, 


122  MARLBOROUGH 

costly,  and  unprofitable  campaigns  on  the  public  temper 
is  too  often  overlooked ;  as  well  as  the  fact  that  Marl- 
borough  had  himself,  so  to  speak,  spoilt  his  audience. 
He  had  given  them  four  great  victories  in  little  more 
than  five  years;  it  was  perhaps  unreasonable,  but  cer- 
tainly not  unnatural,  that  they  should  grow  fretful  when 
he  gave  them  none  during  nearly  half  the  same  time. 
Add  to  this,  that  the  war  in  Spain  had  been  carried  on 
with  almost  uniform  ill-success  for  years,  that  the  opera- 
tions in  Italy  and  on  the  Rhine  had  never  produced 
any  effect,  and  that  the  expense  of  the  war  was  frighten- 
ing men  of  all  classes  in  England,  and,  independently  of 
the  more  strictly  political  considerations  which  will  be 
entered  upon  in  a  few  pages,  it  will  be  seen  that  there 
was  some  reason  for  wishing  Marlborough  anywhere 
but  on  or  near  the  field  of  battle.  He  was  got  rid  of 
none  too  honourably ;  restrictions  were  put  upon  his 
successor  Ormond,  which  were  none  too  honourable 
either;  and  when  Villars,  freed  from  his  invincible 
antagonist,  had  inflicted  a  sharp  defeat  upon  Eugene  at 
Denain,  the  military  situation  was  changed  from  one 
very  much  in  favour  of  the  allies  to  one  slightly 
against  them,  and  so  contributed  beyond  all  doubt  to 
bring  about  the  Peace  of  Utrecht. 

That  peace  has  for  many  years  had  little  quarter 
from  English  historians  of  any  shade  of  politics.  The 
omission  to  obtain  guarantees  for  the  Catalans,  who 
had  valiantly  supported  the  allies  against  Philip,  is 
indeed  indefensible.  But  the  advantages  gained  by 
England  were  very  solid,  and  I  am  myself  unable  to 
understand  how  anyone  who  examines  the  facts  can 
possibly  hold  that  it  was  the  interest  of  this  country  to 


THIRD  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP- IN-CHIEF  123 

continue  the  war.  It  had  had  originally  on  England's 
part  one  main  object — to  break  the  intolerable  and 
overbearing  power  of  France,  and  two  subsidiary 
objects — to  prevent  that  power  from  being  used  to 
incorporate  France  with  Spain,  or  to  force  a  restoration 
of  the  Stuarts  against  the  will  of  the  English  people. 
All  these  objects  had  been  achieved,  and  achieved  for 
some  time,  or  rather  two  had  been  achieved  and  one  had 
ceased  to  be  important.  The  elevation  of  Charles  of 
Austria  to  the  Imperial  throne  made  it  impossible  that 
England,  with  any  sense  or  reason,  should  fight  to 
prevent  France  from  acquiring  Spain  in  order  that 
Austria  should  acquire  it,  even  if  experience  had  not 
shown  the  practical  impossibility  of  imposing  a  king 
upon  the  Spaniards  against  their  will.  The  French 
power  was  completely  broken  for  attack,  though  it  was 
still  formidable  for  defence.  I  know  that  this  pro- 
position is  sometimes  denied,  but  I  am  quite  certain 
that  it  is  not  denied  by  anyone  who  is  intimately 
acquainted  with  the  history  of  France  during  the  18th 
century.  Properly  speaking,  France  never  recovered 
from  the  financial  difficulties  into  which  this  war 
plunged  her,  till  the  Revolution  enabled  her  to  commit 
bankruptcy  and  begin  afresh.  Neither  did  the  French 
army  ever  during  the  century  recover  the  blows  dealt 
to  its  prestige  by  Marlborough,  till  in  the  same  way  the 
Revolution  broke  it  up  and  gave  it  a  fresh  start.  Yet 
more,  the  misery  of  the  French  peasantry,  which  went  on 
increasing  during  the  whole  age,  dates  from  this  period. 
So  does  the  loss  of  popular  respect  of  the  French  nobles, 
who,  as  Villars  and  others  bitterly  complain,  shirked  the 
service  as  soon  as  it  became  toilsome,  dangerous,  and 


124  MARLBOROUGH 

rarely  honourable  or  profitable.  All  the  seeds  of  the 
decay  of  France,  which  during  the  following  eighty  years 
handed  over  her  colonies  to  England,  were  sown  by  this 
war.  It  would  have  been  more  honourable  to  England, 
doubtless,  if  it  had  ended  when  the  campaign  of  Oude- 
narde  ended,  than  after  the  almost  disloyal  inaction  of 
Ormond  and  the  defeat  of  Denain.  But  its  real  work  as 
a  war,  the  rendering  it  impossible  that  France,  until 
some  total  transformation  had  come  on  her  people  and 
institutions,  should  tyrannise  over  Europe,  had  been 
done  and  done  thoroughly  even  before  the  first  negotia- 
tions for  peace. 

There  was  also  another  and  an  almost  stronger 
reason  for  peace,  which  is  sometimes  denied,  but 
to  which  Marlborough  himself,  had  he  chosen,  could 
have  given  the  strongest  testimony.  It  had  been 
obvious  for  years  there  was  absolutely  no  community  of 
interest  between  the  allies,  except  in  the  one  point  of 
reducing  the  power  of  France.  Already  the  tendency 
on  the  part  of  the  continental  powers  to  make  England 
fight  for  all  and  pay  for  all  had  clearly  displayed  itself ; 
and,  brief  as  the  foregoing  account  of  Marlborough's 
campaigns  has  necessarily  been,  abundant  instances 
have  been  given  of  the  obstacles  which  the  slowness 
and  timidity  of  the  Dutch,  the  questionable  faith  and 
ill-organised  resources  of  the  Emperor,  and  the  incurable 
jealousies  and  self-seeking  of  the  minor  German  princes, 
had  thrown  in  the  way.  Nor  was  mere  hindrance 
in  warlike  operations  the  chief  thing  that  had  to  be 
dreaded.  Did  a  great  success  occur,  then,  as  was  seen 
after  Ramillies,  the  jarring  interests  of  the  States  and 
the  Empire  were  certain  to  quarrel  over  the  booty  and 


THIRD  PERIOD  OF  GENERALSHIP-IN-CHIEF  125 

waste  the  moments  of  victory.  It  may  be  thought 
strange  that  any  Powers  should  have  acquiesced  in  the 
prolonging  of  a  desperate  war.  But  the  German 
States  from  the  Empire  downward,  relying  not  at  all  on 
trade,  greedy  of  subsidies,  and  accustomed  for  centuries 
to  draw  willing  recruits  from  a  poor  and  warlike 
population,  gained  something  and  lost  hardly  anything 
by  war,  while  the  continuance  of  it  freed  them  from  the 
perpetual  terror  of  French  aggression  under  which  for  an 
entire  century  they  had  suffered.  Holland  had,  indeed, 
more  to  lose  and  was  herself  a  paymaster.  But  to  the 
Dutch,  drawing  most  of  their  revenue  from  colonies  and 
trade,  war  was  not  very  burdensome  provided  that  they 
were  assured  of  safety  at  home,  which  they  could 
never  be  so  well  as  when  protected  by  the  alliance  of 
England  and  the  Empire.  Moreover,  the  Dutch  had  a 
kind  of  traditional  cause  of  quarrel  with  France,  and 
a  very  excusable  one,  on  account  of  the  unprovoked 
aggressions  of  Louis  XIV.  in  the  earlier  years  of  his 
reign,  while  their  darling  ambition,  a  strong  '  barrier,' 
could  hardly  be  attained  except  at  the  cost  of  the 
Emperor.  All  these  things  made  it  very  unlikely  that 
peace  would  come  speedily  if  it  were  left  to  the  High 
Allies,  and  though  the  suspicions  which  the  Tory 
pamphleteers  hinted,  of  equal  readiness  on  the  part  of 
the  Dutch  and  the  Emperor  to  make  separate  peace  if 
they  could,  may  not  have  been  justified  in  fact,  there 
Was  quite  enough  ground  in  the  known  history  of  the 
past  for  not  dismissing  the  suggestion  as  wholly  un- 
likely. To  sum  up,  the  manner  of  the  Peace  of  Utrecht 
was  objectionable,  and  some  of  its  omissions  were 
almost  more  so.  But  it  obtained  very  solid  advantages 


126  MARLBOROUGH 

for  England,  including  a  permanent  hold  on  the 
Mediterranean  and  the  opening  of  the  South  American 
trade,  and,  above  all,  it  put  an  end  to  English  participa- 
tion in  a  bloody  and  costly  war,  from  which  there  was 
little  prospect  of  escape  otherwise,  and  which  had 
ceased  to  be  either  necessary  or  profitable  for  the 
country.  It  is  difficult  to  see  what  further  advantages 
of  the  territorial  kind  could  have  been  obtained;  for 
England  was  not  at  the  moment  ready  to  occupy  large 
tracts  of  colony.  The  thirty  years  of  peace  obtained 
by  the  treaty  of  Utrecht  gave  her  time  to  get  into 
such  readiness,  and  thus  the  treaty  itself,  not  imme- 
diately but  far  from  indirectly,  led  to  the  wonderful 
acquisitions  of  territory  which,  after  the  cessation  of 
the  'Pax  Walpoliana,'  made  her  mistress  of  America 
and  India  and  the  strongest  power  in  the  world.  To 
Marlborough  himself  this  was  in  great  part  owing,  but 
like  a  great  many  other  excellent  and  even  consummate 
craftsmen,  Marlborough  did  not  quite  understand  that 
there  is  a  time  for  ceasing  to  exercise  as  well  as  a  time 
for  exercising  even  the  noblest  crafts. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

MARLBOROUGH  AS  DIPLOMATIST. 

IN  order  not  to  interrupt  the  continuous  account  of  the 
actual  military  occupations  in  which  Marlborough  was 
engaged,  it  has  been  thought  well  to  make  in  the  last 
three  chapters  only  scanty  and  passing  references  to  his 
diplomatic  employments,  and  to  leave  them,  as  well  as 
his  share  in  home  politics  and  home  intrigues,  for 
treatment  in  the  same  way  separate  and  continuous. 
Unlike  the  general  run  of  commanders,  but  perhaps 
like  most  of  the  greatest,  Marlborough  was  a  diplo- 
matist of  the  very  first  rank.  -  His  combination  of 
grasp  and  penetration  of  view,  the  singular  suavity  of 
his  manners,  his  unrivalled  command  of  temper,  and 
the  mixture  of  tenacity  and  suppleness  which  enabled 
him  to  wait  for  the  favourable  moment  by  which  his 
keenness  of  sight  and  promptitude  of  action  were  sure  to 
profit :  these  things  supplied  him  with  all  the  equip- 
ment of  a  diplomatist  of  the  first  class.  Nor  did  he 
want  experience.  He  had,  as  has  been  seen,  acted  in 
negotiations  between  Charles  and  James,  between 
James  and  the  French  king,  between  William  and  the 
copartners  in  the  Grand  Alliance,  before  the  death  of 
William  and  the  accession  of  Anne  gave  him  still 


128  MARLBOROUGH 

wider  scope  for  displaying  his  talents  in  this  direction. 
His  services  at  the  close  of  the  last  reign  especially 
fitted  him  for  continuing  them  under  Anne,  and  it  can 
hardly  be  said  that  at  any  time,  until  the  expulsion  of 
his  friends  from  power  deprived  him  of  the  confidence 
of  the  Home  Government,  he  was  entirely  free  from 
diplomatic  work.  When  he  had  nothing  else  of  the 
kind  to  do,  Dutch  deputies  and  recalcitrant  Imperialist 
generals  took  good  care  that  his  powers  of  negotiation 
should  not  rust. 

A  minute  history  of  his  diplomacy  is,  however,  no 
more  possible  here  than  a  minute  history  of  his  tactics, 
and,  as  before,  we  must  seize  only  those  points  which 
chiefly  show  his  character  and  abilities  in  this  particular 
function.  The  incidents,  or  series  of  incidents,  which 
may  be  selected,  both  for  this  purpose  and  as  most 
important  in  themselves,  are  his  tour  to  the  German 
capitals  in  the  winter  succeeding  Blenheim,  the  similar 
tour  a  year  later,  the  visit  to  Charles  XII.  in  1707,  and 
the  negotiations  with  Torcy  in  the  two  following 
years. 

These  were  the  chief  instances  in  which  he  was 
engaged  in  personal  diplomacy.  As  far  as  negotiation 
by  letter  and  by  subordinate  agents  went,  all  the 
negotiations  of  1702-1709  passed,  directly  or  indirectly, 
through  his  hands.  His  real  power  both  as  general 
and  as  favourite  was  exaggerated  by  continental 
ignorance  of  the  English  parliamentary  system ;  and 
almost  every  quarrel  or  suit  of  importance  from  Stock- 
holm, through  Berlin  and  Warsaw  to  Vienna  and 
Pesth,  from  Vienna  and  Pesth,  through  Turin  to 
Lisbon  and  Madrid,  in  some  way  or  other  engaged 


MARLBOROUGH  AS  DJPLOMATIST  129 

Marlborough's  attention.  It  is  in  this,  even  more  than 
in  the  importance  of  the  armies  which  he  commanded, 
that  his  unique  position  among  generals,  and  especially 
among  English  generals,  consists. 

The  first  occasion,  however,  which  presented  itself 
for  his  personal  diplomacy  elsewhere  than  at  the 
Hague,  was  in  the  winter  after  Blenheim.  The  Duke 
of  Savoy  was  very  hard  pressed,  and  it  was  not  at  all 
clear  how  aid  was  to  be  sent  him.  The  Emperor 
would  not,  perhaps  could  not;  Maryborough's  own 
troops  were  limited  by  treaty  to  Germany  and  the 
Netherlands  as  campaigning  grounds.  The  newly 
made  king  of  Prussia,  however,  had  begun  the  policy, 
never  afterwards  abandoned  by  his  family,  of  keeping  a 
considerable  army  on  foot.  He  was  known  to  be  very 
accessible  to  judicious  flattery,  and  it  was  thought 
possible  that  a  contingent  might  be  got  out  of  him  by 
personal  application.  Accordingly  on  November  15, 
Marlborough  set  out  from  Landau  with  many  groans 
as  to  the  hardships  of  the  winter  journey.  He  reached 
Berlin  in  a  week,  set  to  work  at  once  and  was  com- 
pletely successful,  though  the  king  was  at  variance 
with  the  Dutch  about  the  Orange  inheritance,  and 
though  the  war  between  Sweden  and  Poland — both 
Prussia's  nearest  neighbours — might  have  served  as 
something  more  than  a  pretext  for  refusal.  He  finished 
the  business  in  less  than  a  week. 

A  year  later  he  took  a  more  extensive  diplomatic 
tour,  in  which  he  visited  nearly  all  the  German  courts  of 
any  mark  except  that  of  Bavaria,  which  his  own  victories 
had  for  the  time  deprived  of  importance.  He  began  with 
the  Elector  Palatine,  then  went  to  his  old  colleague  and 


130  MARLBOROUGH 

almost  enemy,  Louis  of  Baden,  made  liis  way  to  Vienna, 
hurried  thence  to  Berlin,  where  he  succeeded,  not 
without  difficulty,  in  putting  Frederick  William  the 
Expensive  into  good  humour,  and  averting  the 
threatened  recall  of  his  contingents,  soothed  at  Hanover 
the  wrath  of  the  Electoral  family,  who  were  equally 
angry  with  Whigs  and  Tories  for  opposing  a  project  of 
inviting  the  Electress  Sophia  to  England,  and  so  made 
his  way  to  the  Hague.  These  tours  might  have  been 
very  advantageously  repeated  every  year,  had  not 
domestic  politics  and  domestic  squabbles  called  Marl- 
borough  off  from  work  for  which  he  was  much  better 
fitted. 

The  most  curious  and  interesting  of  Maryborough's 
diplomatic  commissions  was,  however,  undertaken  in 
the  spring  of  1707,  and  the  object  of  it  was  Charles  XII. 
of  Sweden.  Not  only  was  the  meeting  between  two 
such  famous  and  so  strangely  contrasted  generals  of 
itself  interesting,  but  the  circumstances  made  it  still 
more  so.  Charles,  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  say,  was 
very  much  of  a  comet  in  the  European  system.  In  fact 
he  spent  his  energies  on  the  impregnable  mass  of  the 
Russian  Empire,  on  Poland  (which  was  fast  becoming 
the  cypher  in  European  politics  which  a  few  more  years 
made  it),  and  on  his  own  subjects. '  But  he  was  per- 
fectly capable  of  dashing  into  the  west  instead  of  into 
the  east,  and  such  a  dash  would  have  interfered  sorely 
with  the  projects  of  the  allies.  Sweden  and  France  had 
been,  on  the  whole,  in  friendly  relations  since  the  time  of 
Gustavus  Adolphus,  and  though  Charles  professed  great 
zeal  for  'the  Protestant  religion,'  his  chivalrous  or 
whimsical  temper,  whichever  adjective  may  be  pre- 


MARLBOROUGH  AS  DIPLOMATIST  131 

ferredj  had  been  struck  by  the  misfortunes  of  the 
Elector  of  Bavaria  to  such  an  extent  that  he  was  be- 
lieved to  be  meditating  his  restoration  and  perhaps  also 
the  support  of  the  Hungarians  against  Austria.  No  one 
who  knows  the  character  of  the  two  generals  and  has 
considered  their  exploits,  can  doubt  that  if  Charles 
had  executed  his  design  and  had  met  Marlborough 
in  arms  instead  of  in  amity,  blushing  glory  would 
have  had  to  hide  Pultowa's  day  considerably  earlier 
than  she  actually  did.  But  the  actual  struggle  with 
France  was  too  equal  for  any  prudent  statesman  or 
general  to  wish  further  weight  cast  in  the  French  scale. 
Besides,  the  imagination  of  the  period  had  been  so 
strongly  struck  with  Charles's  actual  achievements, 
that  he  no  doubt  seemed  a  much  more  formidable 
enemy  than  he  was.  So,  after  preparing  the  way  by 
bribing  those  of  his  ministers  who  had  not  been  already 
bribed  by  the  French,  and  perhaps  some  who  had,  it 
seemed  good  that  Marlborough  should  visit  Saxony, 
where  Charles  then  was  in  person.  It  is  said  that 
the  king  declared  he  would  treat  with  no  one  but 
Marlborough,  and  as  he  was  undoubtedly  curious  to 
meet  him  and  could  not  well  make  the  advance  himself, 
it  is  very  likely. 

Marlborough  journeyed  by  the  Hague  and  Hanover 
to  Altranstadt,  where  the  Swedes  were  encamped,  and 
arrived  there  on  the  night  of  Monday,  April  24.  He 
put  himself  under  the  charge  of  Count  Piper,  the 
principal  pensioned  minister,  and  was  introduced  to 
the  king  next  day.  His  reported  address  might,  in 
more  modern  times,  have  been  thought  fulsome — and 
certainly  Marlborough  never  hesitated  at  flattery  when 


132  MARLBOROUGH 

he  thought  it  advisable.  But  it  does  not  seem  to  be 
much  if  at  all  beyond  what  the  customs  of  the  time 
authorised  in  addresses  to  monarchs,  and  it  was  per- 
fectly well  known  that  Charles  was  at  least  as  fond  of 
flattery  as  of  glory.  The  reply  was  gracious,  though 
slightly  braggart,  and  after  dining  with  the  king, 
Marlborough  was  summoned  to  a  private  interview. 

The  accounts  of  this  celebrated  interview,  which  are 
given  by  Voltaire,  the  nearest  writer  of  eminence  to 
the  time,  and  those  which  Archdeacon  Coxe  has 
elaborated  from  the  very  few  documents  and  from 
other  contemporary  accounts,  differ  in  a  manner  even 
more  striking  than  usual.  Both  are  favourable  to 
Maryborough's  diplomatic  dexterity ;  indeed  that  dex- 
terity has  had  few  more  lavish  eulogists  than  Voltaire, 
who  calls  the  English  general  roundly  'the  cleverest 
diplomatist  of  his  time.'  But  they  differ  remarkably 
as  to  the  particular  fashion  in  which  that  dexterity 
was  exercised.  According  to  Voltaire,  Piper  received 
no  money  at  all ;  but  though  he  invokes  Sarah  as  his 
authority,  this  can  be  of  no  weight  as  against  Marl- 
borough's  statements  in  his  letters  to  Godolphin.  In 
the  same  way,  Voltaire's  assertion  that  Marlborough 
made  no  definite  proposals  to  the  king,  is  quite  incon- 
sistent with  the  certain  fact  that  he  held  out  to  Charles 
the  prospect  of  mediating  between  France  and  the 
allies,  and  with  the  difficulty  he  had  in  preventing 
Charles  from  insisting  on  the  execution  of  the  religious 
part  of  the  Treaty  of  Westphalia.  Yet,  again,  Voltaire 
says  that  the  negotiations  were  chiefly  carried  on 
through  Goertz,  not  Piper;  and  here  Marlborough 
himself  again  contradicts  him.  What  is  less  easy  of 


MARLBOROUGH  AS  DIPLOMATIST  133 

decision  is  whether  or  no  Charles,  as  Voltaire  reports, 
thought  Marlborough's  appearance  too  point-de-vice  for 
a  general.  He  was  very  likely  to  do  this,  for  he  was 
himself,  as  is  well  known,  a  confirmed  sloven. 

But  what  is  certain  is  that  none  of  the  designs  hostile 
to  the  allies  which  had  been  talked  of  were  carried  out, 
and  that  Charles  abstained,  not  merely  from  actively  sup- 
porting France  or  Bavaria,  but  from  pushing  his  own 
petty,  but  all  the  more  obstinately  cherished  grievances 
against  the  Emperor.  So  that  the  ambassador  certainly 
succeeded  in  his  mission,  whatever  were  the  particular 
means  of  success  which  he  used.  It  is,  moreover, 
justly  claimed  for  Marlborough,  that  he  managed  two 
extremely  delicate  pieces  of  business — his  relations 
with  the  discomfited  Augustus  of  Saxony,  and  with 
Augustus's  temporarily  successful  rival  Stanislaus  Lec- 
zinski — without  giving  any  offence  to  a  prince  so 
almost  insanely  ready  to  take  offence  as  Charles. 

He  finished  this  difficult  matter  with  another  visit 
to  the  king  of  Prussia,  and  that  expensive  Herr  pre- 
sented him  with  a  diamond  ring  worth  a  thousand 
pounds,  which  it  is  quite  certain  Marlborough  did  not 
fail  to  estimate  at  its  proper  value. 

The  last  important  diplomatic  negotiations  in  which 
Marlborough  was  concerned  contrast  remarkably  with 
the  earlier.  They  were  the'  long  and  complicated  hag- 
glings  for  peace  with  the  French  which  lasted  from 
the  winter  of  1708  till  the  definite  refusal  of  Louis  to 
make  war  upon  his  own  grandson  at  the  Congress  of 
Gertruydenberg.  Nothing,  it  is  known,  came  of  these 
negotiations ;  unless  it  may  be  said  that  the  readiness 
of  the  Tory  Ministry  to  accept  comparatively  less 


134  MARLBOROUGH 

favourable  terms  at  Utrecht  came  of  them.  It  cannot 
be  said  that  the  appearance  which  Marlborough  pre- 
sents in  these  matters  is  altogether  favourable.  That 
public  opinion  charged  him  with  contributing  to  the 
insistence  on  impossible  terms,  and  with  thus  endea- 
vouring to  keep  up  the  war,  is  well  known,  and  I 
cannot  say  that  either  his  own  or  his  advocates'  defence 
appears  to  me  satisfactory.  The  faithful  Coxe  will  have 
it  that  Marlborough  was  a  mere  mouthpiece  of  the 
Whig  Ministry ;  that  he  had  nothing  to  do  with  the 
decisions  of  the  Cabinet,  and  that  whether  or  no  he 
was  sincerely  as  anxious  for  peace  as  he  himself  pre- 
tends, he  was  only  a  channel  and  an  instrument  in 
the  proceedings  which  kept  up  the  war.  This,  it  is 
hardly  necessary  to  remark  to  anyone  who  has  the 
faculty  of  estimating  evidence,  will  not  do.  In  the  first 
place,  the  presence  of  Godolphin  in  the  Ministry  practi- 
cally made  Marlborough  as  responsible  for  its  decisions 
as  if  he  himself  had  held  a  post  in  the  Cabinet.  In  the 
second  place,  the  Whig  Ministry  itself  was  Marl- 
borough's  own  creature.  Without  him  and  his  wife, 
the  Coalition  or  moderate  Tory  Government  of  the 
Queen's  first  years  would  never  have  been  broken  up. 
Without  him  the  pure  Whig  Government  which 
succeeded  could  not  have  remained  a  day  in  office. 
More  than  all  this,  Marlborough,  putting  his  back- 
stairs influence  entirely  aside,  had  a  method  of  direct- 
ing the  peace  or  war  decisions  of  the  Cabinet  which 
was  quite  final.  His  resignation  would  have  made  it 
impossible  for  the  most  desperate  hater  of  wooden  shoes 
and  warming-pans  to  carry  on  the  war  for  three  months. 
This  being  so,  it  is  parfectly  useless  to  uphold  Marl- 


MARLBOROUGH  AS  DIPLOMATIST  135 

borough  as  a  humble  servant  of  his  country  and  his 
country's  ministers,  who  did  nothing  for  peace  because 
it  was  not  within  his  power  or  his  province  to  do  any- 
thing. It  is  quite  open  to  anyone  to  contend  that  he 
honestly  thought  the  prosecution  of  the  war  the  best 
thing  for  England.  The  celebrated  delusion  of  M.  Josse 
is  by  no  means  always  a  consciously  corrupt  or 
interested  delusion ;  it  is  sometimes  a  delusion  quite 
independent  of  any  interested  or  corrupt  motives,  con- 
scious or  unconscious.  From  a  very  young  man,  Marl- 
borough  had  seen  France  the  arbiter  and  the  tyrant  of 
continental  Europe.  Few  people  knew  better  than  he 
how  she  had  been  for  years  the  arbiter  and  had  nearly 
been  the  tyrant  of  England.  Not  a  man  living 
probably  knew  so  well  how  unstable  was  the  alliance 
which  was  gradually  forcing  her  to  her  knees,  and  how 
difficult  it  might  be  if  that  alliance  were  once  dissolved 
to  get  its  members  together  again.  It  will  perhaps 
seem  that  if  Marlborough  did  wrong  here  (and  he  pro- 
bably did),  he  did  it,  if  not  with  a  totally  honest  inten- 
tion, at  any  rate  with  reasons  to  appeal  to  which  might 
have  sufficed  for  a  totally  honest  intention.  But  to. 
represent  him  as  a  mere  helpless  Spenlow,  the  unwill- 
ing instrument  of  such  Jorkinses  as  Godolphin, 
Sunderland,  Russell,  and  the  rest,  is  really  childish; 
and  it  must  be  taken  as  one  of  the  numerous  proofs 
that  Archdeacon  Coxe,  with  an  industry  in  perusing, 
and  a  sagacity  in  selecting  historical  documents  which 
have  not  been  equalled  by  far  more  pretentious 
historians,  either  had  no  knowledge  of  human  nature 
and  the  force  of  evidence  at  all,  or  was  so  completely 
under  the  dominion  of  the  idea  that  a  biographer  must 


136  MARLBOROUGH 

defend  his  hero  at  all  hazards,  that  he  did  not  attempt 
to.  exercise  his  faculty  of  judgment. 

If,  however,  Maryborough  erred  in  these  negotia- 
tions, it  is  fair  to  remember  that  the  jarring  interests 
which  he  had  to  recognise,  and  if  possible  reconcile, 
were  so  irreconcilable  that  his  successors  only  got  rid 
of  them  by  ignoring  them  altogether,  and  practically 
making  a  separate  peace.  He  was  punished  very 
curiously  in  kind.  After  the  downfall  of  his  friends  in 
1710  he  had  no  further  control  of  diplomatic  affairs 
whatever,  and  it  is  quite  clear  that  he  felt  this  very 
bitterly.  Some,  indeed,  of  his  expressions  to  Boling- 
broke,  while  he  still  continued  in  command,  are  hardly 
dignified,  and  nothing  seems  to  have  galled  him  more 
than  that  he,  who  for  nearly  nine  years  had  practically 
controlled  the  diplomacy  of  England,  and  had  carried 
on  great  part  of  it  through  his  private  agents,  should 
now  be  left  out  in  the  cold  and  in  ignorance  of  what 
was  going  on  behind  his  back. 

The  extent  of  his  diplomacy  is  simply  wonderful, 
and,  as  has  been  said,  can  at  best  be  generally  de- 
scribed, not  given  by  sample  and  detail  here.  In  a 
war  which  was  only  less  universal  than  the  great  war 
which  succeeded  it  three  quarters  of  a  century  later  ;  a 
war  which  engaged  every  country  from  Shetland  to 
Lisbon,  from  the  utmost  Spanish  and  French  capes  of 
the  west  to  the  borders  of  Turkey,  nothing  during 
these  years  was  done  without  Marlborough's  privity 
and  advice.  He  had  not  merely  that  which  came  upon 
him  daily :  the  care  of  mollifying  the  Dutch  States  and 
deputies ;  of  coaxing  sulky  or  half-hearted  imperialist 
generals ;  of  keeping  the  minor  kings  and  princes  of 


' 


MARLBOROUGH  AS  DIPLOMATIST  137 

the  Empire  in  good  humour ;  of  controlling  the  finan- 
cial affairs  of  the  subsidised  troops  in  Germany;  he 
had  even  to  keep  the  Italian  war  steadily  under  his  eye  ; 
to  advise  (though  not  often  with  much  effect)  on  the 
affairs  of  Spain,  and  to  suggest  (though  again  without 
much  success)  descents  on  the  French  coasts  to  distract 
the  attention  of  the  enemy.  He  maintained,  it  would 
seem  (and  there  is  at  least  fair  ground  for  accepting 
his  plea  that  the  too  famous  bread  money  was  mainly, 
if  not  wholly,  devoted  to  this  purpose),  a  complete 
intelligence  system  of  his  own  (not  a  few  documents 
respecting  which  are  still  extant)  at  nearly  all  the 
capitals,  camps,  and  head-quarters  in  Europe.  He  was 
also  generally  in  direct  communication — though,  as  may 
be  supposed,  this  communication  was  not  unfrequently 
interrupted  by  jealousy — with  all  the  chief  English 
ambassadors  and  envoys  ordinary  and  extraordinary  on 
the  Continent.  Except  in  the  case  of  Napoleon,  there 
is  absolutely  no  instance  of  work  so  multifarious  and 
crushing  being  laid  on  a  single  man ;  and  Marlborough 
had,  of  course,  greatly  the  disadvantage  of  Napoleon, 
both  in  respect  of  irresponsibility  and  of  means  in  men 
and  money  to  carry  out  his  plans.  It  would  not  be  true 
to  say  that  he  discharged  this  heavy  load  of  work  (to 
which,  it  must  be  remembered,  had  to  be  added  his 
voluminous  private  correspondence  with  the  Duchess  and 
Godolphin,  and  a  participation  in  home  politics  nearly 
as  active  as  if  he  had  been  a  peer  at  home  with  nothing 
to  do  but  to  go  to  his  office  for  an  hour  or  two,  and  to 
the  House  of  Lords  for  an  hour  or  two  more)  altogether 
without  suffering.  He  was  not  young,  nor  even  in  early 
middle  life,  when  it  began ;  and  there  can  be  very  little 


138  MARLBOROUGH 

doubt  that  the  enormous  intellectual  labour  of  these 
years,  unrelieved  except  by  bodily  labour  no  less  severe 
when  he  was  in  the  field,  had  something  to  do  with  the 
failure  of  intellectual  vigour  which  came  upon  him  in 
his  last  days.  It  is  a  common  complaint  in  his  private 
letters  that  '  his  head  is  so  hot,'  that  '  his  blood  is  in 
a  fever,'  and  the  like.  But  he  never,  in  all  the  years 
of  his  command,  seems  to  have  failed  in  the  punctual 
discharge  of  whatever  work  came  upon  him ;  and,  until 
the  failure  (if,  indeed,  it  was  not  an  intended  failure)  of 
Gertruydenberg,  he  was  as  invariably  successful  in  his 
diplomatic  as  in  his  military  work,  and  as  little  demon- 
strative over  his  successes.  Thackeray,  who  was  certainly 
less  than  just  to  him  on  the  whole,  has  remarked  on 
the  unique  calm  and  almost  humility  with  which  he 
records  the  most  splendid  victories ;  and  this  is  equally 
characteristic  of  his  accounts  of  his  negotiations.  There 
is  nothing  of  the  pride  that  apes  humility  about  this ; 
nothing  of  the  depreciation  which  is  intended  merely 
to  extort  praise.  There  is  no  scorn  of  others ;  not  even 
any  apparent  delight  in  talking  about  himself.  Al- 
though there  are,  as  has  been  more  than  once  noticed, 
flashes  of  humour  and  pungency,  they  seem  to  be 
rather  avoided  than  sought.  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
there  is  no  jejuneness  or  brevity.  He  takes  as  much 
pains  to  make  his  correspondent  clearly  understand 
what  he  has  done  as  he  takes  'little  to  impress  on  him 
that  it  is  he,  Maryborough,  who  has  done  it.  It  is 
to  be  regretted  that  partly  the  bodily  exhaustion  of  the 
day's  work,  and  partly  the  dislike  just  noticed  of  brag- 
ging, seems  to  have  prevented  him  from  giving  anyone 
familiar  detailed  accounts  of  his  own  great  victories,  for 


MARLBOROUGH  AS  DIPLOMATIST  139 

the  exceptional  clearness  of  his  style  would  have  made 
them  of  the  first  value.1 

1  It  has  occurred  to  me  that  it  may  be  interesting  to  the  reader 
to  have  Marlborough's  first  accounts  of  his  four  great  victories 
placed  in  juxtaposition.  They  are  as  follows : — 

BLENHEIM — to  SAEAH,  and  written  on  the  back  of  a  Bill,  or 
Commistariat  form. 

Aug.  13,  1704. — I  have  not  the  time  to  say  more,  but  to  beg 
you  will  give  my  duty  to  the  Queen  and  let  her  know  her  army  has 
had  a  glorious  victory.  M.  Tallard  and  two  other  generals  are  in  my 
coach,  and  I  am  following  the  rest.  The  bearer,  my  aide-de-camp, 
Colonel  Parke,  will  give  her  an  account  of  what  has  passed.  I  shall 
do  it  in  a  day  or  two  by  another  more  at  large, — MARLBOKOUGH. 

EAMILLIES — to  SAEAH,  with  a  somewJiat  longer  one  to  GODOLPHIN. 
(TJic  official  dispatch  had  been  sent  the  night  before.) 

Monday,  Nay  24th,  11  o'clock. — I  did  not  tell  my  dearest  soul  in 
my  last  the  design  I  had  of  engaging  the  enemy  if  possible  to  a  battle, 
fearing  the  concern  she  has  for  me  might  make  her  uneasy:  but  I  can 
now  give  her  the  satisfaction  of  letting  her  know  that  on  Sunday  last 
we  fought,  and  that  God  Almighty  has  been  pleased  to  give  us  a 
victory.  I  must  leave  the  particulars  to  this  bearer,  Colonel  Richards, 
for  having  been  on  horseback  all  Sunday,  and  after  the  battle  march- 
ing all  night,  my  head  aches  to  that  degree  that  it  is  very  uneasy  for 
me  to  write ;  poor  Bingfield,  holding  my  stirrup  for  me  and  helping 
me  on  horseback,  was  killed.  I  am  told  that  he  leaves  his  wife  and 
mother  in  a  poor  condition.  I  can't  write  to  any  of  my  children,  so 
that  you  will  let  them  know  I  am  well,  and  that  I  desire  they  will 
thank  God  for  preserving  me.  And  pray  give  my  duty  to  the  Queen 
and  let  her  know  the  truth  of  my  heart,  that  the  greatest  pleasure  I 
have  in  this  success  is  that  it  may  be  a  great  service  to  her  affairs  : 
for  I  am  sincerely  sensible  of  all  her  goodness  to  me  and  mine. 
Pray  believe  me  when  I  assure  you  that  I  love  you  more  than  I  can 
express.' 

OUDENABDE — to  SAEAH,  with,  as  usual,  another  and  rather 
longer  to  GODOLPHIN. 

July  12. — I  have  neither  spirits  (the  GODOLPHIN  letter  tayx  his 
head  '  aches  terribly ')  nor  time  to  answer  your  three  last  letters,  this 


140  MARLBOROUGH 

All  these  gifts  found  at  least  as  appropriate  em- 
ployment abroad  in  diplomacy  as  in  war.  It  is  only  to 
be  regretted  that  they  had  to  be  employed  so  largely 
on  the  petty  and  often  discreditable  intrigues  at  home, 
which  will  be  described  in  the  next  chapter. 

being  to  bring  the  good  news  of  a  battle  we  had  yesterday,  in 
which  it  pleased  God  to  give  us  at  last  the  advantage.  Our  foot 
on  both  sides  having  been  all  engaged  has  occasioned  much  blood : 
but  I  thank  God  the  English  have  suffered  less  than  any  of  the 
other  troops — none  of  our  English  horse  having  been  engaged.  I 
do,  and  you  must,  give  thanks  to  God  for  His  goodness  in  protecting 
and  making  me  the  instrument  of  so  much  happiness  to  the  Queen 
and  nation,  if  she  will  please  to  make  use  of  it. 

MALPLAQUET — a  postscript  to  SARAH,  added  to  a  letter  written 
t?ie  day  before  the  fight. 

September  11. — I  am  so  tired  that  I  have  but  strength  enough  to 
tell  you  that  we  have  had  this  day  a  very  bloody  battle :  the  first 
part  of  the  day  we  beat  their  foot  and  afterwards  their  horse.  God 
Almighty  be  praised,  it  is.  now  in  our  power  to  have  what  peace  we 
please,  and  I  may  be  pretty  well  assured  of  never  being  in  another 
battle :  but  that  nor  nothing  in  this  world  can  make  me  happy  if 
you  are  not  kind.' 


CHAPTER  IX. 

DOMESTIC  AND    POLITICAL  ATTITUDE    DURING   PERIOD   OF 
GENERALSHIP. 

IT  may  seem  strange  to  some  readers  that  the  entire 
relations  of  Marlborough  to  home  policy,  touching  as 
they  do  on  matters  which  have  had  to  themselves 
hundreds  of  volumes  for  treatment,  should  here  be 
consigned  to  a  single  if  a  long  chapter.  The  reason, 
however,  is  a  simple  one.  It  is  that  the  events  here 
to  be  recorded,  though  they  exercised  a  momentous 
influence  on  Marlborough's  career,  were  really  to  a 
very  small  extent  in  Marlborough's  direct  guidance. 
He  made,  as  has  been  seen,  flitting  visits  to  England 
each  winter,  sometimes  when  Parliament  was  not  sitting. 
He  profited  at  first,  immensely,  by  his  wife's  influence 
over  the  queen  ;  he  suffered  almost  more  immensely,  in  ' 
the  proper  meaning  of  the  word,  from  the  abuse  and 
the  loss  of  that  influence.  The  extraordinary  accident 
of  his  possessing  in  Godolphin  a  kind  of  alter  ego  gifted 
with  statesmanship  maintained  his  credit  longer,  no 
doubt,  than  it  could  otherwise  have  been  maintained. 
During  the  whole  time  he  gave  much,  and  generally  good 
advice  to  his  colleagues.  He  profited  by  the  moderate 
Tory  party  as  long  as  he  could,  advised  and  upheld  the 
7 


142  MARLBOROUGH 

expedient  of  a  coalition  between  the  moderate  Tories 
and  moderate  Whigs,  availed  himself  of  the  Whig  party 
pure  and  simple  when  the  coalition  broke  down,  and 
for  a  time,  at  any  rate,  served  without  rebelling  a  pure 
Tory  Ministry,  after  the  Whigs  had  thrown  away  their 
chance.  But  the  feeling  which  is  uppermost  in  the 
minds  of  most  impartial  and  tolerably  qualified  readers 
of  the  annals  of  the  time  must  be,  I  think,  that  Marl- 
borough  was  not  at  the  height  of  the  political  situation 
as  he  was  at  the  height  of  the  military.  He  could  not, 
distant  as  he  was  from  England,  and  absorbed  for  the 
most  part  in  other  business,  fully  appreciate  the  ad- 
vance which  the  party  system  in  the  House  of  Commons 
was  making  under  a  female  sovereign  of  little  vigour 
and  a  set  of  Ministers  who  were  much  more  intriguers 
than  -  statesmen.  He  did  not  perceive,  and  it  was 
nearly  impossible  for  him  to  perceive,  that  while  in  his 
earlier  days  it  had  been  a  question  how  parties  in 
Parliament  could  rise  to  power  by  attaching  them- 
selves to  this  or  that  claimant  of  the  throne — to  James, 
to  Monmouth,  to  William — the  question  now  was, 
what  claimant  to  the  throne  could  win  or  hold  it  by 
attaching  himself  to  this  or  that  party  ?  He  began  and 
continued  at  the  wrong  end  of  the  machine,  and  the 
downward  history  of  his  parliamentary  influence,  which 
he  finally  lost,  as  I  have  no  doubt,  from  double-dealing 
during  his  absence  on  the  Continent  in  the  last  two 
years  of  Queen  Anne's  reign,  is  due  to  this.  He  did 
not  see  that,  in  the  fourfold  change  above  detailed,  he 
was  gradually  losing  grasp  of  the  only  lever  which 
remained  to  an  English  statesman.  That  conviction 
no  less  than  interest  kept  him  to  the  side  of  '  the 


DOMESTIC  AND  POLITICAL  ATTITUDE      143 

Protestant  religion'  and  the  anti-Gallican  crusade,  I 
for  one  have  no  doubt.  But  he  never  seems  to  have 
fully  realised  that  after  the  Revolution  the  ultimate 
power  had  passed  from  the  Court  to  the  polling- 
booths,  and  that  at  these  latter  the  battle  had  really 
to  be  fought.  I  think  that  the  war  of  the  Spanish 
Succession,  at  least  after  Oudenarde,  was  a  bad  war  for 
England;  I  think  that  the  peace  of  Utrecht  was  a 
good  peace  for  England.  But  Marlborough  was  quite 
entitled  to  hold  the  opposite  view.  The  fault  of  his 
conduct — a  fault  which  in  a  man  of  such  exceptional 
power  of  intellect  must  be  attributed  at  least  partly 
to  his  distance  from  the  scene  of  action — was  in  mis- 
taking not  so  much  his  ends  as  his  means. 

Among  those  means  his  wife  has,  perhaps,  had  an 
undue  place  assigned  her  by  history.  Clio  has  always 
had  a  feminine  turn  for  scandal,  and  in  no  instance  has 
it  pleased  her  to  assign  so  much  influence  to  the  cama- 
rilla as  in  this  reign  of  Queen  Anne.  Sarah  Marlborough 
and  Abigail  Masham  occupy  in  all  histories  of  the  time 
what  appears  to  me  a  wholly  disproportionate  place. 
That  they  had  no  influence,  or  small  influence,  no  one 
but  a  fool  would  say :  that  their  influence  accomplished 
by  itself  anything  like  the  changes  of  these  ten  years  I 
do  most  sturdily  deny.  Towards  the  end  of  William  III.'s 
reign  the  English  nation  sickened  of  its  Dutch  de- 
liverer without  exactly  yearning  for  its  exiled  tyrant. 
Anne,  and  Anne's  favourite  ministers,  Marlborough, 
Nottingham,  Godolphin,  exactly  met  its  wishes,  and 
Marlborough's  pugnacity  met  them  likewise.  But  the 
Tory  '  tail '  proved  itself  factious  and  incapable,  and  by 
degrees  public  confidence  turned  to  the  Whigs,  aided 


144  MARLBOROUGH 

a  little  by  Whig  electioneering.  The  Whigs  proved 
themselves  more  tyrannical  and  more  incompetent  than 
the  Tories,  while  their  place-hunting  disgusted  the 
country.  The  crowning  folly  of  the  Sacheverell  prosecu- 
tion put  them  out  of  favour,  and  a  Tory  Ministry  came 
in  to  end  the  war  of  which  the  nation  was  tired,  and,  if 
it  had  not  blundered  (fortunately  or  not,  who  can  tell  ?), 
to  restore  the  dynasty  which,  if  it  only  would  have 
behaved  decently,  the  nation  warmly  and  rightly  pre- 
ferred. Sarah  and  Abigail,  perhaps,  did  something 
more  than  sit  upon  the  wheels ;  they  put  spokes  in 
them  now  and  then.  But  that  the  whole  history  of 
Marl  borough's  downfall  and  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht 
resolves  itself  into  the  fact  that  Sarah  was  an  insolent 
handmaid  and  Abigail  an  obliging  one,  can  only  be 
admitted  by  those  who  refuse  to  listen  to  history  unless 
it  represents  itself  as  an  historical  novel.  I  am  not 
writing  the  life  of  Sarah  Jennings,  and  she  will  make 
less  appearance  here  than  she  has  made  in  any  life  of 
her  husband.  She  will  appear  when  it  is  necessary 
that  she  should  appear,  and  not  otherwise. 

Authorities  worthy  of  respect  assert  that,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  Lady  Marlborough  lost  her  influence 
with  Anne  from  the  date  of  the  latter's  succession.  If 
there  were  no  authorities  on  the  subject  it  would  be 
perfectly  easy  to  accept  the  fact  as  true.  To  admit 
the  kind  of  domination  which  Sarah  exercised  during 
a  difficult  and  dangerous  period  of  opposition  was  one 
thing ;  to  admit  it  when  the  dominated  person  was 
Queen  of  England  was  another.  It  is  probable  that,  if 
Lady  Mdrlborough  had  had  the  good  sense  to  abstain 
from  dictating  to  her  mistress  while  utilising  that  mis- 


DOMESTIC  AND  POLITICAL  ATTITUDE      145 

tress's  habitual  tendency  to  spoil  and  gratify  her,  she 
would,  in  effect,  have  played  a  much  more  effectual 
part  than  she  actually  did.  But  it  is  so  much  human 
nature  to  mistake  the  tenses  of  favour  that  one  can 
hardly  be  very  angry  with  Sarah  Marlborough. 

The  first  liberalities  of  the  new  queen  to  her 
favourites  have  already  been  noticed.  It  was  not  of  less 
importance  to  the  Marlborough  interest  that  Godolphin 
was  appointed  lord  treasurer.  Neither  Marlborough  nor 
Godolphin  was  a  '  high-flying '  Tory.  But  they  did  not 
at  first  attempt,  or  privately  wish,  to  interfere  with 
the  queen's  desire  for  a  Tory  Ministry,  and  the  Tory 
colour  of  the  new  administration  was  deepened  to  such 
an  extent  that  Montagu,  Somers,  and  Russell  were 
omitted  from  the  list  of  the  Privy  Council.  Even  at 
this  time  Lady  Marlborough  is  said  to  have  inclined  to 
the  Whigs,  it  is  supposed,  because  of  her  daughter's 
marriage  to  Sunderland's  heir.  It  is,  perhaps,  more 
reasonable  to  suppose  that  her  engrossing  temper 
found  more  satisfaction  in  the  prospect  of  bringing 
to  power  a  party  which,  save  herself,  had  no  support 
with  the  queen  than  in  the  concurrence  of  Tory 
partisans  who  were  independent  of  the  Marlboroughs, 
and  owed  them  no  thanks.  This  ruinous  folly,  to  which 
Marlborough  himself  gave  too  much  heed,  showed 
itself  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  reign ;  and  a  letter 
which  has  been  printed l  shows  the  extent  to  which, 

1  The  first  paragraph  of  this  letter  is  well  worth  giving,  as  it 
illustrates  Sarah's  temper  and  the  way  in  which  she  showed  it  in 
these  political  matters.  It  is  dated  Margate,  Tuesday  the  29th  May, 
and  is  written  not  to  her  husband  but  to  Godolphin : — '  Since  you 
have  been  so  kind  as  to  write  so  long  a  letter  for  my  satisfaction,  I 
hope  it  will  hold  out  to  read  my  answer,  though  I  know  my  opinion 


1 46  MARLBORO  UGH 

before  Anne  was  well  seated  on  the  throne,  it  had 
attained.  But  Sarah's  dislike  of  the  only  party  that 
could  really  support  or  really  endanger  her  husband's 
predominance  was  for  a  time  confined  to  minor  matters. 
The  elections  of  the  late  autumn  of  1702  returned  a 
large  Tory  majority,  and  the  motion,  intended  to  gal] 
the  Whigs,  that  the  Earl  of  Maryborough  had  '  signally 
retrieved '  the  ancient  honour  of  the  nation,  was  carried 
by  a  majority  of  a  hundred.  Yet  even  in  this  mood  of 
the  Commons  there  were  abundant  evidences  of  the 
impatience  with  which  anything  like  a  favourite  as 
such  has  always,  and  rightly,  been  regarded  by  the 
English  nation.  The  attempt  to  make  Maxlborough's 
pension  (of  5,OOOZ.  upon  the  Post  Office,  which  was 
conferred  at  the  same  time  as  the  dukedom  on  December 
14, 1702)  perpetual  and  hereditary  raised  decided  oppo- 
sition, and  while  it  probably  increased  the  Duchess's 
antipathy  to  the  Tories  it  ought  to  have  shown  her  the 
folly  of  attempting  to  dictate  to  the  House  of  Commons. 
It  was  not  till  after  Ramillies  that  the  pension  was 
made  perpetual  by  Act  of  Parliament,  and  that  Wood- 
stock and  Blenheim,  which  after  the  battle  of  that  name 

is  very  insignificant  upon  most  occasions.  (/£  is  good  to  look  at 
Sarah's  portrait  and  imagine  the  tost  of  the  head  rvith  which  thit 
mutt  hare  been  written.)  In  the  first  place  I  will  begin  without 
any  compliment,  and  say  that  if  anything  would  give  me  a  worse 
thought  of  the  meetings  of  those  gentlemen  (the  Tories')  than  I  had 
before  it  would  be  their  desire  to  turn  any  man  out  of  an  employ- 
ment to  put  in  my  Lord  Sandwich.  This  looks  to  me  as  if  every- 
thing were  to  be  governed  by  faction  and  nonsense:  and  'tis  no  matter 
what  look  things  have  in  the  world,  or  what  men  are  made  use  of, 
if  they  are  but  such  creatures  as  will,  right  or  wrong,  be  at  the  dis- 
posal of  two  or  three  arbitrary  men  that  are  at  the  head  of  them. 
&o.  &o. 


DOMESTIC  AND  POLITICAL  ATTITUDE      147 

were  presented  to  Maryborough  by  the  queen  in  accord- 
ance with  an  address  of  the  Commons,  were  entailed 
with  the  dukedom  on  the  female  as  well  as  the  male 
heirs  of  his  body.  Marlborough  himself  was  as  yet  an 
undoubted  Tory,  and  he  took  a  considerable  part  in. 
the  ill-omened  Bill  against  Occasional  Conformity, 
which  for  years  was  the  chief  bone  of  contention  be- 
tween the  two  parties. 

The  first  real  breach  between  Marlborough  and  the 
Tory  party  was  certainly  due  to  the  fault  of  the  party. 
Its  chief  leaders,  Kochester  and  Nottingham,  were  ill 
inclined  to  the  Churchills  :  the  former  being  the  queen's 
uncle,  and  as  such  jealous  of  their  influence  ;  the  latter 
as  a  politician  of  unblemished  integrity,  though  not 
very  great  ability,  who  held  by  the  traditional  principles 
of  Toryism.  These  principles  were  unquestionably  ad- 
verse to  foreign  connections,  a  standing  army,  and  a 
French  war.  Not  merely  Rochester  and  Nottingham, 
but  Buckinghamshire  (Mulgrave),  and  Jersey  in  the 
House  of  Lords,  and  Hedges  and  Seymour  in  the  House 
of  Commons,  were  adverse  to  the  war.  Sarah  was  at 
once  for  coalescing  with  the  Whigs,  and  it  would  appear 
that  Godolphin,  upon  whom  party  principles  always 
sat  very  loose,  agreed  with  her.  But  Marlborough  him- 
self entertained,  at  any  rate  for  a  time,  a  juster  view 
of  the  situation.  In  his  letters  l  he  more  than  once 

1  Proper  names  in  these  letters  were  often  in  cypher,  but  can 
generally  be  identified.  The  well-known  nicknames  of  Anne  and 
her  friends  sometimes  also  appear.  I  do  not  know  whether  it  is 
more  impertinent  to  remind  the  reader  or  more  remiss  not  to  remind 
him,  that  in  this  nomenclature  Anne  was  Mn.  Morlcy ;  Prince 
George,  Mr.  Norley ;  Marlborough,  Mr.  Freeman;  Sarah,  Mrs. 
Freeman;  and  Godolphin,  Mr.  Montgomery. 


148  MARLBOROUGH 

expresses  the  undoubtedly  sound  opinion  that  no  single 
party  could  be  trusted,  but  he  does  not  seem  to  have 
fully  realised  the  fact.  He  was,  however,  at  this  time 
on  good  terms  with  Harley,  the  Speaker,  whose  parlia- 
mentary influence  was  very  great ;  and  he  appears  to  have 
been  guided  by  Harley  in  declining,  during  the  whole 
course  of  1703,  to  break  with  the  ultra-Tories.  In  the 
next  year,  however,  partly  by  manoeuvring  and  partly 
by  exertion  of  influence,  the  main  Tory  obstructives 
were  got  rid  of.  Harley  succeeded  Nottingham  as 
Secretary  of  State,  and  by  Maryborough's  special  in- 
fluence Henry  St.  John  was  made  Secretary  of  War, 
but  no  extreme  Whigs  were  admitted  to  the  Cabinet. 
It  was  under  this  Ministry  that  Blenheim  was  fought, 
and  it  was,  on  the  whole,  the  most  satisfactory  that 
Maryborough  had  to  do  with. 

It  was  not  altogether  by  his  own  fault  that  it  came 
to  an  end.  In  the  winter  of  1704  the  extreme  Tory 
party  attempted  one  of  those  violent  and  unconstitu- 
tional proceedings  which  distinguished  the  party  tactics 
of  both  parties  from  the  Exclusion  Bill  to  the  Septennial 
Act.  They  proposed  to  tack  the  Occasional  Conformity 
Bill  to  the  Bill  granting  the  Land  Tax,  on  which  the 
subsidy  promised  by  Marlborough  to  the  King  of 
Prussia  was  chargeable.  This  outrageous  measure 
was  defeated  by  a  very  large  majority,  Harley  and 
the  moderate  Tories  voting  against  it.  But  Marl- 
borough  and  Godolphin,  when,  the  Occasional  Con- 
formity Bill  by  itself  reached  the  Lords,  changed  their 
former  policy  and  voted  against  it,  thus  declaring  war 
against  the  Tory  party.  The  Bill  itself  finds  few,  if 
any,  defenders  now ;  but  it  may  be  asked  with  some 


DOMESTIC  AND  POLITICAL  ATTITUDE      149 

pertinence  what  change  in  it  or  in  the  situation  had 
occurred  to  make  Marlborough  oppose  what  he  formerly 
supported  ?  Indeed,  the  whole  history  of  Marlborough's 
connection  with  this  measure  is  a  typical  instance  of  his 
unfortunate,  and  not  much  more  intelligent  than  for- 
tunate, opportunism  in  these  years,  when  he  only  saw 
part  of  politics,  and  was  obliged  to  see  the  rest  through 
the  spectacles  of  his  wife's  temper,  Sunderland's  party 
spirit,  and  Godolphin's  habit  of  clinging  to  power.  Oc- 
casional Conformity — that  is  to  say,  compliance  with 
the  Test  and  Corporation  Acts  on  the  occasions  required 
by  law  and  on  those  only — was  undoubtedly  something 
of  a  scandal,  and  unfortunately  it  touched  the  pockets 
and  the  ambition  as  well  as  the  consciences  of  Church- 
men by  allowing  Nonconformists  to  use  '  the  office  key, 
the  picklock  to  a  place,'  which  otherwise  they  them- 
selves could  alone  have  applied.  Moreover,  all  the 
Dissenters  who  thus  sneaked  into  place  were  more  or 
less  Whiggish,  and  so  party  zeal  complicated  religious 
zeal  and  the  not  less  ardent  zeal  of  greed.  Accordingly 
nothing  was  more  at  the  heart  of  the  extremer  Tory 
party  than  the  Bill  rendering  Occasional  Conformity 
illegal  and  penal.  Marlborough  was  at  first  strong  for 
the  measure  in  1702,  when  it  would  have  passed  had 
not  the  Lords  (who  were  Whiggish)  introduced  amend- 
ments which  the  Commons  would  not  accept.  In  1 703 
we  find  him,  with  some  surprise,  writing  to  his  wife  :  '  I 
am  firmly  resolved  never  to  assist  any  Jacobite  whatso- 
ever or  any  Tory  that  is  for  persecution ' ;  and  that  as 
he  has,  by  arguments  not  mentioned,  persuaded  himself 
that  the  high  Tories  wish  him  to  vote  against  it,  he  will 
not  do  so,  but  that  at  the  same  time  he  will  not  speak 


1 50  MARLBOROUGH 

for  it.  He  did  not,  and  accordingly  the  Bill  was  lost, 
whereupon  he  and  Godolphin  formally  protested  against 
its  rejection — an  ingeniously  crooked  policy  which  seems 
to  have  deceived  nobody.  What  happened  a  year  later 
has  been  mentioned  already,  and  the  only  thing  to  be 
said  for  Marlborough  and  Godolphin  is  that  they  had 
the  grace  neither  to  support  vote  with  voice,  nor,  as  has 
been  seen  since  their  time,  to  speak  in  one  sense  and 
vote  in  another. 

The  Whig  party  which,  though  in  a  minority  and 
in  opposition,  was  united,  knew  its  own  mind,  and  was 
ably  led  by  the  so-called  Junta,  would  have  been  more 
or  less  than  human  if  it  had  not  endeavoured  to  profit 
by  the  disunion  of  its  adversaries,  and  if  it  had  been 
content  to  keep  a  moderate  Tory  Government  in  office 
by  siding  with  it  against  the  ultras.  No  one  of  its 
leaders  was  indeed  a  statesman  as  Marlborough,  as 
Godolphin,  or  as,  on  its  own  side,  Walpole  was  a 
statesman.  Somers  was  an  able  lawyer,  who,  like 
other  able  lawyers,  knew  the  value  of  fidelity  to  party  ; 
Wharton  was  a  profligate  man  of  parts,  to  whom 
politics  were  another  kind  of  Newmarket,  and  with 
whom  electioneering  was  a  special  passion ;  Halifax 
was  a  clever  financier ;  Orford  a  representative  of  the 
theory  that  England  ought  to  be  governed  by  and  in 
the  interest  of  a  limited  number  of  Whig  families ; 
Sunderland  a  sincere  partisan  of  the  bitterest  type. 
But  everyone  of  the  five  was  of  ability  above  the  average, 
and  everyone  was  determined  that  the  Whig  party 
should  triumph.  They  proceeded  with  sufficient  dex- 
terity by  at  first  merely  demanding  a  share,  and  a 
subordinate  share,  in  the  offices  of  government.  This, 


DOMESTIC  AND  POLITICAL  ATTITUDE      151 

with  the  crude  ideas  of  the  time  as  to  party  govern- 
ment, could  hardly  be  denied  them,  and  by  degrees, 
without  a  declaration  of  war,  Walpole,  Cowper,  and 
others  were  introduced.  Marlborough's  better  judgment 
long  resisted  the  introduction  of  the  hot-headed  Sunder- 
land,  but  the  Duchess's  partiality  for  her  son-in-law  at 
length  prevailed.  It  is  necessary  to  remember  all  this 
when  considering  the  accusations  which  are  liberally 
brought  against  Harley  for  treachery,  duplicity,  and 
factiousness  in  his  subsequent  action ;  for,  though  it 
was  no  doubt  quite  natural  of  the  Whigs  to  wish  not 
to  serve  their  country  for  nothing,  it  can  hardly  be  said 
to  have  been  unnatural  of  the  moderate  Tories  to  watch 
with  anything  but  satisfaction  the  gradual  permeation 
of  Government  by  creatures  of  Sunderland  and  Wharton. 
Marlborough,  it  is  certain,  perceived  these  things,  but, 
not  being  on  the  spot,  he  did  not  perceive  them  quite 
clearly  enough  ;  and  he  is  hardly  to  be  blamed  when, 
as  he  says,  '  Upon  many  occasions  I  have  the  spleen, 
and  am  weary  of  my  life,  for  my  friends  give  me  much 
more  uneasiness  than  my  enemies.' 

His  policy  for  the  Parliament  of  1705  was  a  waiting 
one.  He  hoped  that  neither  party  might  have  a  great 
majority,  so  that  Crown  influence  might  be  able  to 
make  itself  felt.  But  that  he  should  have  thought  this 
likely  shows  how  little  he  understood  the  character  of 
his  countrymen,  since  the  expulsion  of  the  direct  Stuart 
line  had  removed  the  feeling  of  paramount  loyalty  to 
the  sovereign.  The  Whigs  gained  greatly  in  the  elec- 
tions, and  they  became  still  more  importunate  for 
office.  A  special  struggle  was  made  for  the  Great  Seal, 
and  the  indiscreet  and  indecent  partisanship  of  the 


152  MARLBOROUGH 

Duchess's  letters  to  the  queen  is  said  to  have  for  the 
first  time  provoked  something  like  a  revolt  in  Anne. 
Finally,  Maryborough  made  what  was  certainly  a  great 
blunder.  The  queen  appealed  personally  to  him  from 
his  wife  and  Godolphin,  thinking,  no  doubt,  as  hitherto 
she  had  good  reason  to  think,  that  he  was  less  of  a 
partisan  than  either.  His  reply  is  couched  in  guarded 
and  rather  indefinite  language,  but  it  cannot  be  inter- 
preted otherwise  than  as  an  almost  direct  recommenda- 
tion to  her  to  discard  the  Tories  and  trust  to  the  Whigs. 
It  marks,  indeed,  something  like  a  climax  in  the 
progress  of  Marlborough's  feelings  towards  the  two 
parties.  Up  to  this  time  we  have  had  constant  phrases 
in  his  letters  such  as  that  '  He  pretends  to  be  of  no 
party  ' ;  c  He  knows  both  too  well ' ;  '  He  will  never  enter 
into  party  or  faction  ' ;  '  He  would  be  glad  not  to  enter 
into  the  unreasonable  reasoning  of  either  party.'  In 
June  1705  the  queen  had  written  to  him  a  letter  which 
Coxe  justly  describes  as  '  no  less  gracious  than  affec- 
tionate,' in  which  she  complains  naturally  enough  of 
the  *  unjust,  unreasonable  things  those  strange  people 
desire,'  and  so  forth.  The  answer  is  very  guarded  and 
hints  at  '  encouragement  proper  to  give  to  the  Whigs,' 
but  it  still  keeps  up  the  impartial  tone.  He  'would 
not  have  her  Majesty  in  either  of  the  parties'  hands,' 
he  thinks  Godolphin  '  the  only  man  in  England  capable 
of  giving  such  advice  as  may  keep  her  out  of  the  hands 
of  both  parties.'  But  in  September,  influenced  perhaps 
by  the  Whig  success  in  the  elections,  he  takes  a  very 
different  tone.  The  queen's  letter  does  not  appear,  but 
Marlborough's  answer,  dated  Michaelmas  day,  is  plain 
enough.  He  refers  her  to  Godolphin  (from  whom  she  has 


DOMESTIC  AND  POLITICAL  ATTITUDE      153 

appealed  to  him),  and  he  tells  her  that  there  is  nothing 
else  to  do  except  to  summon  Rochester  and  Nottingham 
(the  extreme  Tory  leaders),  and  let  them  'take  her 
business  into  their  hands,  the  consequences  of  which 
are  much  to  be  feared.'  Such  a  letter  could  not  fail 
to  shake  Anne's  confidence  in  the  independence  of 
Marlborough's  judgment ;  and,  known  as  no  doubt  it 
soon  was  to  Harley,  it  could  not  fail  also  to  make  the 
moderate  Tories  think  seriously  as  to  the  wisdom  of 
supporting  a  statesman  whose  wife  passionately  opposed 
them,  and  who  himself  gave  them  the  most  lukewarm 
assistance.  For,  the  time,  however,  Harley  himself 
showed  no  discontent,  and  in  the  fight  for  the  Speaker 
the  Whig  candidate  Smith,  whom  he  and  some  of  his 
followers  supported,  was  elected.  A  Whig  speech  was 
also  put  into  the  queen's  mouth. 

Throughout  this  reign,  however,  the  Tories  had  a 
card  to  play  which  nearly  always  won  a  trick  from  the 
opposite  side,  and  they  played  it  now.  One  of  their 
bitterest  representatives  in  the  Lords  moved  the  in- 
vitation of  the  Electress  Sophia  to  England,  thereby 
putting  the  Whigs  in  the  dilemma  of  offending  the 
queen,  who  was  vehemently  set  against  such  an  invi- 
tation, or  else  being  false  to  their  own  principles  and 
mortifying  the  House  of  Hanover.  The  Whigs  chose 
the  latter  course,  and  suffered  not  a  little  from  it  in 
popular  estimation,  though  the  Tories  can  hardly  be 
said  to  have  gained  ;  indeed,  the  queen  was  for  a  time 
well  affected  towards  the  Whigs,  and  in  the  spring  of 
1706  an  apparently  definite  rapprochement  took  place 
between  the  leaders  of  the  latter  on  the  one  side  and 
Harlev  and  St.  John  on  the  other.  As  the  ultra-Tories 


1 54  MARLBOROUGH 

could  do  nothing  by  themselves,  things  looked  rosy  for 
the  Marlborough-Godolphin  system. 

The  breach  of  this  understanding  was  due  to  Whig, 
not  to  Tory,  action.  Godolphin,  who  was  quite  as  much 
under  the  Duchess's  influence  as  her  husband,  if  not 
more  so,  pressed  upon  Anne  the  substitution  of  Sunder- 
land,  the  most  acrimonious  of  all  the  Whigs,  for  Hedges 
as  Secretary  of  State.  This  appointment,  despite  her 
repugnance,  for  which  she  gave  very  good  grounds,  was 
urged  upon  her  by  all  three  with  the  greatest  and  the 
most  unwise  insistence.  Finding  her  still  reluctant, 
they  chose  to  attribute  it  to  Harley.  Those  who  are 
determined  to  see  in  Anne  a  woman  little  better  than  a 
fool  in  understanding  may  possibly  derive  an  argument 
for  Barley's  inspiration  from  the  character  of  the 
queen's  correspondence  with  her  tyrannical  ministers.  If 
Harley  did  inspire  that  correspondence  directly  he  was 
an  even  cleverer  person  than  he  is  considered  by  his 
least  severe  judges.  The  tone  of  it  is  feminine  enough, 
but  the  writer  has  got  hold  of  the  main  argument 
which  Marlborough  had  so  long  pressed  upon  her — the 
necessity  of  the  queen's  standing  aloof  from  party — and 
urges  it  with  either  very  artless  or  extremely  artful 
skill.  l  You  press ' — she  says  to  Godolphin  in  the  begin- 
ning of  September  1706,  when  Marlborough  himself  was 
still  half-hearted  about  forcing  Sunderland  on  her — '  you 
press  the  bringing  Lord  Sunderland  into  business  that 
there  may  be  one  of  that  party  in  a  place  of  trust  to 
help  carry  on  the  business  this  winter ;  and  you  think 
if  this  is  not  complied  with,  they  will  not  be  very  hearty 
in  pursuing  my  service  in  the  Parliament,  but  is  it  not 
very  hard  that  men  of  sense  and  honour  will  not  pro- 


DOMESTIC  AND  POLITICAL  ATTITUDE      155 

mote  the  good  of  their  country  because  everything  in 
the  world  is  not  done  they  desire?  ....  Why,  for 
God's  sake,  must  I  who  have  no  interest,  no  end,  no 
thought,  but  for  the  good  of  my  country,  be  made  so 
miserable  as  to  be  brought  into  the  power  of  one  set  of 
men  ? '  And  a  week  or  two  later  (again  to  Godolphin) 
'  The  making  him  secretary  I  can't  help  thinking  is 
throwing  myself  into  the  hands  of  a  party' — which 
Marlborough  and  Godolphin  had  always  protested 
against.  This  latter  letter  (of  September  21)  is  long  and 
spirited,  and  though  Godolphin  set  the  Duchess  to  work 
and  tried  himself,  he  could  make  little  impression  on 
Anne.  Then  he  tried  Marlborough,  who  wrote  to  the 
queen  one  of  the  (as  it  seems  to  me  very  injudicious) 
letters,  merely  saying  ditto  to  Godolphin,  which  by 
degrees  lost  him  all  credit  as  a  referee.  This  is  the  turn- 
ing-point of  the  whole  history,  and  it  is  most  important 
that  it  should  be  clearly  understood.  The  correspondence 
on  the  subject  is  voluminous,  but  the  facts  do  not  appear 
to  be  in  much,  if  in  any,  dispute.  There  is  little  doubt 
that  Harley  did  use  what  influence  he  possessed  to  pre- 
vent the  entrance  of  Sunderland  into  the  Ministry,  but 
it  is  impossible  to  see  in  this  any  breach  of  good  faith 
towards  Marlborough  and  Godolphin.  The  Ministry 
was  avowedly  a  coalition  Ministry,  and  no  one  had 
been  more  lavish  of  hope  that  it  would  continue  so  than 
Marlborough.  It  was  urged  both  by  Harley,  by  St. 
John,  and  by  the  queen  that  the  substitution  of  Sunder- 
land for  a  Tory,  coming  on  the  top  of  other  changes  of 
the  same  kind,  would  amount  in  effect  to  throwing  the 
whole  power  into  the  hands  of  the  Whigs.  Against 
this  they  certainly  had,  from  the  coalition  point  of  view, 


1 56  MARLBOROUGH 

a  right  to  protest  and  to  work.  To  speak  of  such 
efforts  as  '  undermining/  '  striving  to  draw  Marlborough 
and  Godolphin  to  their  party,'  and  so  forth  is  absurd. 
Both  parties  worked,  and  very  properly  worked,  for 
their  own  side  ;  but,  independently  of  this,  which  jus- 
tified each,  Harley  and  St.  John  had  the  justification 
that  the  Whigs  were  obviously  striving  to  make  the 
Government  not  a  coalition  Government  at  all,  but  a 
Government  wholly  or  in  preponderant  measure  Whig. 
At  length  the  instances  of  the  Marlborough  party  pre- 
vailed, and  almost  every  Tory,  except  Harley  and  St. 
John  themselves,  was  removed  from  office. 

According  to  modern  ideas  it  was,  no  doubt,  the 
duty  of  these  two  Ministers  to  resign ;  but  it  must  be 
remembered  that  modern  ideas  had  veiy  little  to  do 
with  the  whole  transaction.  Theoretically,  faith  had 
been  broken  with,  not  by,  the  two  Tory  leaders,  and 
they  doubtless  considered  themselves  perfectly  justified 
in  seeking  to  reply  by  influence  to  influence.  All  the 
world  knows  what  instrument  was  chosen,  and  how 
Abigail  Hill  supplanted  her  cousin  Sarah  Marlborough, 
and  very  amusing  the  details  of  the  story  are.  But 
their  results  only  concern  us  ;  and  it  is  pretty  certain 
that  if  Marlborough  had  been  on  the  spot  the  Duchess's 
silly  jealousy  would  have  had  far  less  scope.  *  What 
you  say,'  he  writes  in  the  early  days  of  the  battle,  '  of 
Mrs.  Masham  is  very  odd,  and  if  you  think  she  is  a 
good  weather-cock  it  is  high  time  to  leave  off  strug- 
gling; for,  believe  me,  nothing  i#  worth  rowing  for 
against  wind  and  tide — at  least  you  will  tliinlc  so  when 
you  come  to  my  age'  Abigail  was  a  cousin  of  Harley 
as  well  as  of  the  Duchess ;  she  was  undoubtedly  a 


DOMESTIC  AND  POLITICAL  ATTITUDE      157 

sincere  Tory  and  Higli  Church  woman,  and  she  thus 
was  congenial  to  Anne.  The  Whigs,  moreover,  by 
pursuing  their  system  of  monopoly,  and  even  endeavour- 
ing to  force  the  queen  into  making  ecclesiastical 
appointments  at  their  bidding — a  point  on  which,  as 
is  well  known,  she  was  always  very  sensitive,  so  much 
so  as  to  resist  the  powerful  claim  of  Swift — deeply 
offended  her.  Not  content  with  this,  they  attacked 
Marlborough's  own  brother,  George  Churchill,  who 
was  a  staunch  Tory.  Godolphin,  who  had  very  few 
party  inclinations,  and  was,  though  not  a  spotless 
character,  chiefly  anxious  that  the  queen's  government 
should  be  carried  on,  seems  to  have  been  honestly  in- 
clined to  the  Whigs  when  he  found  that  he  could  not 
work  with  the  extreme  Tories.  But  Maryborough,  had 
he  been  on  the  spot,  would  pretty  certainly  have  seen 
the  impossibility  of  his  via  media.  As  it  was,  he  played 
the  game  surprisingly  ill,  if  it  can  be  considered  sur- 
prising that  a  man  should  play  a  game  ill  when  he 
never  sees  it.  The  disputes  between  the  Duchess  of 
Marlborough  and  Mrs.  Masham  continued,  and  Harley's 
so-called  intrigues  were  replied  to  by  intrigues  on  the 
other  side  to  get  rid  of  Harley.  The  more  carefully 
these  counterininings  are  studied  the  clearer  will  it  be- 
come how  entirely  false  it  is  to  represent  faction  and 
intrigue  as  exclusively,  or  even  mainly,  on  the  Tory 
side. 

In  short,  both  Marlborough  and  Godolphin,  but 
especially  the  former,  seem  to  have  incurred  the  pro- 
verbial fate  of  those  who  try  to  sit  on  two  stools.  They 
lost  no  opportunity  of  annoying  the  Tories,  while  Marl- 
borough,  at  any  rate,  was  reluctant  to  throw  hirrself 


158  MARLBOROUGH 

entirely  on  the  side  of  the  Whigs.  Thus  disgusting 
both  parties,  they  had  nothing  to  depend  on  but  the 
private  favour  of  the  queen,  and  this  Sarah  was  un- 
ceasingly employed  in  turning  into  dislike.  Marl- 
borough  himself  is  very  excusable,  for  no  one  is  a  judge 
of  his  own  wife's  conduct  unless  he  happens  to  hate 
her.  But  it  must  always  be  considered  surprising  that 
a  man  of  Godolphin's  acuteness,  constantly  on  the  spot 
and  intimately  acquainted  with  all  the  parties,  should 
not  have  seen  that  the  Duchess  was  far  more  dangerous 
than  valuable  as  an  instrument. 

Indeed,  in  reading  the  history  of  the  matter  as 
written  by  the  principal  actors,  it  is  impossible  not  to 
perceive  the  immense  disadvantage  under  which  Marl- 
borough  lay.  In  one  of  her  letters  to  him  the  queen 
speaks  of  '  the  malice  of  the  Whigs,  which  you  would 
perceive  if  you  were  here.'  Malice  may  be  allowed  to 
be  question-begging,  but  the  rest  of  the  phrase  is 
undeniably  suggestive.  Nor  can  it  be  denied  that  in 
this  same  letter  Anne,  or  probably  Harley,  makes  a 
strong  point  when  she  says  she  has  (  a  resolution  to 
encourage  all  those  that  will  concur  in  my  service, 
whether  they  be  Whigs  or  Tories.'  This  was  Marl- 
borough's  own  theory,  and  no  one  could  deny  that  it 
had  been  broken  through  in  the  Whig,  not  the  Tory 
interest.  Accordingly  his  answer  to  her  is,  to  say  the 
least,  awkward,  and  the  simultaneous  correspondence 
with  Godolphin,  Sunderland,  and  the  Duchess  shows 
that  he  felt  the  Whigs  to  be  hard  masters.  That  he 
should  have  submitted  to  them  at  all  is  only  com- 
prehensible when  the  rooted  dislike  of  the  Tories  of 
those  days  to  a  foreign  war  is  remembered — a  dislike 


DOMESTIC  AND  POLITICAL  ATTITUDE      159 

senseless  enough,  and  not  unjustly  punished  by  their 
exclusion  from  office  for  the  best  part  of  the  next 
century. 

At  last,  in  the  autumn  of  1707,  both  Marlborough 
and  Godolphin  determined,  as  the  vulgar  phrase  is,  to 
have  it  out  with  Harley.  His  answers  have  again  been 
supposed  to  show  vile  duplicity  on  his  part ;  I  own  that 
I  cannot  see  it.  There  is  not  the  slightest  evidence 
that  Harley  was  unwilling  to  continue  his  support  to 
the  via  media  policy  which  Marlborough  and  Godolphin 
still  professed  to  represent.  That  he  used  Mrs.  Masham's 
interest  to  counteract  the  now  purely  Whig  influence  of 
Sarah  is  perfectly  true  ;  but  Marlborough's  own  pro- 
fessions are  on  record  denying  his  anxiety  to  promote 
Whig  party  interests.  If  Marlborough  did  not  support 
those  interests,  why  was  Harley  treacherous  to  Marl- 
borough  in  opposing  them  ?  We  know,  of  course,  that 
Marlborough  did  support  those  interests,  but  as  this 
was  in  direct  contravention  of  his  public  professions 
and  of  the  terms  and  principles  on  which  Harley  entered 
the  Ministry,  Harley  himself  was  certainly  justified  in 
playing  a  game  of  diamond  cut  diamond.  Neither  side 
is  defensible  wholly.  Both  sides  finessed  a  great  deal 
too  deeply  for  honest  play.  But  if  it  was  permissible 
for  Marlborough,  however  unwillingly  and  against  his 
better  judgment,  to  lend  a  hand  constantly  to  the 
aggrandisement  of  the  Whigs,  how  was  it  unpardonable 
of  Harley  to  lend  a  hand  constantly  to  the  aggrandise- 
ment of  the  Tories  ? 

It  was,  however,  impossible  that  this  state  of  things 
could  go  on  long,  and  the  crisis  was  precipitated  in 
the  winter  session  of  1707-8  by  an  ingenious  move  of 


1 6O  MA  RLBO&OUGH 

the  Whigs,  which  seems  to  have  been  due  to  Halifax 
and  Wharton.  The  preceding  campaign  had  been  un- 
fortunate, and  the  losses  at  sea  from  privateers  had  been 
very  great.  An  attack  was  planned  upon  the  military 
and  naval  conduct  of  affairs  alike,  and  especially  upon 
Admiral  Churchill.  The  ultra-Tories  fell  into  the  trap 
and  joined  this,  so  that  Marlborough  and  Godolphin 
seem  to  have  been  forced,  or  at  least  frightened,  into 
throwing  themselves  into  the  arms  of  the  Whigs.  Anne 
was  at  the  same  time  alarmed  by  the  fact  that  her  hus- 
band as  well  as  George  Churchill  was  threatened,  and 
for  the  moment  she  was  at  the  mercy  of  the  Whigs,  re- 
inforced by  Marlborough  and  Godolphin.  They  availed 
themselves  of  the  opportunity  to  get  rid  of  Harley. 
Some  treasonable  practices  of  a  clerk  of  his,  named 
Gregg,  were  trumped  up,  the  general  and  the  trea- 
surer threatened  resignation  (Marlborough  declaring 
that  '  no  consideration  can  make  me  serve  any  longer 
with  that  man ')  and,  after  a  violent  struggle  the  Queen 
consented  to  Harley's  dismissal ;  St.  John,  Mansel, 
and  Harcourt  accompanied  him.  Marlborough  had 
at  last  burnt  his  boats  and  irretrievably  committed 
himself  to  the  Whig  party.  By  that  party,  as  will 
be  seen,  he  was  treated  with  by  no  means  excessive 
gratitude,  though  nothing  but  his  influence  brought 
them  into  power.  But  what  is  certain  is,  that  Harley 
had  up  to  this  time  used  no  influence  against  Marl- 
borough  himself,  and  that  it  was  Marlborough,  not 
Harley,  who  put  an  end  to  the  system  of  coalition 
government  which  had  prevailed  for  five  years,  and  of 
which  Marlborough,  not  Harley,  had  been  the  nominally 
strenuous  advocate. 


DOMESTIC  AND  POLITICAL  ATTITUDE      161 

The  Whigs  started,  at  the  beginning  of  1708,  with 
a  great  advantage  in  the  shape  of  a  threatened  French 
invasion,  which  naturally  rekindled  ill-will  to  the  House 
of  Stuart  and  strengthened  the  hands  of  the  party  hos- 
tile to  its  claims.  But  the  Peers'  address  to  the  Queen 
(it  must  be  remembered  that  the  Upper  House  was 
strongly  Whig)  was  disfigured  by  a  good  deal  of  fac- 
tiousness, and  the  Queen  was  coerced  into  echoing  it  in 
her  reply.  Anne  was  not  likely  to  forgive  this,  espe- 
cially as  the  influence  of  Mrs.  Masham  continued,  while 
the  Duchess  took  care  to  augment  it  by  her  own  unwise 
persecution  of  her  mistress.  The  Whigs,  too,  continued 
their  insatiable  grasping  at  office,  and  having  forced 
most  of  their  leaders  in,  now  brought  forward  Somers 
once  more.  Anne  appealed  to  Marlborough  himself, 
and  once  more  he  committed,  as  it  seems  to  me,  the  fatal 
mistake  of  not  availing  himself  of  the  opportunity  and 
supporting  what  were  evidently  the  Queen's  wishes. 
It  was  all  the  more  unwise  that  an  opening  had  just 
before  been  given  to  him  for  re-establishing  something 
like  confidential  relations  with  his  sovereign.  Anne, 
despite  many  disappointments,  was  apparently  loth  to 
give  up  the  idea  of  Marlborough  as  an  impartial  umpire 
and  counsel.  In  July  1708  the  Whigs  reverted  to  the 
plan  of  inviting  the  Electoral  Prince  of  Hanover  to  Eng- 
land, a  project  which,  as  already  noted,  was  the  most 
obnoxious  possible  to  Anne.  Lord  Haversham,  a  bitter 
Tory,  got  wind  of  the  plan,  and  immediately  waited  on 
the  Queen  to  apprise  her  of  it,  suggesting  that  the  only 
thing  for  her  to  do  was  to  anticipate  the  proposal  by 
inviting  the  Prince  herself.  She  had  written  to  Marl- 
borough  earnestly  entreating  him  to  '  prevent  this  mor- 


1 62  MARLBOROUGH 

tification  coming  upon  her,'  and  he  wrote  strongly,  and 
it  would  appear  effectually,  to  Sarah  on  the  subject. 
This  was  in  July,  and  about  a  month  later  we  find 
the  Queen  remonstrating  once  more  with  the  cruel 
stress  that  was  laid  on  her  by  Marlborough's  and 
Godolphin's  constant  threats  of  resignation,  if  she  failed 
to  comply  with  the  Whig  demands.  '  There  is  nobody,' 
she  says,  l  more  desirous  than  I  to  encourage  those  Whig 
friends  that  behave  themselves  well :  but  I  do  not  care 
to  have  anything  to  do  with  those  that  are  of  so  tyran- 
nising a  temper,  and,  not  to  run  fartheron  those  subjects, 
I  think  things  are  come  to  whether  I  shall  submit  to 
the  five  tyrannising  lords  or  they  to  me.  This  is  my 
poor  opinion  on  the  disputes  at  present,  which  could  not 
be  if  people  would  weigh  and  state  the  case  just  as  it  is, 
without  partiality  on  one  side  or  on  the  other,  which  I 
beg  for  the  friendship  you  have  ever  professed  for  me, 
you  would  do ;  and  let  me  know  your  thoughts  of  what 
may  be  the  best  expedient  to  keep  me  from  being 
thrown  into  the  hands  of  the  five  lords.'  Alas !  this 
pathetic  appeal,  which  corresponded  so  exactly  with 
Marlborough's  own  earlier  views  on  the  subject,  produced 
no  effect  on  him.  He  certainly  did  not  answer  her  in  the 
spirit  which  she  requested  him  to  show,  and  it  is  sup- 
posed that  he  contented  himself  with  copying  a  draught 
of  Godolphin's  which  exists,  and  which  must  at  once 
have  convinced  the  Queen  how  little  use  there  was  in 
appealing  to  him.  Marlborough's  facility  in  letting 
himself  thus  be  made  a  referee  pour  rire,  a  mere  echo  of 
the  opinions  of  other  people,  cannot  but  be  matter  of 
surprise,  and  it  is  certain  that  it  contributed  not  a  little 
to  the  Queen's  resentment.  On  the  other  hand,  nothing 


DOMESTIC  AND  POLITICAL  ATTITUDE      163 

(except  the  Sacheverell  business,  and  Maryborough's 
request  for  the  Captain-Generalship  for  life)  seems  to 
have  put  a  better  weapon  in  the  hands  of  the  Tories  than 
this  indifference  of  his  and  Godolphin's  to  the  Queen's 
personal  wishes.  In  the  political  ideas  of  the  age  such 
indifference  would  have  been  scandalous  in  any  case, 
but  it  was  doubly  scandalous  in  persons  whose  elevation 
to  the  highest  posts  in  the  State  was  universally  known 
to  be  due  to  nothing  so  much  as  to  that  very  personal 
influence  which  they  now  disregarded  and  thwarted  in 
every  possible  way,  contrary  to  their  own  professions 
and  the  arguments  on  which  their  own  tenure  of  power 
was  founded. 

The  elections  of  1708  again  displayed  the  factious- 
ness of  the  party  with  which  Marlborough  and  Godol- 
phin  had  allied  themselves.  The  Junta  electioneered 
almost  openly  in  their  own  interest,  and  not  in  that  of 
the  national  government,  of  which,  it  must  be  remem- 
bered, Godolphin  was  the  head.  In  England  and  in 
Scotland,  repeating  an  old  manosuvre,  they  combined 
with  the  extreme  Jacobites.  Failing  to  force  Somers  into 
the  Presidency,  they  revived  the  project  of  inviting 
over  the  Electoral  Prince,  a  point  on  which  the  Queen 
was  more  sensitive  than  any  other,  while  Marlborough 
and  Godolphin,  though  personally  appealed  to  by  Anne 
to  save  her  from  the  tyranny  of  the  five  lords,  not  only 
took  no  heed  but  renewed  the  old  trick  of  threatening 
resignation. 

It  will  thus  be  obvious  that  the  conduct  of  Marl- 
borough's  party,  and  too  often  his  own,  was  in  the 
highest  degree  imprudent.  The  Duchess  harassed  and 
tormented  Anne  in  private,  the  Whig  Junta  in  public 


1 64  MARLDOROUGH 

matters,  and  at  the  very  time  that  they  cried  out  on  her 
for  allowing  her  private  inclinations  to  govern  her  con- 
duct they  seem  to  have  studied  every  means  of  alien- 
ating those  inclinations  from  themselves. 

The  project  of  promoting  Somers  was  pursued 
during  the  whole  year,  and  it  is  an  interesting  question 
(which  the  admirers  of  Somers  never  seem  to  have  taken 
the  trouble  to  answer),  how  his  alleged  patriotism  and 
disinterestedness  are  to  be  reconciled  with  his  pertinacity 
in  seeking  an  object  which  was  certainly  one  of  no 
national  importance.  Being  unsuccessful  in  their  in- 
trigue for  Somers,  the  Whigs  resorted  to  every  pos- 
sible means  of  annoying  Godolphin  and  Marlborough, 
short  of  actually  throwing  up  the  offices  they  themselves 
held,  which  they  threatened  but  took  good  care  not  to 
do.  They  forced  Admiral  Churchill  out  of  the  Admiralty 
and  menaced  Prince  George.  The  good  man  solved  the 
difficulty  by  dying,  an  event  which  enabled  the  greed  of 
the  Whigs  to  be  satisfied  by  the  advancement  not  merely 
of  Somers  but  of  Wharton,  who  was  made  Lord  Lieu- 
tenant of  Ireland.  Halifax  was  the  next  subject  of  Whig 
policy,  and  after  him,  Orford.  Indeed,  the  whole  history 
of  the  Godolphin  Government  after  Barley's  dismissal 
may  be  said  to  be  the  history  of  Whig  place-hunting. 
The  same  events  recurred  in  cycles.  The  Queen  indig- 
nantly protested  against  the  monopolising  of  office  by 
one  party ;  the  Duchess  vehemently  promoted  it ; 
Godolphin  talked  and  acted  with  such  lukewarmness  that 
he  disgusted  the  Whigs  without  recovering  the  good- 
will of  the  Tories,  and  Marlborough,  against  his  better 
judgment,  was  dragged  into  the  same  course.  To  cap 
the  climax  of  injudiciousness  the  Duchess  proceeded 


DOMESTIC  AND  POLITICAL  ATTITUDE      165 

almost  to  an  open  quarrel  with  the  Queen,  and  Marl- 
borough  committed  the  great  error  of  applying  for  the 
Captain-Generalship  for  life.  It  is  doubtful  whether  it 
would  have  been  constitutional  to  grant  this;  it  was  cer- 
tainly, in  Anne's  present  temper  towards  the  Churchills, 
easy  to  represent  it  to  her  as  a  petition  of  the  most 
grasping  and  ambitious  kind.  No  part  of  Marlborough's 
conduct  seems  to  have  affected  the  public  mind  more 
than  this.  It  is  constantly  urged  in  various  forms  in 
the  masterly  series  of  newspaper  articles  and  pamphlets 
which  Swift  wrote  or  edited  against  the  Whigs  and 
their  great  champion.  It  was  this  that  gave  point  and 
application  to  Bolingbroke's  famous  manoeuvre  of  sum- 
moning Booth,  the  actor,  to  his  box  after  the  performance 
of  Addison's  *  Cato '  and  presenting  him  with  a  purse  of 
guineas  for  c  defending  the  cause  of  liberty  against  a 
perpetual  dictator.'  And  though  it  is  difficult  for  those 
who  have  long  learnt  to  regard  the  Commandership-in- 
chief  as  a  mere  administrative  office  naturally  and  use- 
fully held  during  life  or  good  behaviour,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  the  memory  of  Cromwell  was  not  far 
off,  and  that  with  the  still  nearer  memory  of  James's 
attempt  to  dragoon  England  into  popery,  a  standing 
army,  was  the  subject  of  the  most  genuine  and  lively 
distrust  if  not  detestation  to  the  vast  majority  of  Whigs 
and  Tories  alike.  That  Marlborough  should  have  made  \ 
a  demand  so  certain  to  excite  odium  in  the  very  face  of 
his  own  failing  influence  and  popularity  must  always  be 
taken  as  the  very  strongest  proof  of  the  extent  to  which  he 
had  lost  grasp  of  the  political  situation.  The  brief  period 
of  Whig  predominance  now  drew  to  an  end,  and  the 
circumstance  which  brought  about  the  downfall  not  only 


1 66  MARLBOROUGH 

of  the  Whigs  but  of  the  Godolphin  Government  is  no 
less  famous  than  the  career  of  Abigail  Hill.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  say  much  here  about  the  Sacheverell  trial. 
Marlborough,  like  Somers,  was  against  the  fatal  blunder 
of  making  a  political  matter  of  this — a  blunder  which  it 
is  impossible  not  to  attribute  rather  to  the  hot-headed 
Sunderland  than  to  the  alleged  sensitiveness  of  a 
political  hack  of  thirty  years'  experience  like  Godolphin. 
But,  though  Marlborough  was  not  responsible  for  this 
blunder,  he  fell  into  the  trap  on  his  own  account  by 
resisting  the  Queen's  command  to  bestow  a  regiment  on 
Abigail's  brother.  He  followed  this  up  by  attempting 
to  insist  on  the  dismissal  of  Mrs.  Masliam,  a  measure  in 
which  he  was  but  feebly  supported  by  the  Whigs  them- 
selves, and  which  was  evidently  a  complete  mistake. 
The  end  of  a  very  unwise  business  was  that  the  Queen 
withdrew  her  point  about  the  regiment,  and  Marlborough 
was  forced  to  withdraw  his  much  more  important  point 
about  Mrs.  Mash  am,  a  compromise  which  was  justly 
regarded  as  a  defeat  for  him.  On  this  matter  followed 
the  decision  of  the  Sacheveroll  case  (with  a  nominal 
victory  for  the  Government,  and  with  the  manifestation 
of  a  violent  Tory  spirit  throughout  the  country),  the 
failure  of  the  congress  of  Gertruydenberg,  and  a  final 
quarrel  between  the  Queen  and  the  Duchess.  Harley 
proceeded  in  his  return  match  with  remarkable  dexterity. 
No  instance  of  Marlborough's  mismanagement  is  more 
remarkable  than  his  having  omitted  or  failed  to  attach 
the  Duke  of  Shrewsbury  to  the  interest  of  the  Govern- 
ment. Shrewsbury  was  a  very  singular  person,  and 
for  the  quarter  of  a  century  between  the  accession  of 
James  and  that  of  George  might  be  called  a  modern 


DOMESTIC  AND  POLITICAL  ATTITUDE      167 

kingmaker.  He  was  not  a  consistent  politician,  and 
his  private  character  was  not  blameless.  But  he  had  the 
advantage  which,  when  once  gained,  has  been  observed 
to  seldom  leave  a  man  during  political  life  in  England ; 
he  was,  or  was  supposed  to  be,  entirely  disinterested.  If 
Harley  may  be  trusted,  he  had  been  taken  into  counsel 
by  Marlborough  in  1707,  and  had  unfortunately  been 
thrown  over  by  him  for  the  Whigs.  However  this  may 
be,  he  certainly  was  now  made  the  engine  of  the  Whig 
overthrow,  as  four  years  later  he  was  the  engine  of  the 
Whig  recovery.  He  is  accused  by  the  Duchess  and 
other  partisans  of  duplicitous  conduct  to  Marlborough, 
but  this  will  not  weigh  much.  It  is  certain  that  he  was 
a  warm  supporter  of  Sacheverell,  and  this  may  be  said 
to  have  given  fair  warning  of  what  was  to  come. 

It  came,  however,  with  sufficient  suddenness.  In 
April,  when  Marlborough  was  away  and  Godolphin  at  his 
house  at  Newmarket,  Anne  sent  for  the  Marquis  of  Kent, 
an  insignificant  Whig  who  held  the  Chamberlainship,  and 
demanded  his  staff  of  office,  promising  him  a  dukedom. 
She  then  conferred  the  post  on  Shrewsbury,  informing 
Godolphin  of  the  proceeding  only  after  it  was  completed. 
The  step  thus  taken  was,  of  course,  an  open  affront,  and 
it  is  justly  charged  against  Godolphin  that  he  either 
lacked  the  spirit  or  the  intelligence  to  take  it  as  such 
and  to  resign  with  all  his  adherents.  It  is  barely  pos- 
sible that  such  a  course  might  have  enlisted  the  popular 
sentiment  on  his  side ;  the  course  which  he  actually 
pursued,  of  feebly  remonstrating  and  holding  on,  was 
fatal.  But  it  must  be  remembered  in  his  defence  that 
even  yet  the  Ministerial  system  was  very  little  developed, 
and  that,  though  the  Government  had  been  flagrantly 


1 68  MARLBOROUGH 

Whig  for  years,  neither  lie  nor  Marlborough  had  ever 
explicitly  given  up  the  theory  of  coalition  with  the 
Queen's  servants  of  whatever  party,  ministering  as  best 
they  could  at  the  Queen's  summons.  Unless  this  theory 
is  kept  in  view  (and  very  few,  if  any,  historians  have 
kept  it),  all  the  transactions  of  this  reign  become 
obscure.  It  is  especially  noticeable  that,  after  a  first 
tiff  of  indignation,  not  merely  Godolphin,  but  the 
Whigs  themselves,  acquiesced  in  the  appointment. 
They  had  very  soon  to  learn  that  to  let '  I  dare  not  wait 
upon  I  would  '  in  politics  is  always  fatal. 

Shrewsbury  meanwhile,  with  what  would  appear  to 
be  considerably  worse  duplicity  than  any  that  is  charged 
upon  Harley,  endeavoured  to  keep  upon  good  terms 
with  his  new  colleagues,  which  was  the  easier  that  the 
Whigs,  after  the  Sacheverell  business,  were  desperately 
afraid  of  a  dissolution.  The  next  step  in  the  Tory  siege 
was  a  less  bold  but  a  more  insidious  one.  It  was  led 
up  to  by  a  mistake  of  Marlborough's,  who,  in  submit- 
ting a  list  of  promotions  to  the  Queen,  stopped  short, 
it  was  impossible  to  think  by  accident,  of  Hill  and 
Masham.  He  had  to  yield,  as  it  must  have  been  per- 
fectly clear  to  any  man  of  half  his  intelligence  that  he 
would  have  to  yield,  and  his  inexorable  foes  followed  up 
their  victory  by  adroitly  suggesting  that  the  Duchess 
should  seek  a  reconciliation  with  Mrs.  Masham.  Of 
course  she  refused,  and  equally  of  course  she  put  her- 
self in  the  wrong  by  refusing.  All  these  things  were 
so  excellently  directed  by  Harley  and  so  badly  met  by 
the  Whigs,  that  disunion  began  to  grow  even  among 
the  latter.  The  Whigs,  moreover,  had  never  been 
thoroughly  well  affectioned  to  Marlborough,  and,  despite 


DOMESTIC  AND  POLITICAL  ATTITUDE      169 

their  obligations  to  him,  it  is  difficult  to  find  very  great 
fault  with  them.  It  was,  indeed,  notorious  that  Marl- 
borough's  coming  round  to  their  party,  or  rather  (for  it 
can  hardly  be  said  that  he  ever  openly  proclaimed  him- 
self a  Whig)  entering  into  alliance  with  it,  had  been 
merely  the  result  of  interested  calculation.  With  the 
curious  dramatic  justice  which  political  affairs  so  often 
show,  they  were  by  no  means  eager  to  take  up  heartily 
the  Marlborough-Masham  quarrel,  though  on  Marl- 
borough's  own  part  if  not  on  his  wife's  it  had  been 
originally  entered  upon  much  more  because  Mrs. 
Masham  was  supposed  to  be  working  against  the  Whigs, 
than  because  she  was  a  personal  enemy  of  the  Church- 
ills.  Marlborough,  as  we  have  seen,  had  declared  war 
against  Abigail  with  some  reluctance  and  after  warning 
his  wife  '  not  to  struggle  against  wind  and  tide ; '  and 
now,  when  he  wished  to  make  it  a  war  to  the  knife,  the 
allies  for  whose  sake  he  had  at  least  partly  declared  it 
hung  back.  The  irony  of  the  situation  is  certainly 
rather  pathetic  :  but  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the  pathos 
is  distinctly  ironical.  Nor  were  the  Junta  indissolubly 
united  even  among  themselves.  It  soon  became  notorious 
that  a  dead  set  would  be  made  upon  Sunderland,  whom 
the  Queen  had  always  disliked  extremely,  who  was  not 
too  affectionately  regarded  even  by  his  immediate  col- 
leagues, and  who  was,  owing  to  his  hot  and  acrimonious 
temper,  obnoxious  to  many  of  the  more  moderate  Whigs. 
By  fixing  on  this  unpopular  victim,  Harley  showed  his 
political  genius ;  by  consenting  to  the  victim's  sacrifice, 
Somers  and  his  friends  showed  their  lack  of  it.  For  a 
moment  Marlborough  seemed  ready  to  espouse  the  cause 
of  his  son-in-law,  but  a  '  round  robin '  from  all  the 


170  MARLBOROUGH 

ministers  except  Somerset  and  Shrewsbury  induced 
him  to  withdraw  his  resignation.  This  may  be  con- 
sidered as  the  final  mistake  which  Marlborough  com- 
mitted. He  had  refused  to  support  the  Queen  against 
Sunderland,  he  now  refused  to  support  Sunderland 
against  the  Queen,  and  it  was  inevitable  that  he  should 
come  to  be  regarded  as  a  man  to  whom  office  and  the 
opportunity  of  showing  his  military  genius  were  above 
all  other  considerations.  On  the  other  hand,  the  re- 
maining ministers,  and  especially  the  rump  of  the  Junta, 
Somers,  Orford,  and  Halifax,  showed  their  own  sense 
of  weakness  by  abandoning  their  colleague.  From 
this  time  forth  the  Administration  may  be  taken  as 
doomed.  And  the  keen  political  sense  of  Walpole,  him- 
self a  member  of  it,  saw  this.  *  I  think,'  he  wrote 
to  Marlborough  on  June  6,  '  our  affairs  here  at  home  in 
a  most  unaccountable  situation.  Lord  Sunderland,  it  is 
agreed  by  all,  is  to  be  removed,  and  by  none  endeavoured 
to  be  saved.  I  don't  know  what  this  means :  but  I  am 
sure  it  must  end  in  the  dissolution  of  this  Parliament, 
and  in  the  destruction  of  the  Whigs.'  Craggs  wrote  to 
the  Duchess  to  the  same  effect,  and  Marlborough  him- 
self in  a  letter  to  Sarah  exclaims  against  the  '  tame 
quietness '  of  the  Whigs,  pronounces  them  '  mistaken  if 
they  think  this  will  go  no  further  than  the  mortifying 
of  you  and  me,'  and  declares  that  '  their  ruin  and  a  new 
Parliament  is  most  certainly  the  scheme.'  It  was  all  in 
vain,  and  the  successive  steps  which  ended  in  Sunder- 
land's  being  deprived  of  his  appointment  were  arranged 
BO  as  to  bring  the  pusillanimity  of  Godolphin  and  the 
disunion  of  the  Whigs  more  and  more  in  evidence,  and 
so  to  discredit  the  Ministry  further  and  further. 


DOMESTIC  AND  POLITICAL  ATTITUDE      171 

The  Tories  gave  it  no  respite.  In  the  place  of 
Sunder]  and  they  appointed  Dartmouth,  a  High  Church- 
man if  not  a  Jacobite,  and  before  long  the  final  mine 
was  sprung.  It  had  already  become  evident  that  the 
Whigs  were  too  fain  of  office  to  quarrel  even  with  the 
removal  of  their  own  friends,  that  Marlborough  could  be 
forced  into  holding  his  command,  that  Godolphin's  influ- 
ence was  gone,  while  every  sign  from  the  country  pointed 
to  a  Tory  majority  in  the  next  Parliament.  On  August 
7,  1710,  after  a  personal  audience,  in  which  he  asserts 
that  the  Queen  distinctly  requested  him  to  { go  on,' 
Godolphin  was  summoned  by  a  servant  to  break  his 
staff.  His  reception  of  the  order  was  very  honour- 
able to  himself,1  and  indeed  it  must  be  admitted  that 
timidity,  not  corruption,  was  Godolphin's  chief  fault. 
He  did  not  attempt  to  resist  the  Queen's  order,  and  she 
begged  Marlborough  to  continue  in  command.  No  new 
Lord  Treasurer  was  created,  but  Harley  was  put  at  the 
head  of  the  commission,  and  Lord  Poulett  was  made 
Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer.  Even  now,  so  consum- 
mate was  Harley's  management,  he  contrived  to  play 
the  hapless  Whig  fish.  The  party  had  never  been 
kindly  disposed  to  Godolphin,  and  they  seem  to  have 
entertained  the  absurd  notion  that  they  could  continue 
in  office  as  well  without  as  with  him.  Indeed,  there 
seems  no  strong  reason  for  believing  that  Harley  was 
determined  to  make  a  pure  Tory  administration.  He 
offered  amity  to  the  Whigs.  But  they  would  neither 
resign  nor  coalesce,  and  at  last  resignation  became 

1  He  is  accused  of  showing  violent  temper  in  private,  which  is 
scarcely  to  be  wondered  at ;  his  public  conduct  and  his  formal  letters 
to  Marlborough  are  what  is  referred  to  in  the  text. 


1 7  2  MARLBOROUGH 

imperative.  First  Somers,  then  the  entire  body  of 
Whig  Ministers,  resigned  and  were  replaced  by  Tories  ; 
a  dissolution  took  place  on  September  26 ;  Sacheverell 
made  his  triumphal  progress ;  the  elections  turned  com- 
pletely in  favour  of  the  Tories  ;  and  the  entire  fabric  of 
political  influence  which  Marlborough  had  so  carefully 
built  up  tumbled  to  the  ground. 

The  language  of  St.  John,  in  a  private  letter  on  the 
occasion,  is  undoubtedly  rather  brutal ;  but  there  is  little 
reason  for  quarrelling  with  its  truth.  '  He  has  nothing 
to  reproach  us  with.  His  wife,  Lord  Godolphin,  and 
himself  have  thrown  the  Queen's  favour  away,  and  he 
ought  not  to  be  angry  if  other  people  have  picked  it 
up.'  Bolingbroke  did  not  often  make  a  mistake  in 
statement,  and  it  is  impossible,  after  two  hundred 
years'  discussion  of  the  subject,  to  add  very  much  to 
his  words. 

Even  after  the  dismissal  of  the  Whigs  and  the  con- 
firmation of  the  Queen's  action  by  the  general  election, 
Marlborough's  career  as  a  general  was  by  no  means 
ended.  Nor  is  it  very  clear  that  it  need  have  been  if 
he  himself  had  not  adopted  a  course  of  action  which 
was  not  only  in  itself  injudicious,  but  contrasted  notably 
with  his  professions  not  many  years  earlier.  It  will 
not  do  to  take  too  literally  the  account  of  Bolingbroke, 
according  to  which  a  combination  of  baits  and  threats 
was  at  once  offered  to  induce  Marlborough  to  '  leave  his 
new  friends  the  Whigs  and  take  up  with  his  old  frienda 
the  Tories,'  '  no  longer  to  leave  his  country  to  rapine 
and  faction,'  and  '  to  restrain  the  rage  and  fury  of  his 
wife.'  But  the  fact,  if  not  the  manner  of  the  fact,  is 
perfectly  evident  from  the  terms  of  Marlborough's  own 


DOMESTIC  AND  POLITICAL  ATTITUDE      173 

disclaimers  in  his  letters  to  Sarah  as  to l  acting  with  Mr. 
Harley  and  the  Tories.'  That  he  was  pursued  and  en- 
treated to  a  peace  is  clear — equally  clear  that  he  refused 
the  offer.  '  I  detest  Mr.  Harley,'  he  says ;  a  bad  sign 
in  a  man  who  had  been  accustomed  to  use  friends  and 
foes  alike  and  to  detest  nobody.  Now,  if  Maryborough 
detested  Mr.  Harley,  it  may  be  taken  as  pretty  certain 
that  Mr.  Harley,  who  was  a  very  astute  person,  was 
not  long  in  finding  it  out.  He  showed,  however,  at  first 
no  signs  of  retaliating.  There  were  difficulties  about 
the  expenses  of  Blenheim ;  but  when  it  is  remembered 
how  enormously  the  expenses  exceeded  the  estimate,1  it 
is  not  quite  certain  that  Marlborough  might  not  have 
found  a  more  modern  treasury  equally  recalcitrant. 
Nor  could  he,  according  to  the  manners  of  the  time, 
make  much  objection  to  the  cashiering  of  three  partisan 
officers  of  his,  Macartney,  Meredith,  and  Honeywood, 
who  publicly  drank  confusion  to  the  new  Ministry.2 
Leave  granted  to  the  Duke  of  Argyll  without  reference 
to  Marlborough  was  a  more  legitimate  grievance,  but 
it  must  be  remembered  that  Marlborough  had  put  him- 
self in  a  thoroughly  false  position.  He  was  notoriously 
holding  office  as  general  to  carry  out  the  views  of  a 
particular  political  party ;  he  had  certainly  rejected  the 
offers  of  the  new  Ministry  to  return  to  the  creed  and 
the  attitude  which  he  had  held  during  the  greatest  part 

1  It  had  been  expected  that  the  house   would  cost  a  hundred 
thousand  pounds  :  first  and  last  it  cost  nearly  three  hundred  thou- 
sand. 

2  Swift  has  some  agreeable  remarks  in  his  driest  style  on  this 
matter  in  the  Examiner,  No.  20.     He  suggests  judicially  that  '  It 
might  perhaps  be  prudent  to  forbid  the  detestable  custom  of  drink- 
ing to  the  damnation  or  confusion  of  any  person  whatsoever.' 


174  MARLBOROUGH 

of  his  ]ife,  and  lie  was  ostentatiously  maintaining  con- 
nections with  their  bitter  enemies.  Their  conduct  in 
details  may  not  have  been,  probably  was  not,  defensible ; 
for  Harley  was  one  of  those  born  intriguers  who  delight 
in  administering  a  croc-en-jambe  to  any  adversaiy,  and 
St.  John,  though  far  from  ungenerous,  was  a  red-hot 
partisan.  Among  these  details  it  is  difficult  not  to  rank 
the  omission  of  a  vote  of  thanks  for  military  services  to 
Marlborough  at  the  end  of  1710,  breaking  a  custom  of 
many  years'  standing,  which,  especially  in  the  cases  of 
Blenheim  and  Ramillies,  had  sometimes  been  completed 
by  triumphal  processions  to  St.  Paul's  during  Marl- 
borough's  winter  visits  to  England.  It  is  true  that  the 
advantages  gained  were  chiefly  strategical  and  had  been 
dearly  bought,  but  as  a  solemn  thanksgiving  was  offered 
to  the  Divinity  for  successes  in  Flanders,  the  usual  vote 
of  thanks  to  the  instruments  of  those  successes  could 
hardly  be  called  unreasonable. 

Parliament  met  on  November  25,  and  Marlborough 
returned  home  a  month  later  much  depressed  by  the 
situation  in  which  he  found  himself  and  by  the  im- 
minence of  the  Duchess's  final  disgrace.  This,  ac- 
celerated and  aggravated  by  Sarah's  usual  conduct, 
happened  in  the  following  January,  though  Marl- 
borough  (with  a  spirit  which  cannot  but  be  called 
undignified,  though  the  outward  expression  of  it  was 
nothing  extraordinary  for  the  age)  went  on  his  knees 
to  the  Queen  to  beg  her  not  to  insist  on  the  surrender 
of  the  gold  key  which  was  the  symbol  of  office.  The 
Duchess,  with  an  exquisite  felicity  of  putting  herself 
in  the  wrong  which  must  have  delighted  her  enemies 
and  her  husband's,  requited  Anne  for  the  gift  of  hun- 


DOMESTIC  AND  POLITICAL  ATTITUDE      175 

dreds  of  thousands  by  removing  the  brass  locks  on  her 
apartments  in  the  palace  and  giving  orders,  the  execu- 
tion of  which  Marlborough  seems  to  have  been  in  time  to 
prevent,  for  the  removal  of  the  marble  chimneypieces 
and  other  fixtures.  It  is  scarcely  to  be  wondered  at 
that  when  Marlborough's  agent,  Maynwaring,  solicited 
Harley  about  the  delays  at  Blenheim,  he  should  have 
received  the  answer,  '  The  Queen  is  so  angry  that  she 
says  she  will  build  110  house  for  the  Duchess  of  Marl- 
borough  when  the  Duchess  has  pulled  hers  to  pieces.' 
Yet  Maynwaring  himself,  in  this  very  letter,  admits  that 
Harley  expressed  his  willingness  to  live  on  good  terms 
with  the  Duke.  It  would  be  easier  to  dismiss  this  as 
mere  hypocrisy  if  we  were  not  in  possession  of  the 
evidence  showing  that  the  Duke  was  not  disposed  to 
live  on  good  terms  with  Harley.  Months,  indeed, 
after  the  Duchess's  disgrace  and  when  Marlborough 
had  returned  to  the  Continent,  both  St.  John  and 
Harley  persisted  in  their  overtures  to  him — a  super- 
fluity of  hypocrisy,  if  it  was  hypocrisy,  which  would  be 
both  extravagant  and  unintelligible.  It  is,  however, 
certain  that  they  had  little  hope  of  really  securing  him, 
and  that  they  were  not  extraordinarily  careful  of  his 
feelings.  His  complaint  of  'the  villainous  way  of 
printing  which  stabs  me  to  the  heart,'  is  pathetic 
enough  and  may  be  said  to  render  his  alleged  impas- 
siveness  not  a  little  dubious ;  but  from  Swift's  confes- 
sions as  to  the  difficulty  of  stopping  the  opposition 
pamphleteers,  it  is  clear  enough  that  Harley  and  St. 
John  might  have  been  quite  unable  to  stop  the  '  villain- 
ous way '  if  they  had  tried.  For  no  one  can  reasonably 
doubt  that  the  unpopularity  of  Marlborough  among  a 


176  MARLBORO  UGH 

great  part  of  the  people  was  quite  genuine  and  was 
growing.  The  blood  and  treasure  expended  on  the  war 
were  more  and  more  bitterly  felt;  the  very  disputes 
about  Blenheim  drew  attention  to  the  enormous  outlay 
on  it,  and  as  we  know  from  a  note  of  the  Tory  Hearne,1 

1  He  gives,  under  date  January  13,  1706,  '  An  Estimate  of  the 
yearly  Income  of  one  Prince  [i.e.  the  Duke  of  Marlborough] : — 

Pounds  per  aim. 

Plenipotentiary  to  y"  States 7,000 

General  for  ye  English  Forces  on  Mr.  H.'s  establish- 
ment   -.    •    .        .  5,000 

General  in  Flanders  on  Mr.  B — g's  establishment    .  6,000 

Master  of  y"  Ordinance 3,000 

Travelling  charges  as  Master  of  ye  Ordinance  .        .  1 ,825 

Colonell  of  ye  Foot  Guards,  being  24  Companies      .  2,000 

Pension 5,000 

From  y"  States,  as  General  of  their  Forces        .        .  10,000 
From  y"  Foreign  troops  in  English  pay,  at  Gd.  per 

pound,  as  per  warrant 15,000 

For  keeping  a  table 1,000 

Keeper  of  y"  Great  and  Home  Parks        .        .        .  1,500 

Mistress  of  the  Robes 1,500 

Privy  Purse 1,500 

Groom  of  the  Stole 3,000 

Total 62,325 

'  The  States  General  on  y«  battle  of  Blenheim,  presented  a  blank 
bill  of  50,000  livres,  besides  presents  from  Germany  and  Flanders, 
from  officers  and  others  for  employments,  and  y'  profits  on  ex- 
change of  money,  and  by  safeguards,  &c.  The  estate  of  Woodstock 
is  not  reckoned  because  it  cannot  yet  be  known  what  it  will  cost 
to  build  and  furnish  a  palace  there.  The  Emperor  gave  gifts  to 
y*  value  of  60,000  livres,  besides  what  was  presented  by  the  King 
of  Prussia,  the  Elector  of  Hanover,  and  other  Courts.' — Collections, 
ed.  Doble,  i.  162.  Somerville  and  Stanhope  give  the  same  list. 

Note  that  Hearne  mentions  the  2£  per  cent,  commission,  as  to 
which  such  a  coil  was  afterwards  made,  and  that  he  mentions  it  as  on 
exactly  the  same  footing  as  Marlborough's  unquestioned  emoluments. 


DOMESTIC  AND  POLITICAL  ATTITUDE      177 

years  before  the  immense  receipts  of  the  favourite  and 
her  husband  had  long  been  counted  and  watched  with 
the  sharpest  envy  and  indignation.  That  these  feelings 
were  represented  on  the  committee  which,  during  the 
spring  of  1711,  was  appointed  to  inspect  the  national 
accounts,  is  certain ;  and  it  was  not  very  long  before 

A  much  better  known  but  less  exact  estimate  of  Marlborough's  gains 
is  contained  in  the  sixteenth  number  of  the  Examiner,  where  Swift 
has  ingeniously  drawn  up  the  following : — 

A  BILL  OF  ROMAN  GRATITUDE. 

Inprlm.  £  s.    d. 

For  frankincense  and  earthen  pots  to  burn  it  in  .       4  10    0 

A  bull  for  sacrifice 800 

An  embroidered  garment 50    0    0 

A  crown  of  laurel        .        .        .        .        .        .002 

A  statue 100    0    0 

A  trophy 80    0    0 

A  thousand  copper  medals  value  halfpence  apiece     218 

A  triumphal  arch 500    0    0 

A  triumphal  car,  valued  as  a  modern  coach       .  100    0    0 
Casual  charges  at  the  Triumph  ....  150    0    0 

994  11  10 

A  BILL  OP  BRITISH  INGRATITUDE. 
Imprim.  £ 

Woodstock 40,000 

Blenheim 200,000 

Post-office  grant 100,000 

Mildenheim 30,000 

Pictures,  jewels,  &c 60,000 

Pall  Mall  grant        .        .        .        .        .        .        .     10,000 

Employments.        .        .        .        .        .        .        .  100,000 

540,000" 

The  Medley,  which  tried  to  keep  up  on  the  other  side  with  the 
Examiner,  presented  a  counter-statement  in  which  the  towns  taken 
by  Marlborough  were  charged  per  contra  at  £300,000  each  and  set  to 
his  credit. 


1 7  8  MARLDOROUGH 

it  became  evident  that  the  result  of  them  would  appear 
to  concern  the  Duke  directly.  It  is  probable  that 
Harley  would  have  been  unable  to  restrain  the  extreme 
Tories  if  he  had  wished.  But  the  secret  negotiations 
now  pending  through  Lord  Raby,  afterwards  Lord 
Strafford,  made  it  more  and  more  inconvenient  to  have 
Marlborough  at  the  head  of  military  affairs,  and  by 
degrees  the  conduct  of  the  ministry,  which  at  first  will 
at  least  bear  the  colour  of  an  attempt  to  find  a  modus 
vivendi  with  the  general,  turned  into  an  indirect  and  far 
from  creditable  attack  on  him.  Yet,  in  March  and 
again  in  July,  a  sort  of  rapprochement  took  place  be- 
tween Harley,  now  Earl  of  Oxford,  and  Marlborough. 
From  Stair's  account,  who  was  the  agent  in  the  nego- 
tiations, it  certainly  would  appear  that  Harley  either 
for  once  merited  the  charge  of  bad  faith,  or  at  best 
rejected  very  explicit  offers  of  peace  and  amity  with 
Marlborough,  these  offers  being  accompanied  by  an 
alternative  offer  of  resignation.  But  it  must  be  re- 
membered that  this  is  an  ex  parte  statement,  made 
about  twenty  years  after  date,  that  the  financial  inquiry 
into  the  expenses  of  the  war  had  already  gone  far,  and 
had  roused  so  much  popular  feeling  that  Harley  might 
have  been  unable  to  stem  it,  and  that  the  whole  ques- 
tion resolves  itself  into  this  :  Was  Marlborough,  or  was 
he  not,  irrevocably  opposed  to  the  peace  on  which  the 
Ministers  were  bent  ?  and  did  the  rapprochement  turn 
upon  his  abandoning  this  opposition  ?  It  seems  to  me 
that  a  good  deal  of  confusion  exists  on  these  points  in 
the  minds  of  some  thorough-going  defenders  of  Marl- 
borough  and  opposers  of  the  Peace  of  Utrecht.  He 
cannot  have  the  credit  of  opposing  the  peace  to  the 


DOMESTIC  AND  POLITICAL  ATTITUDE      179 

death,  and  also  of  being  subjected  to  unmerited  treat- 
ment by  the  makers  of  that  peace. 

The  storm  finally  broke  on  him  in  November.  Sir 
Solomon  Medina,  bread  contractor  to  the  army,  then 
deposed  before  the  committee  of  investigation  that  he 
had  paid  to  the  Duke  sums  amounting  in  all  to  some 
seventy  thousand  pounds  for  his  private  use.  Marl- 
borough's  reply  was  prompt,  that  the  payments  had 
been  customary  before  his  time  and  had  been  regarded 
and  expended  as  secret  service  money,  nor  is  there 
practically  any  other  answer  to  the  charge  given  or 
needed  to  this  day.  But  the  Duke  committed  the 
mistake,  or  at  any  rate  took  the  step,  when  he  re- 
turned to  England  on  November  18,  of  declaring 
himself  opposed  to  the  peace,  remonstrating  with  the 
Queen  and  absenting  himself  from  the  council.  This 
was  surely  a  declaration  of  war  against  the  ministry, 
and  St.  John  can  hardly  be  blamed  for  the  words  he 
used :  '  His  fate  hangs  heavy  upon  him.'  Not,  of 
course,  that  Marlborough  was  not  perfectly  within  his 
rights  in  opposing  the  peace.  But  it  is  certainly  sur- 
prising that  he  should  have  thought  it  possible  or 
reasonable  at  once  to  oppose  the  peace  and  to  receive 
the  support  of  the  ministry  whose  chief  measure  he  was 
obstructing  and  whose  very  existence  as  ministers  a 
coalition  between  himself,  Shrewsbury,  Buckingham- 
shire, and  some  others  was  supposed,  and  not  unreason- 
ably supposed,  to  threaten  for  a  moment. 

At  any  rate  the  ministry  resolved  to  keep  no  more 
terms  with  him.  The  Medina  charges,  and  others 
founded  on  a  deduction  of  two  and  a  half  per  cent,  from 
the  pay  of  the  auxiliaries  which  he  had  admitted  and 


i  So  MARLBOROUG'H 

justified,  were  formulated  in  a  solemn  report.  This 
was  printed  by  order  of  tlie  Government,  and  on  De- 
cember 31,  1711,  an  entry  was  made  in  the  council 
books  that  the  information  having  been  laid  against 
the  Duke  before  the  House  of  Commons,  Her  Majesty 
thought  fit  to  dismiss  him  from  all  his  employments  that 
the  matter  might  undergo  an  impartial  investigation. 
The  dismissal  was  conveyed  to  Marlborough  in  a  letter 
from  the  Queen  herself,  which  is  not  extant ;  the  Duchess 
says  he  burnt  it.  The  reply,  however,  exists  and  is  not 
very  happy.  It  is  long  and  it  contains  some  damaging 
admissions.  Thus  Marlborough  acknowledges  'that  '  my 
duty  to  your  Majesty  and  the  country  would  not  give 
me  leave  to  join  in  the  counsel  of  a  man  who,  in  my 
opinion,  puts  your  Majesty  upon  all  manner  of  ex- 
tremities,' and  asserts  that  '  the  friendship  of  France 
must  needs  be  destructive,'  and  that  '  that  court  had 
a  root  of  irreconcilable  enmity.'  Surely  these  phrases 
justified  those  who  said  that  with  Marlborough  in 
command  and  power,  peace  was  impossible.  At  any 
rate,  he  had  behaved  as  if  it  was,  and  he  paid  the 
penalty.  The  greatest  general  of  the  age  lost  his  em- 
ployment nominally  because  he  had  taken  what  in  those 
days  all  men  took,  the  customary  perquisites  of  his 
office,  really  because  he  was  too  determined  to  be  a 
general  or  nothing. 


CHAPTER    X. 

LAST  YEARS. 

SEVERE  as  was  Marlborough's  fall,  it  is  not  probable  that 
either  he  or  any  of  his  contemporaries  perceived  that 
it  was,  as  it  turned  out  to  be,  a  practical  close  to  his 
public  life.  He  lived  for  ten  years  longer,  his  party 
triumphed,  and  he  held  positions  of  nominally  great 
importance.  But  he  was  never  again  actively  engaged 
at  the  head  of  affairs,  and  though  the  new  dynasty  had 
to  fight  for  its  life  almost  immediately  on  attaining 
it,  the  greatest  captain  in  England,  the  greatest  captain 
in  Europe,  was  not  employed  in  its  service.  Par- 
liamentarily  speaking,  the  fracas  with  Poulett  and 
Argyll  was  also  the  last  important  appearance  of  Marl- 
borough.  The  history  of  these  last  years,  which  I  shall 
now  give  briefly,  will  in  part  explain  this  seeming 
paradox ;  for  it  is  undeniable  that  Marlborough's  con- 
duct was  on  the  whole  injudicious.  But  there  were 
other  reasons.  His  health  was  already  seriously  af- 
fected by  the  enormous  labours  he  had  undergone  and 
the  chagrin  in  which  they  had  ended.  Moreover, 
though  not  really  an  old  man  (he  was  but  sixty-two), 
he  had  outlived  his  immediate  associates  and  found 
himself,  partly  owing  to  his  own  fault,  alone  among  a 


1 82  MARLBOKOUGH     . 

younger  generation  who  were  on  both  sides  but  ill- 
disposed  towards  him.  He  had  injured  and  been 
injured  by  the  Tories  too  deeply  for  forgiveness  on  either 
side.  He  had  never  possessed  the  confidence  of  the 
Whigs  proper,  nor  had  he  ever  sympathised  with  them. 
Now  the  principle  of  party  government,  which  had  been 
gradually  crystallising  for  four  reigns,  had  at  last 
attained  solidity,  and  it  was  impossible  for  a  man  to  try 
to  use  both  parties,  as  Marlborough  had  done,  without 
disgusting  both.  At  a  much  later  period  and  by  a 
curious  coincidence,  another  great  soldier,  taking  part 
in  politics,  carried  Whig  measures  or  acquiesced  in 
them  without  losing  the  confidence  of  the  Tories,  and 
belonged  to  the  Tories  without  forfeiting  the  respect  of 
the  Whigs.  But  nothing,  save  the  Duke  of  Wellington's 
services,  united  with  his  stainless  political  reputation, 
enabled  even  him  to  carry  out  his  famous  and  favourite 
theory  of  duty  to  the  Queen's  Government.  Unfor- 
tunately Marlborough's  antecedents  were  very  different, 
and  when  he  once  lost  the  personal  favour  of  the 
sovereign,  his  hold  on  public  affairs  was  lost  altogether. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  this  loss  was  confirmed  and 
made  certain  by  the  singular  step — of  going  abroad 
— which  he  took  not  long  after  his  disgrace.  It  is 
true  that  the  intervening  months — January  to  October 
— had  been  months  of  considerable  vexation  to  him. 
He  had  hardly  been  disgraced  when  Eugene  arrived  for 
a  personal  visit,  which  had  been  long  planned  by  the 
Whigs  in  the  hope  that  it  might  strengthen  the  war 
party.  In  the  circumstances  it  is  pretty  certain  that  it 
did  more  harm  than  good  to  the  cause  it  was  intended 
to  further.  Englishmen  have  never  liked  foreign 


LAST  YEARS  183 

interference  in  their  politics;  and  at  that  time  the 
objection  to  'foreigners'  was  far  stronger  than  it  is 
now.  Moreover,  even  in  the  dim  and  rudimentary 
conception  of  political  dignity  which  then  prevailed,  it 
must  have  seemed  somewhat  indecent  that  a  foreign 
prince — a  professional,  and,  as  ill-natured  people  might 
put  it,  a  mercenary  soldier — should  be  imported  to 
counteract  and  thwart  the  measures  of  the  responsible 
ministry  of  the  Queen  of  England.  At  any  rate  Eugene, 
though  most  politely  received,  effected  nothing;  and 
his  generous  but  somewhat  imprudent  partisanship  for 
Marlborough,  probably  did  that  general  no  good  either 
with  the  authorities  or  the  people.1  No  one  now- 
adays takes  seriously  the  wild  story  devised,  or  at 
least  reported,  by  the  Jesuit  Plunket,  to  the  effect  that 
a  plot  (countenanced  if  not  started  by  Eugene,  Mai'l- 
borough,  and  the  Hanoverian  envoy  Bothmar)  was  on 
foot  for  setting  London  on  fire,  seizing  the  Queen's 
person,  and  proceeding  to  further  measures  which  seem 
to  have  varied,  as  usual,  according  to  the  taste  and 
fancy  of  the  deponent.  But  it  is  by  no  means  certain 
that  no  one  then  believed  it.  It  was  but  a  little  more 
than  thirty  years  since  Titus  Gates  had  set  all  London 
and  half  England  frantic  with  a  more  improbable  story ; 
the  '  Irish  night '  was  a  memory  still  more  recent,  and 
the  imprudence  of  swashbucklers  like  Macartney  and 
Meredith  gave  a  certain  colour,  especially  in  conjunction 

1  The  story  is  well  known  how  Oxford,  at  a  dinner  to  the  Prince, 
gave  '  The  greatest  captain  of  the  age.'  Eugene,  with  more  wit  than 
politeness,  replied,  'If  I  am  so,  I  owe  it  to  your  lordship.'  But  at 
this  time  the  populace  of  London  were  crying,  « Thief  1  Stop  thief  1 ' 
after  Marlborough,  and  it  is  to  be  feared  that  Eugene's  rapier  was 
weak  against  this  kind  of  bludgeon. 


1 84  MARLBOROUGH 

with  a  coincident  outburst  of  Mohock  outrages,  to  the 
assertion.  The  Queen  seems  certainly  to  have  been 
frightened,  and  it  is  by  no  means  clear  that  Swift  did 
not  believe  that  there  was  some  foundation  for  the 
story.  His  attitude  in  the  matter  is,  however,  certainly 
peculiar,  not  to  say  louche.  The  anonymous  editor  of  the 
'  Four  Last  Years  of  Queen  Anne,'  whoever  he  was,  has 
hit  off  Swift's  handling  of  these  and  other  points  in 
Marlborough's  career  rather  happily,  by  remarking  that, 
'  in  a  manner  peculiar  to  this  author '  he  '  insinuates  a 
new  crime  by  seeming  to  attempt  to  acquit  Marlborough 
of  aspiring  to  the  throne.'  The  history  of  what  the  same 
writer  calls  Swift's  charge  against  Eugene,  of 'raising  and 
keeping  up  a  most  horrible  mob  with  intent  to  assassinate 
Harley,'  and  of  the  other  matters  concerned,  is  as  follows. 
On  the  17th  of  November,  1711,  just  before  Marl- 
borough's  dismissal  ( '  Queen  Elizabeth's  day  ' )  a  great 
pope-burning  was  arranged  for.  These  pope-burnings 
were  constant  occasions  of  riot,  and  when  Tory  govern- 
ments were  in  power  had  always  been  subjects  of  anxiety 
to  the  authorities.  In  the '  Journal  to  Stella'  Swift  rather 
pooh-poohs  the  affair;  but  as  Scott  and  others  have 
insisted  on  this  in  opposition  to  the  words  in  the  '  Four 
Last  Years,'  it  may  be  well  to  point  out  that  he  says  even 
in  the  '  Journal '  *  they  had  some  very  foolish  and  mis- 
chievous designs,  and  it  was  thought  they  would  have 
put  the  rabble  on  assaulting  my  lord  treasurer's  house 
and  the  secretary's.'  The  militia  was  called  out,  the 
figures  carried  by  the  procession  seized,  and  a  pamphlet, 
in  which  Swift  may  have  had  some  slight  hand,  and 
which  is  to  be  found  in  his  works,  gave  a  grave  and  very 
circumstantial  account  of  the  intended  tumult.  Marl- 


LAST  YEARS  185 

borough  had  returned  from  Flanders  on  this  day,  and 
the  accusation  against  him  takes  form  in  the  '  Four  Last 
Years '  thus  : — '  Whether  this  frolic  were  only  intended 
for  an  affront  to  the  Court,  or  whether  it  had  a  deeper 
meaning,  I  must  leave  undetermined.  The  Duke  in  his 
own  nature  is  not  much  turned  to  be  popular ;  and  in 
his  flourishing  times,  whenever  he  came  back  to  Eng- 
land upon  the  close  of  a  campaign,  he  rather  affected 
to  avoid  any  concourse  of  the  mobile  if  they  had  been 
disposed  to  attend  him :  therefore  so  very  contrary  a 
proceeding  at  this  juncture  made  it  suspected  as  if  he 
had  a  design  to  have  placed  himself  at  their  head.' 
There  the  matter  rested  for  the  moment.  But  when 
Eugene  came  over  in  January,  similar  designs  were  once 
more  attributed  to  Marlborough  and  his  friends  by  the 
extreme  Tories.  The  reference  in  the  '  Four  Last  Years ' 
is  even  more  studiously  vague  than  before.  After  some 
innuendoes  on  Eugene's  '  Italian  cruelty,'  he  is  accused 
of  suggesting  that  the  treasurer  might  be  taken  off,  and 
that,  as  a  preliminary,  small  riots  might  be  raised. 
Next  the  Mohock  outrages  are  described,  and  it  is 
remarked  that  'an  effectual  stop  was  put  to  these 
enormities,  which  probably  prevented  the  execution  of 
the  main  design.'  The  historian  then  glides  off  with 
an  apology  for  '  such  an  imputation,'  excusing  himself  by 
saying  that  the  account  was  given  by  more  than  one 
person  present,  and  confirmed  by  letters  and  papers.  It 
is  needless  to  say  that  the  witnesses  are  unidentified, 
and  that  the  letters  and  papers  have  never  been  pro- 
duced. The  real  informant,  as  far  as  there  was  one,  was, 
as  has  been  said,  a  Jesuit  named  Plunket,  whose  informa- 
tion after  long  lying  hid  was  published  in  Bolingbroke's 


1 86  MARLBOROUGH 

correspondence  and  in  Macplierson's  collections  and 
history.  It  was  from  Plunket  beyond  all  doubt  that 
Torcy,  who  refers  to  the  story  with  the  cautious  words  '  si 
Ton  en  croyait  des  gens  peutetre  mal  informes,'  derived 
his  intelligence,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  Plunket's 
authority  was  worthless.  The  simple  consideration  that 
the  Ministry,  if  they  had  had  the  slightest  evidence, 
would  have  eagerly  used  it  to  ruin  their  chief  enemies 
for  ever,  would  dispose  of  it  even  if  there  were  no  other 
reasons  for  doubting  it.  But  no  doubt  it  did  some  harm 
to  Marlborough. 

Again,  when  the  orders  given  to  Ormond  to 
cease  active  operations  came  (on  May  28)  to  be  dis- 
cussed in  Parliament,  Marlborough,  who  had  for  years 
been  a  rare  speaker,  met  with  a  misadventure.  He  not 
only  inveighed,  as  of  course  he  had  a  right  to  do, 
against  the  peace,  but  appealed  to  Argyll  to  bear  him 
out  as  to  the  necessity  of  a  vigorous  prosecution  of  the 
war.  Argyll  rose  and  unexpectedly  declared  that,  no 
doubt,  if  the  war  had  been  vigorously  prosecuted  it 
would  have  been  best,  but  that  Marlborough  had 
neglected  to  do  so  when  he  might,  and  that  action  was 
in  his  (Argyll's)  opinion  now  useless.  This  damaging 
speech  Marlborough,  having  invited  it,  could  not  directly 
resent.  But  he  was  provoked  by  the  clumsier  but  still 
more  galling  remark  of  Lord  Poulett,  that  Ormond 
1  did  not  resemble  a  certain  other  general  who  led  troops 
to  the  slaughter  in  order  to  fill  his  pocket  by  selling 
commissions,'  and  sent  Mohun  with  a  challenge.  The 
fight  did  not  come  off.  Indeed,  it  seems  that  Poulett 
was  more  successful  than  Mr.  Winkle  in  indirectly 
procuring  the  intervention  of  the  civic  arm.  For  this 


LAST  YEARS  187 

conduct  Marlborough  could  not,  according  to  the  ideas 
of  the  day,  be  fairly  blamed ;  yet,  as  everything  at  this 
time  turned  to  his  disparagement,  he  was  charged  with 
introducing  political  duels  into  England,  and  the 
incident  undoubtedly  heightened  the  odium  .of  the 
subsequent  Hamilton-Mohun  affair.  Finally  Godolphin 
died,  and  Marlborough  lost  a  close  comrade  of  thirty 
years  in  good  and  ill  luck,  in  good  (it  must  be  added)  and 
ill  dealing.  Before  going  abroad  he  obtained  a  regular 
passport,  worded  in  terms  suggesting  a  kind  of  irregular 
mission,  through  Oxford ;  and  it  is  recorded  that  the 
Queen  said, '  The  Duke  of  Marlborough  has  acted  wisely 
in  going  abroad.'  But  why  he  did  this,  unless  it  was 
because  of  the  chagrins  just  mentioned,  no  one  seems 
to  know — for  the  reasons,  sometimes  alleged,  that 
actions  against  him  were  threatened  on  the  public 
account  about  the  bread  money,  in  private  about  the 
building  of  Blenheim,  are  quite  insufficient,  unless  it  is 
implied  that  Marlborough  had  no  defence  to  make. 
Political  justice  had  been,  and  even  for  some  time  was 
ill-administered  in  England  now  and  then ;  but  I  do 
not  know  of  a  single  instance  tending  to  prove  that 
the  ordinary  courts  would  have  given  unjust  judgment 
in  a  plain  question  of  money  due.  A  story  is  referred 
to  by  Scott  in  one  of  his  notes  on  Swift,  to  the  effect  that 
Harley  had  got  hold  of  the  evidence  tending  to  connect 
Marlborough  with  the  disaster  of  Camaret  Bay.  Either 
he  threatened  to  use  it  if  Marlborough  did  not  quit 
England,  or  Marlborough  fled  in  fear,  the  former 
hypothesis  being  alone  consistent  with  the  granting  of 
the  passport.  In  the  first  place,  there  is  no  proof  what- 
ever of  this ;  in  the  second,  it  would  have  been  much 


1 8  8  MARLBOROUGH 

more  to  Harley's  advantage  (supposing  he  did  not  use 
the  information  at  once  and  publicly)  to  hold  it  in 
terror  over  Maryborough,  and  to  hold  Maryborough  in 
England,  and  on  his  good  behaviour,  than  to  let  him 
go  abroad  to  intrigue  with  Hanover  and  with  foreign 
powers.  But  the  strongest  argument  of  all  is  that  no 
statesman  of  that  time,  and  the  head  of  the  Tory  Govern- 
ment, which  was  negotiating  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht,  least 
of  all,  could  afford  to  wake  the  sleeping  dogs  of  Jacobite 
intrigue  in  the  reign  of  William.  The  Camaret  Bay 
matter  could  not  well  have  come  out  alone,  and  many 
of  Harley's  own  party,  more  than  one  even  of  his 
own  colleagues  in  the  Ministry,  would  have  had  their 
heads  little  firmer  on  their  shoulders  than  Marlborough. 
The  most  probable  explanation  is  that  Marlborough,  cha- 
grined and  humiliated  by  his  altered  position  in  England, 
was  very  glad  to  escape  from  the  scene  of  the  chagrin  and 
the  humiliation.  It  may  be  added  (though  this  is  not 
a  conclusive  argument)  that  an  act  of  grace  passed  so 
recently  as  1709  would  apparently  have  protected 
Marlborough  in  this  particular  case  from  legal  powers, 
though  not,  of  course,  from  public  obloquy.  The  Duchess 
did  not  immediately  accompany  him,  and  the  most  sig- 
nificant circumstance  of  the  many  that  have  been  men- 
tioned about  the  matter  is  that,  before  leaving  England, 
he  vested  his  estates  in  his  sons-in-law  as  trustees, 
and  lodged  50,OOOZ.  in  the  Dutch  funds,  'in  order/ 
says  Sarah,  'to  secure  a  subsistence  if  the  Stuarts 
were  restored.'  Meanwhile,  before  he  left  England  his 
unpopularity  was  increased  by  the  killing — according  to 
some  stories  the  murder — of  the  Duke  of  Hamilton  by 
Lord  Mohun,  who  was  a  strong  partisan  of  Marl- 


LAST  YEARS  189 

borough's,  and  whose  second,  charged  with  treacherously 
stabbing  Hamilton,  was  General  Macartney,  one  of  the 
disgraced  general's  dmes  damnees. 

Marlborough's  foreign  journey,  which  was  begun 
on  November  28,  1812,  whether  it  was  an  exile,  a 
flight,  a  political  expedition,  or  merely  a  distrac- 
tion, was  at  first  prolific  in  compliments.  He  was 
received  by  the  garrisons  of  Ostend,  Antwerp,  and 
Maestricht  with  almost  royal  honours,  and  his  journey 
was  a  triumphal  progress.  He  stayed  for  some  time  at 
Aix-la-Chapelle  and  then  returned  to  Maestricht,  where 
he  was  joined  by  the  Duchess  in  February,  and  after- 
wards established  himself  at  Frankfort,  making  ex- 
cursions to  Mindelheim  and  elsewhere.  It  was  from 
Frankfort  that,  new  charges  of  malversation  being 
brought  against  him,  he  wrote  an  answer  to  be  laid 
before  both  Houses  which  his  partisans  regard  as  final, 
and  which  certainly  seems  to  have  stopped  all  further 
proceedings.  This  new  and  last  charge  was  connected 
with  a  rather  intricate  detail  of  military  administration, 
Marlborough  being  charged  with  giving  instructions  to 
enter  complete  musters  of  the  English  troops  when  they 
were  in  reality  defective,  and  with  obtaining  perquisites 
or  fees  on  the  strength  of  such  musters.  He  pleaded  in 
return  (and,  as  has  been  said,  no  reply  seems  to  have 
been  made  to  the  plea),  first  that  he  had  acted  under 
distinct  statutory  authority,  secondly  that  (at  least  this 
seems  to  be  the  drift  of  his  very  technical  defence)  the 
muster-money  was  applied  to  recruiting,  and  that  the 
public  was  saved  expense  by  the  proceeding.  To  finish 
with  this  question  of  malversation,  it  cannot  be  too  much 
impressed  upon  the  reader  that  the  frequent  rhetorical 
9 


190  MARLBOROUGH 

allusions  to  Marlborough  in  all  sorts  of  books  as  having 
'  starved  the  soldiers/  '  cheated  them  of  their  pay,'  and 
so  forth,  are  rhetoric  and  nothing  more.  The  only  two 
charges  which  an  investigation  carried  out  with  full 
powers  and  certainly  in  no  friendly  spirit  could  establish, 
were  the  reception  of  the  bread  money  and  the  deduc- 
tion of  the  sixpence  a  pound  on  the  pay  of  the  foreign 
troops.  The  evidence  as  to  custom  in  the  former  case, 
and  the  royal  warrants  in  the  latter,  must  be  allowed  to 
exonerate  Marlborough  of  anything  like  direct  pecula- 
tion, though  the  system  of  perquisites,  gratuities,  pots-de- 
vin  and  the  like  is  one  of  course  veiy  dangerous  in  itself, 
and  very  liable  to  further  abuse.  From  Frankfort  he  re- 
moved to  Antwerp,  and  there  spent  the  winter  of  1713. 
He  was  doubtless  sincerely  grieved  at  the  conclusion  of 
the  Treaty  of  Utrecht,  more  especially  as  it  involved 
the  restitution  of  the  estate  of  Mindelheim  to  Bavaria. 
The  English  Ministry  have  been  blamed  for  not  pre- 
venting this,  but  the  blame  clearly  concerned  the 
Emperor  only,  who  thus  took  away  an  Imperial  gift, 
and  though  he  promised  indemnity  never  bestowed  it. 

The  occupations  of  Marlborough  at  Antwerp  are  not 
very  well  known,  but  it  is  certain  that  he  was  partly 
employed  in  concerting,  with  the  House  of  Hanover, 
measures  for  supporting  their  claim  on  the  English 
throne  by  arms,  and  one  of  the  most  curious  points  in 
his  history  is  the  fact  that  at  the  same  time  confidential 
missions  were  sent  by  Harley  and  by  Marlborough  to 
Hanover.  It  is  not  obvious  why,  on  patriotic  grounds, 
Marlborough  should  object  to  the  Prime  Minister  of 
England  maintaining  communications  with  the  legal 
heir  to  the  crown ;  and  though  his  letters  to  his  private 


LAST  YEARS  191 

agents  represent  Harley's  proceedings  as  a  blind,  it 
is  difficult  to  resist  the  conclusion  that  a  '  Codlin,  not 
Short '  feeling  was,  in  reality,  at  the  bottom  of  the  affair. 
It  does  not  appear  that  Marl  borough  did  himself  much 
good  with  the  Elector  by  these  proceedings.  George, 
who  had  a  good  memory,  had  an  old  grudge  against 
him  arising  from  the  campaign  of  Oudenarde,  and  he 
was  quite  shrewd  enough  to  appreciate  the  motives  of 
Marlborough's  adherence  to  his  interests.  This  adhe- 
rence seems  to  have  been  carried  pretty  far,  for  Marl- 
borough  is  said,  on  credible  if  not  absolutely  certain 
authority,  to  have  made  arrangements  with  Cadogan  and 
Stanhope  for  bringing  over  troops  from  the  continent 
at  the  Queen's  death,  for  inducing  the  force  occupying 
Dunkirk  to  declare  for  the  Hanoverian  line,  and  for 
providing  money  even  at  his  own  expense.  The  Princess 
Sophia,  who  was  better  disposed  towards  him  than  her 
son,  appears  to  have  given  him  a  blank  warrant  (an 
exceedingly  questionable  document,  looked  upon  from 
the  point  of  view  of  the  English  constitution)  appointing 
him  commander-in-chief  of  her  troops  and  garrisons  on 
her  accession  to  the  crown.  At  the  same  time  he  seems 
to  have  intrigued,  or,  if  that  word  appears  question- 
begging,  to  have  negotiated  at  the  Hague,  so  as  to  in- 
flame the  resentment  and  apprehension  of  the  Dutch  in 
reference  to  the  policy  of  the  Tory  Ministry.  There  is 
less  evidence  of  transactions  with  the  Chevalier,  but  it 
is  almost  impossible  to  reconcile  the  subsequent  attitude 
of  George  I.  to  Marlborough  with  any  other  hypothesis 
than  that  the  Elector  was  in  possession  of  proofs,  or 
at  least  very  strongly  suspected  the  existence,  of  some 
such  dealings  on  Marlborough's  part.  Lord  Stanhope 


192  MARLDOROUGH 

thought  he  had  discovered  proof  of  these  dealings  even 
after  George's  accession.  But  as  this  proof  consists  only  in 
an  allusion  of  Bolingbroke's,  in  a  letter  to  the  Chevalier, 
to  '  the  very  sura  which  Maryborough  had  advanced  to 
you '  I  cannot  think  it  very  urgent.  On  the  whole, 
though  authentic  information  is  very  scarce,  it  seems 
probable  that  Marlborough,  both  now  and  afterwards, 
committed  the  mistake  of  intriguing  with  too  many 
parties,  endeavouring,  according  to  his  old  policy  in  the 
reign  of  William,  to  secure  at  once  Hanover  and  St. 
Germains,  Oxford  and  Bolingbroke,  Tory  and  Whig. 
But  the  circumstances  were  completely  changed. 

His  absence  excluded  him  from  direct  participation 
in  the  singular  and  half-legendary  events  which  imme- 
diately preceded  the  death  of  Queen  Anne ;  but  it  can 
hardly  have  been  an  accident  that  he  reached  England 
the  day  after  the  Queen's  decease.  He  had  scarcely  landed 
before  he  received  a  decisive  proof  that  his  day  was 
over.  The  coup  d'etat  (for  it  was  practically  that)  had 
been,  it  must  be  remembered,  effected  not  by  the  Whigs 
proper,  but  by  Shrewsbury,  Argyll,  and  Somerset,  men 
who  were  equally  removed  from  the  Junta  and  the 
October  Club.  The  two  first,  moreover,  were  personal 
enemies  of  Marlborough.  It  may  have  been  due  to 
this,  or  it  may  have  been  due  to  secret  instructions 
from  Hanover,  that  Marlborough 's  name  was  not  to 
be  found  in  the  list  of  Lords  Justices  who  held  the 
Regency  till  the  arrival  of  the  Elector.  He  had, 
however,  a  warm  reception  on  entering  London,  and  it 
is  said  that  when  he  had  retired  in  dudgeon  to  Holy- 
well,  Bothmar  and  other  Hanoverian  agents  apologised 
for  the  slight  cast  on  him.  Sarah  informs  us  that  he 


LAST  YEARS  193 

resolved  to  hold  no  situation  under  the  new  Govern- 
ment, and  that  his  resolve  was  partly  due  to  her  request 
upon  her  knees.  This  is  not  the  situation  or  the  senti- 
ments in  which  it  is  easy  to  conceive  her,  and  the  simple 
explanation  of  the  whole  matter  is,  doubtless,  that  the 
grapes  were  sour.  He  met  the  new  king  at  Greenwich, 
was  graciously  received,  and  was  prevailed  on  to  resume 
his  appointments  of  Captain-General  (which,  however, 
in  time  of  peace  was  honorary  only)  and  Master  of  the 
Ordnance,  while  his  sons-in-law  held  some  honourable 
and  lucrative  employments.  But  none  of  them  save 
Sunderland,  who  was,  as  it  was  held,  banished  to  the 
Lord  Lieutenancy  of  Ireland,  received  any  post  con- 
ferring real  power.  It  would  have  been  better,  perhaps, 
but  was  hardly  to  be  expected,  that  Marlborough  should 
have  abstained  from  taking  part  in  the  impeachment  of 
Oxford  and  Bolingbroke,  and  his  historians,  not  without 
a  sense  of  quantum  mutatus,  record  how  in  the  House  of 
Lords  he  took  a  useful  part  in  opposing  some  Jacobite 
tamperings  with  the  Mutiny  Bill,  and  by  judiciously 
ordering  new  shirts  and  plenty  of  beer  for  his  regiment 
of  Guards,  disposed  those  heroes,  who  had  previously 
thrown  their  defective  garments  into  the  gardens  of 
Marlborough  House  with  disloyal  expressions,  to  duty 
and  loyalty.  He  took  no  active  part  in  the  suppression 
of  the  Jacobite  risings;  but  his  especial  friend  and 
protege  Cadogan  commanded  in  Scotland  with  Argyll, 
and  Marlborough  himself  had  a  certain  official  connec- 
tion with  the  matter.  The  rise  of  Walpole,  who  had 
always  been  a  friend  of  his,  no  doubt  contributed  to  this. 
The  death  of  his  daughters  Elizabeth  and  Anne, 
however,  about  this  time  greatly  affected  him,  and  may 


194  MARLBOROUGH 

have  induced  a  first  stroke  of  paralysis  which  came 
upon  him  on  May  28,  1716.  He  survived  it  six  years, 
and  it  does  not  appear  to  be  literally  true  that  he  was 
ever  in  a  state  of  dotage,  as  Johnson's  famous  line  de- 
clares. Indeed  he  continued  to  make  his  appearance  in 
Parliament  till  very  shortly  before  his  death.  But  he 
never  fully  recovered,  though  Garth's  skill  and  a  visit 
to  Bath  restored  his  health  to  some  extent  after  the 
first  attack,  and  even  after  a  second  on  November  10 
he  regained  a  tolerable  share  of  health.  It  would  have 
been  wiser,  no  doubt,  if  he  had  taken  the  warning  and 
abstained  altogether  from  business;  and  he  did  offer 
to  resign.  But  the  offer  was  probably  not  meant  to  be 
taken,  and  was  not,  the  political  ambition  of  Sunder- 
land  desiring,  it  is  said,  to  retain  his  father-in-law  as  a 
support.  From  this  time,  however,  Marlborough  was  a 
mere  shadow  of  himself. 

As  he  grew  weaker  and  his  wife's  temper  worse, 
she  was  naturally  a  greater  and  greater  cui*se  to  him. 
It  is  indeed  said  to  have  been  due  to  her  influence 
that  he  sold  out  in  time  from  the  South  Sea  Bubble, 
and  having  already  more  money  than  he  knew  what 
to  do  with,  made  a  profit  of  100,000£.  But  Sarah's 
temper,  which  had  previously  been  exercised  only 
indirectly  on  her  family  and  friends,  now  that  she 
was  powerless  to  wreak  it  on  her  enemies,  sought 
newer  game.  She  quarrelled  with  Sunderland,  she 
quarrelled  witli  Cadogan,  she  libelled  Craggs  and 
Stanhope,  and  she  plunged  into  lawsuits  of  every 
description.  Nay,  she  was  charged  with  taking  up  on 
her  own  account  Marlborough's  old  policy  of  double- 
dealing,  and  with  sending  private  .supplies  of  money  to 


LAST  YEARS  195 

the  Pretender,  a  charge  which  exposed  Marlborough 
himself  to  very  unpleasant  suspicions. 

For  these  somewhat  melancholy  last  years  we  have, 
oddly  enough,  more  personal  detail  in  proportion  than 
for  his  earlier  life.  It  is  curious  how  few  of  the  touches 
that  enliven  biography  are  available,  after  the  scanty 
and  scandalous  chronicle  of  his  early  youth,  until  what, 
if  not  his  dotage,  was  certainly  his  retirement  from 
business.  He  played  cards  a  good  deal,  it  is  said, 
especially  whist.  His  grandchildren  and  others  acted 
plays  before  him,  out  of  which  Sarah,  the  rigidly 
virtuous,  scratched  some  of  the  more  amorous  speeches, 
and  allowed  no  embrace  whatever,  though  the  play 
was  ( All  for  Love.'  Mark  Antony  wore  the  sword  that 
the  Emperor  had  given  to  the  Duke  of  Marlborough. 
Hoadley  writ  a  'prologue  for  the  occasion,'  and  Miss 
Cairnes  as  high  priest  wore  (  a  very  fine  surplice  that 
came  from  Holland  for  the  chapel.'  The  chronicler — 
the  Miss  Cairnes  in  question,  afterwards  Lady  Blayney 
— discreetly  adds,  '  no  sacrilege,  for  the  chapel  was 
not  finished  many  years  after.'  Sometimes  he  went  to 
Richmond  to  visit  the  Prince  of  Wales,  his  old  sub- 
ordinate at  Oudenarde,  and  he  made  several  codicils  to 
his  will  in  the  presence  of  numerous  witnesses.  During 
the  winter  of  1721  he  seems  to  have  been  pretty  well, 
but  early  in  June  next  year  a  last  paralytic  stroke  came, 
and  he  died,  apparently  quite  sensible,  at  four  o'clock 
in  the  morning  on  the  16th  of  that  month.  His  last 
recorded  words  are  said  to  have  been  uttered  on  the 
preceding  evening,  when,  prayers  having  been  read, 
the  Duchess  asked  if  he  had  heard  them.  He  replied, 
*  Yes ;  and  I  joined  in  them ; '  nor  can  anyone  who  has 


196  MARLBOROUGH 

carefully  read  his  life  doubt  that  he  joined  with  perfect 
sincerity. 

His  death  took  place  at  Windsor  Lodge,  which  for 
many  years  had  been  his  favourite  country  place  of 
residence,  Blenheim  being  only  partially  habitable  even 
at  the  date  of  his  death.  But  his  body  was  immediately 
embalmed  and  removed  to  Marlborough  House,  where 
it  lay  in  state  for  some  days,  and  then  received  a  mag- 
nificent funeral.  Troops  of  all  arms,  with  Cadogan,  then 
Commander-in-Chief,  at  their  head,  escorted  the  car, 
which  was  gorgeously  decorated,  and  carried  the  coffin 
with  a  full  suit  of  armour  lying  upon  it.  The  Duke  of 
Montagu  and  the  Earls  of  Sunderland  and  Godolphin 
as  connections,  were  chief  mourners,  but  many  other 
peers  attended,  and  the  procession,  for  greater  state, 
instead  of  going  straight  from  Marlborough  House  to 
Westminster,  journeyed  westwards  through  the  Park  to 
Hyde  Park  Corner,  turning  there,  and  proceeding  by 
Piccadilly,  Pall  Mall,  and  Charing  Cross.  The  burial 
took  place  in  Henry  YII.'s  Chapel ;  but  this  was  formal 
only,  and  the  body  was  finally  transferred  to  Blenheim. 
The  funeral,  though  military  and  splendid,  was  not 
strictly  public,  being  neither  ordered  by  Parliament  nor 
paid  for  out  of  public  money. 

Marlborough  had  made  his  last  will  about  a  year 
before  his  death,  and  had  distributed  his  enormous 
fortune,  the  exact  amount  of  which  seems  to  be  no- 
where stated,  between  his  wife  and  children,  the  bulk  of 
it  going  to  Sarah  for  her  life.  That  she  lived  for  nearly 
a  quarter  of  a  century  longer ;  that  she  was  sought  in 
marriage  by  Lord  Coningsby  and  the  Duke  of  Somerset ; 
that  she  hated  Walpole  ;  that  she  hired  literary  men  to 


LAST  YEARS  197 

write  a  life  of  Marlboro  ugh  which  should  not  contain 
'  one  line  of  verse ' ;  that  the  literary  men  (Glover  and 
Mallet),  probably  considering  themselves  insulted  as 
poets  by  the  stipulation,  declined  the  task ;  that  she 
fought  and  quarrelled  with  friends  and  foes  to  the  last, 
are  all  well-known  facts,  and  interesting  in  a  certain 
order  of  historical  gossip.  But  they  have  little  or,  in 
strictness,  nothing  to  do  with  Marlborough. 

The  interest  of  his  life  and  character  is  almost 
wholly  military  and  political,  and  as  such  it  is  treated 
in  this  book.  But  a  few  words  may  be  required  to 
convey  such  more  personal  details  of  his  life  and  con- 
versation as  have  not  been  given  elsewhere.  They  are, 
as  has  been  more  than  once  hinted,  singularly  few.  It 
is  natural  to  think,  as  Mr.  Hill  Burton  thought,  that 
in  the  silence  about  him  there  is  a  sign  that  he  did  not 
'  wear  his  heart  upon  his  sleeve.'  Yet  we  have  plenty  of 
personal  details  about  men  even  more  reserved  than 
Marlborough,  and  in  his  preserved  letters  there  are 
touches  which  seem  to  show  that,  if  all  had  been  pre- 
served, we  should  have  had  more  abundant  details  from 
himself'  All  authorities  are  agreed  as  to  his  personal 
advantages  and  the  extraordinary  charm  of  his  manner. 
His  portraits,  armoured,  periwigged,  and  ermined,  with 
stately,  placid  features,  indicating  no  special  ruling 
passion,  and  having  something  of  the  appearance  of  a 
handsome  mask,  are  familiar  enough.  The  c  wart  on 
his  nose,'  which  Thackeray  makes  General  Webb  sar- 
castically refer  to,  is  not  prominent  in  most  of  these 
portraits,  and  it  seems  at  any  rate  not  to  have  inter- 
fered, either  in  youth  or  age,  with  the  general  acknow- 
ledgment of  his  good  looks.  He  was  of  good  stature, 


198  MARLBOROUGH 

but  not  very  tall.  Of  his  deportment  Chesterfield, 
the  awful  Aristarch  of  that  branch  of  criticism  (who 
had  no  great  fondness  for  him  on  the  whole,  and  who 
delivers  the  absurd  judgment  on  his  intellect  that  there 
was  in  it  '  no  brightness,'  '  no  shining  genius,'  only  '  a 
good  plain  understanding'),  enthusiastically  remarks 
that  'he  possessed  the  graces  in  the  highest  degree, 
not  to  say  engrossed  them.'  The  attraction  of  his 
address  seems  to  have  extended  to  everyone,  low  or 
high,  and  the  aged  Evelyn,  who  had  not  seen  him  for 
many  years,  and  thought  he  might  have  forgotten 
him,  records  the  '  extraordinary  civility  and  familiarity ' 
with  which  Marlborough  came  up  to  him  to  renew  their 
acquaintance.  It  may  be  interesting  to  know  that  on 
this  occasion  the  Duke  '  had  a  most  rich  George  in  a 
sardonyx ;  for  the  rest,  very  plain.'  I  have  said  that  the 
phraseology  of  his  letters  gives  me  the  idea  that,  if  he 
had  ever  written  for  effect,  he  might  have  been  a  bril- 
liant epistoler;  and  his  powers  of  speech  (though  in 
general  he  was,  except  in  polite  attentions,  rather  taci- 
turn) are  well  spoken  of. 

The  chief  private  vice  charged  against  him — that  of 
avarice — concerns  in  great  part  his  public  career.  In 
respect  of  private  matters  it  may,  perhaps,  have  been 
exaggerated.  For  instance,  the  story  which  Macaulay 
borrowed  from  Spence  as  to  his  having  gold  pieces  in 
a  drawer  which  he  had  received  fifty  years  before,  is 
exactly  one  of  those  stories  which  may  mean  anything 
or  nothing.  The  hoarding  of  actual  coin  has  gone  out 
of  fashion ;  but  in  those  days  it  was  a  regular  form  of 
investment,  and  there  would  not  nowadays  be  thought 
anything  very  shocking  in  a  man  retaining  in  old  age 


LAST  YEARS  199 

the  same  investments  lie  had  made  in  youth.  Nor  will 
anyone  take  very  seriously  the  legend  of  his  blowing 
out  one  of  a  pair  of  candles  when  he  and  Eugene  were 
consulting  on  the  night  before  Blenheim  ;  still  less  the 
pleasant  fable  in  the  Examiner  as  to  his  horror  when 
it  was  proposed  to  cut  a  pair  of  wet  boots  off  his  legs. 
But,  no  doubt,  Marlborough,  even  with  his  great  income, 
could  not  have  accumulated  such  a  fortune  if  he  had  not 
been,  to  say  the  least,  careful ;  and  the  line  between 
carefulness  and  avarice  is  never  very  easy  to  draw.  As 
to  his  other  private  and  personal  characteristics,  testimony 
was  unanimous  in  declaring  them  to  have  been  almost 
wholly  amiable.  And  the  explanation,  always  ready  to 
hand,  of  hypocrisy  is  clearly  not  applicable  to  a  great 
body  of  correspondence  written  without  any  view  to 
publication,  and  chiefly  to  a  person  who  was  much  less 
likely  than  most  others  to  allow  herself  to  be  '  paid  with 
words.'  An  early  letter  written  when  Henrietta  and 
Anne  Churchill  were  children  has  often  been  quoted, 
but  will  bear  quotation  once  more,  especially  as  paternal 
affection  usually  stops  a  good  deal  short  of  this  kind  of 
baby  worship.  *  You  cannot,'  he  writes  from  Tunbridge 
to  Sarah,  who  was  away  from  home  '  imagine  how  I  am 
pleased  with  the  children  ;  for  they  having  nobody  but 
their  maid,  they  are  so  fond  of  me  when  I  am  at  home 
that  they  will  be  always  with  me  kissing  and  hugging 
me.  Their  heats  are  quite  gone,  so  that  against  you 
come  home  they  will  be  in  beauty.  If  there  be  room  I 
will  come  on  Monday,  so  that  you  need  not  write  on 
Sunday.  Miss  is  pulling  me  by  the  arm  that  she  may 
write  to  her  dear  mamma :  so  that  I  shall  say  no  more, 
only  beg  that  you  will  love  me  as  well  as  I  love  you, 


2oo  MARLBOROUGH 

and  then  we  cannot  but  be  happy.'  '  I  kiss  your  hands 
my  dear  mamma,'  is  added,  and  signed  '  Harriet.'  The 
letters  on  the  Marquess  of  Blandford's  death  are  full  of 
unaffected  pathos,  and  those  dealing  with  a  hope,  which 
did  not  prove  to  be  fulfilled,  of  Sarah  being  once  more  a 
mother  soon  after  that  event,  have  a  singular  delicacy 
and  good  feeling.  The  earlier  letters  after  the  separation 
brought  about  by  the  continental  campaign  have  been 
already  dealt  with,  and  though  they  are  somewhat  more 
effusive  than  those  which  were  written  after  many  years 
of  worry  (a  good  deal  of  it  due  directly  to  Sarah),  the 
latest  preserved  leave  no  doubt  of  the  continuance  and 
sincerity  of  Maryborough's  family  affection.  His  apolo- 
gies for  the  devastation  of  Bavaria  may  be  differently 
construed,  but  if  they  were  insincere  the  insincerity  is 
marvellously  kept  up,  and  the  similar  expressions  as  to 
the  peasants  of  the  north  of  France  several  years  later 
should  be  compared.  In  opposition  to  the  wild  accusa- 
tions of  robbing  and  starving  the  private  soldier,  which 
rest  on  no  evidence,  not  merely  numerous  expressions 
of  sympathy  in  the  letters  for  the  sufferings  of  the  troops 
may  be  quoted,  but  also  a  consensus  of  testimony  that, 
as  a  general,  Marlborough  was  remarkable  for  the  care 
he  took  of  his  soldiers'  welfare  as  well  as  for  his  thought- 
fulness  for  the  wounded  on  both  sides  after  battle.  Nor 
ought  his  own  confident  appeal  to  the  troops  at  a  rather 
ticklish  time,  iu  the  manifesto  he  issued  during  the 
shirt-riot  of  the  guards  after  George  I.'s  accession,  to  bo 
neglected.  Another  locus  classicus  as  to  Marlborough's 
sofb-heartedness  is  in  a  letter  to  Godolphin  of  Sept.  10, 
1705.  1  do  not  know  whether  the  Comte  de  Lyon  was 
a  refugee  officer  or  a  French  prisoner;  the  wording  looks 


LAST  YEARS  201 

like  the  former,  except  that  if  so  he  might  have  had  an 
awkward  time  of  it  '  in  France.'  '  The  inclosed  is  a 
letter  from  a  young  woman  of  quality  that  is  in  love 
with  the  Comte  de  Lyon.  He  is  at  Lichfield.  I  am 
assured  that  it  is  a  very  virtuous  love,  and  that,  when 
they  can  get  their  parents'  consent,  they  are  to  be 
married.  As  I  do  from  my  heart  wish  that  nobody  were 
unhappy,  I  own  to  you  that  this  letter  has  made  me  wish 
him  in  France ;  so  that  if  he  might  have  leave  for  four 
months  without  prejudice  to  Her  Majesty's  service  I 
should  be  glad  of  it.'  Maryborough's  enemies  will 
perhaps  say  that*  the  young  woman  of  quality  had 
doubtless  bought  Marlborough's  sympathy  with  a  hand- 
some present,  and  of  course  with  such  assumptions'short 
work  can  be  made  of  most  characters.  But  even  such 
ingenious  Devil's  advocates  will  hardly  find  an  evil 
explanation  of  his  writing  to  Sarah  two  years  later,  '  I 
leave  this  camp  to-morrow  and  shall  certainly  have  the 
spleen  to  see  the  poor  soldiers  march  in  dirt  up  to  the 
knees ; '  for  there  was  here  no  case  of  the  possible 
frustration  of  plans,  the  time  being  October  and  the 
movement  nothing  but  a  march  into  winter  quarters. 

It  has  just  been  said  that  he  never  regularly 
resided  at  Blenheim,  the  great  palace  with  which  his 
name  is  associated,  in  the  erection  of  which  he  took 
such  an  interest,  and  which  was  to  him  a  source  of  so 
much  annoyance.1  It  was  indeed  not  nearly  finished 

1  Marlborough's  houses,  both  at  Blenheim  and  at  the  Friary  (the 
present  Marlborough  House),  attracted  a  great  deal  of  attention 
from  his  contemporaries,  and  the  familiar  writings  of  the  time, 
such  as  the  gossipy  \Ventrvorth  Papers,  contain  numerous  references 
to  their  splendour.  The  main  endeavour  of  the  careful  Duke  was  to 
kvoid  committing  himself  for  any  of  the  Blenheim  expenses,  and 


2O2  MARLBOROUGH 

at  bis  death,  and  to  the  quarter  of  a  million  of  public 
money  which  was  expended  on  it  about  fifty  thousand 
more  had  to  be  added  from  his  estate.  But  from  the 
moment  of  his  receiving  the  Manor  of  Woodstock 
he  became  an  important  person  in  Oxfordshire,  was 
shortly  made  its  Lord  Lieutenant,  and  was  regarded  by 
the  Whig  minority  in  the  University  as  a  welcome 
hope  and  support.  Hearne's  '  Collections,'  now  for  the 
first  time  being  published  in  full  by  the  Oxford 
Historical  Society,  have  unfortunately  not  yet  gone 
further  than  1707,  or  barely  two  years  after  the  Duke 
became  neighbour  to  Oxford.  But,  as  it  is,  they  add 
to  the  miserably  scanty  store  of  personal  touches 
available.  We  have  seen  how,  from  a  note  of  the  Tory 
antiquary's,  it  is  clear  that,  long  before  the  committee  of 
inquiry  met,  the  percentage  on  foreign  pay  was  even 
by  malcontents  regarded  as  on  exactly  the  same  footing 
as  Marlborough's  salary  for  any  of  his  offices.  But  this 
is  a  matter  of  public  interest,  and  though  not  without 
its  value,  belongs  to  the  class  of  information  of  which 
we  have  plenty.  What  we  have  not  plenty  of  is  such 
details  as  the  following :  We  hear  on  Jan.  23,  1706, 
that  Dr.  Mill,  the  New  Testament  scholar,  and  other 
Whig  dons,  went  to  Woodstock  to  wait  on  the  Duke  of 

the  frequent  stoppage  of  the  works  arose  partly  from  his  rigid 
refusal  to  guarantee  any  outlay  in  advance  of  the  Treasury  warrants. 
Vanbrugh,  the  architect,  naturally  took  the  part  of  the  workmen 
and  contractors,  which  caused  occasional  unpleasantnesses  between 
him  and  the  Duchess.  On  the  accession  of  George  I.  a  new  Act  of 
Parliament  supplied  means  for  the  discharge  of  arrears  ;  but  as  the 
creditors'  accounts  were  liberally  taxed  the  matter  came,  in  1718, 
before  the  law  courts.  The  final  decision  in  the  House  of  Lords 
was  unfavourable  to  Marlborough,  and  it  was  owing  to  this  that  the 
completion  fell  on  the  duke's  estate. 


LAST  YEARS  203 

Marlborough — evidently  not  at  all  with  Hearne's 
approval.  But  three  days  later  we  read :  '  Dr.  Mill 
and  the  other  five  who  went  with  him  to  Woodstock  to 
wait  on  the  Duke  of  Marlborough  and  his  Duchess ' 
[who,  it  seems,  was  there  too]  '  were  so  poorly  received 
that  they  certainly  had  dined  with  Duke  Humphrey 
had  they  not  put  in  at  a  house  where  a  dinner  was 
provided  at  their  own  expense.  It  seems  the  Duchess 
expected  the  University  should  have  complimented  the 
Duke,  and  therefore,  when  these  gentlemen  came  to 
the  house,  the  servant  who  was  there  to  wait  asked 
whether  they  were  sent  by  the  University,  and  under- 
standing they  were  not,  the  reception  was  ordered 
accordingly.'  The  picturesque  historian  could  make  a 
page  or  two  out  of  poor  Dr.  Mill's  disappointment  and 
his  dinner  provided  at  his  own  expense.  Another  time 
we  hear  that  Lord  Abingdon,  having  discontinued  the 
plate  he  gave  for  a  race  on  Port  Meadow,  the  Duchess 
continued  it,  giving  '  a  plate  of  fifty  libs.'  But  politics 
came  in  even  on  the  turf,  and  one  year  only  l  a  parcel 
of  Whiggish  mobbish  people '  appeared,  while  next  year 
only  one  horse  ran.  There  are  also  references  to  bucks 
from  Woodstock — a  once  favourite  method  of  exercis- 
ing influence,  due  or  undue.  Further,  it  may  be  said, 
in  reference  to  Marlborough's  relations  with  Oxford, 
that  tradition — on  what  evidence  I  am  not  able  to  say — 
assigns  the  fine  Georgian  house  now  used  as  the  judge's 
lodgings  (No.  16,  St.  Giles's)  as  having  been  built  by 
the  Duke  for  a  town  house.  This,  if  true,  is  the  more 
interesting  in  that  the  provincial-capital  system  was 
already  beginning  to  die  out  in  the  eighteenth  century. 


204  MARLBOROUGH 


CONCLUSION. 

IN  the  foregoing  chapters  the  reader  has  before 
him  the  main  facts  of  Maryborough's  life,  stated,  it  is 
believed,  impartially  from  the  best  authorities,  and 
certainly  commented  on  without  the  least  determination 
to  make  the  man  out  a  fiend  or  an  angel.  The  facts, 
rather  than  the  arguments,  no  doubt  will  determine 
each  man's  own  conclusion  as  to  the  moral  character  of 
Marlborough.  Against  that  character  the  very  worst 
that  can  possibly  be  said  has  been  said  by  the  novelist 
of  greatest  genius  and  the  historian  of  greatest  popu- 
larity that  our  time  has  known.  Were  it  not  that  the 
magnificent  and  uncontested  exploits  which  he  per- 
formed for  England  constitute,  even  in  ( slack-sinewed ' 
days,  a  constant  and  irreducible  set-off,  Macaulay  and 
Thackeray  have  given  such  a  portrait  of  John  Churchill 
as  may  well  make  a  reader  with  no  special  knowledge 
hesitate  before  regarding  him  with  anything  but  loath- 
ing. For  the  charges  against  him  are  not  like  the 
charges  of  a  somewhat  similar  kind  against  Bacon. 
The  very  worst  account  of  Bacon's  conduct  admits  that 
he  served  his  sovereign  diligently  and  well  in  the  very 
act,  and  as  a  necessary  consequence  of  the  act  of 
betraying  and  injuring  his  friend.  In  Marlborough's 
case  the  friend  and  the  sovereign  were  one,  and  in- 


CONCLUSION  205 

gratitude  was  complicated  with  treason  instead  of 
being  excused  by  loyalty.  So,  again,  Bacon's  alleged 
venality  was  at  the  very  worst  complicated  with 
nothing  wors6  than  venality.  He  did  not,  as  Marl- 
borough  has  been  accused  of  doing,  betray  trust  to  his 
country's  harm ;  he  could — and  we  know  that  he  did — 
represent  the  matter  as  a  mere  usual  transaction,  less 
culpable,  let  us  say,  than  the  giving  or  taking  of  a  bribe 
at  an  election  was  once  thought.  Putting  Bacon  aside, 
no  one  of  equal  fame  has  been  charged  with  crimes  any- 
thing like  Marlborough's.  The  desertion  of  James,  the 
intrigues  against  William,  the  treachery  in  the  matter 
pf  the  Brest  expedition,  the  alleged  dealings  with  Louis, 
and  with  the  Chevalier  after  Anne's  death,  excel  any- 
thing (always  excepting  the  case  of  Sunderland  the  elder) 
that  is  charged  against  any  other  public  man  in  English 
history ;  and  Marlborough's  enemie's  demand  that  these 
shall  only  be  considered  as  the  head  and  front  of  a  long 
muster  of  similar  offendings.  Venal  without  hesita- 
tion or  limit;  shamelessly  and  indifferently  treacherous; 
not  indeed  wantonly  cruel,  but  as  careless  of  others' 
blood  as  of  his  own  honour  when  his  interest  was  con- 
cerned ;  faithless  to  his  party ;  trimming  to  the  end 
between  the  rival  claimants  to  the  crown ;  sordidly 
avaricious ;  such  is  the  portrait  of  Marlborough  that  we 
are  often  asked  to  accept. 

It  has  repeatedly  been  acknowledged  in  the  course 
of  the  foregoing  pages  that  it  is  idle  to  attempt  to  meet 
this  by  a  simple  negatur,  or  by  the  opposition  portrait  of 
a  uniformly  high-souled  and  consistent  patriot.  The 
facts  of  the  case  are  impossible  to  get  over  in  this  way, 
as  in  commenting  upon  each  of  them  it  has  been  suffi- 


206  MARLBOROUGH 

ciently  shown.  It  is  possible  to  make  large  deductions 
from  the  unfavourable  estimates  of  Marlborough's 
character  at  almost  all  times  of  his  life  ;  but  what  re- 
mains renders  it  futile  to  attempt  to  represent  him  as 
a  man  of  delicate  honour,  of  a  high  ideal  of  patriotism, 
of  an  innate  and  instinctive  repugnance  to  dishonest 
gain.  He  was  nothing  of  the  sort,  and  the  only  excuse 
for  him  is  to  be  found  in  the  undoubted  fact  of  the 
total  debasement  of  the  moral  standard  among  the 
political  men  of  his  time.  I  cannot  myself  think  of  a 
single  public  man  of  that  time  except  Halifax  (Savile, 
not  Montagu)  and  Somers  who  can  be  acquitted  of 
conduct  which  was  as  dishonourable  in  kind,  if  not  in 
degree,  as  Marlborough's.  Halifax's  independent  for- 
tune, and  still  mora  the  intellectual  pleasure  which  he 
seems  to  have  taken  in  ostentatious  and  above-board 
trimming,  saved  him  from  dishonourable  and  under- 
hand trimming.  Somers,  a  man  of  no  fortune  and  no 
connections,  would  have  ruined  his  credit  with  the 
Whigs,  and  would  not  have  gained  any  with  the  Tories, 
who  had  plenty  of  clever  lawyers  of  their  own,  if  he 
had  ratted ;  and  he  did  not  rat.  All  other  prominent 
men  of  any  genius  throughout  the  period  were  corrupt 
and  rotten.  It  is  undisputed  that  Algernon  Sydney 
asked  for  the  gold  of  France  to  stir  up  an  insurrection 
in  England,  whether  he  did  or  did  not  take  Barillon's 
guineas  for  his  own  use ;  and  on  this  last  point  even  no 
reasonable  Whig  has  a  doubt.  Godolphin  is  admittedly 
tarred  with  the  same  brush  as  Marlborough.  Shrews- 
bury, Devonshire,  and  Argyll  ratted  and  rallied  from 
and  to  each  side  incessantly.  Of  Danby  and  Eussell  it  is 
unnecessary  to  do  more  than  merely  mention  the  names. 


CONCLUSION  207 

Peterborough's  fame  has  a  little  gilded  his  extraordinary 
conduct  in  the  Fenwick  matter,  but  that  conduct  was 
such  as  no  man  of  honour  could  have  been  guilty  of. 
The  elder  Sunderland  is  a  by-word,  and  the  younger 
Avas  only  saved  by  the  more  acute  disease  of  a  frantic 
party  spirit  from  corruption  and  treachery. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  go  over  at  length  the  explana- 
tion and  in  part  excuse  of  this  state  of  things  which 
has  been  given  by  many  previous  writers.  It  is  almost 
invariable  in  a  revolutionary  period,  especially  when 
disputed  claims  of  loyalty  are  confused  with,  and  some- 
times clash  with,  disputed  claims  of  religion.  The  best 
and  most  unprejudiced  authorities  have  not  disputed 
that  Marlborough's  attachment  to  what  was  then  called 
the  Protestant  religion  was  perfectly  sincere ;  and  'it 
is  quite  certain  that  he  would  have  found  much  less 
difficulty  in  finding  a  casuistical  defence  for  the  less 
precise  sins  of  covetousness  and  bad  faith  than  his  master 
did  for  the  very  precise  and  unequivocal  sin  of  adultery. 
The  conflicting  motives  and  beliefs  of  Englishmen  of 
that  day  are  indeed  not  easy  to  represent  to  Englishmen 
of  this.  It  is  certain  that  the  great  majority  of  the 
people,  from  the  highest  and  wisest  to  the  lowest  and 
most  foolish,  firmly  believed  that  the  Stuarts  were  the 
rightful  kings  of  England.  It  is  further  certain  that, 
in  the  breasts  of  a  majority  of  this  majority,  the  divine 
right  of  the  sovereign,  which  in  the  abstract  they  ad- 
mitted, clashed  with  the  divine  right  of  the  religion 
which  they  admitted  even  more  strongly,  and  which 
they  conceived  the  sovereign  to  threaten.  Here  were 
two  logically  irreconcilable  beliefs,  either  of  which, 
paramount  at  one  moment,  might  make  a  man  (and  by 


2o8  MARLBOROUGH 

no  means  hypocritically)  hold  that  he  was  doing  right 
when  he  did  something  which  under  the  influence  of 
the  other  dogma,  or  under  no  special  influence  at  all, 
he  would  have  shrunk  from.  The  paramount  allegiance 
due  to  the  Protestant  religion  might  make  the  perhaps 
unhistorical  gvet-apens  of  Warminster  seem  excusable 
and  laudable.  The  paramount  right  of  the  legitimate 
sovereign  of  England  might  gild  the  too  historical 
guet-apens  of  Camaret  Bay.  A  religio  of  either  kind 
certainly  tantum  potuit  suadere,  and  has  often  per- 
suaded things  even  worse. 

But  this  was  not  all.  It  would  be  wholly  idle  to 
pretend  that  the  conflict  of  opinion  was  not  accentuated 
and  complicated  by  a  conflict  of  interest,  and  this  is 
where  Maryborough  comes  in  for  the  heaviest  censure. 
It  is  impossible  for  anyone  to  deny  that  interest,  and 
interest  of  a  very  vulgar  and  unheroic  kind,  was  con- 
stantly in  his  mind.  When  he  is  offered  a  dukedom  he 
thinks  it  well  '  to  wait  till  we  have  a  better  estate,'  and 
the  context  and  sequel  show  too  clearly  that  the  objec- 
tion was  made  rather  to  augment  the  estate  with  a 
view  to  the  title  than  to  refuse  the  title  in  view  of  the 
absence  of  the  estate.  The  similar  refusal  of  the 
German  principality  till  a  solid  estate  went  with  it  is  a 
little  too  similar  to  escape  attention,  though  some  kind 
of  defence  may  be  offered  for  it.  It  may  seem  cruel  to 
revert  again  to  the  fashion  in  which  he  observes,  in 
telling  of  his  extraordinary  escape  from  the  French 
marauders,  that  the  man  '  has  cost  him  fifty  pounds  a 
year  ever  since ; '  but  what  in  another's  mouth  might  be 
merely  humorous,  is  quite  sober  and  businesslike  in 
Maryborough's.  His  avarice,  indeed,  was  one  of  those 


CONCLUSION  209 

things  which  personal  enemies  may  make  the  most  of 
and  exaggerate,  but  which  they  can  hardly  invent. 
And  it  is  precisely  this  vice,  and  the  carefulness  which 
accompanied  it,  that  has  made  Marl  borough  infamous 
for  faults  which,  committed  in  almost  equal,  sometimes 
in  fully  equal  degree  by  others,  have  simply  inflicted  a 
slight  blemish  on  their  memory.  It  is  fortunately,  or 
unfortunately,  idle  for  moralists  to  contend  that  all  vices 
are  equal.  The  world  never  consents  to  hold  this  view. 
Godolphin  shared  Marlborough's  crowning  crime  in 
regard  to  Talmash's  expedition,  and  Ormond  followed 
him  to  William's  quarters.  But  Godolphin  was  a  keen 
sportsman,  and  Ormond  was,  for  openhandedness  and 
generosity  in  every  sense,  the  idol  of  the  whole  army. 
Had  Marlborough  had  a  few  more  taking  virtues,  even 
a  few  more  amiable  vices,  he  would  probably  stand  far 
higher  in  popular  estimation.  But  he  early  became  un 
Iwmme  range  in  respect  of  all  the  minor  foibles  of  his 
time.  He  was  inviolably  constant  to  Sarah,  he  did  not 
drink,  he  did  not  gamble,  he  seems  to  have  cared  little 
for  any  sport  but  the  hunting  of  men  on  fields  of  battle. 
He  was  notorious,  as  his  bitterest  enemies  admit,  for 
his  neglect  to  court  popularity  in  any  way.  Even  on 
the  field  of  battle  itself  his  absence  of  showy  and 
popular  characteristics  still  displayed  itself,  and  pro- 
bably gave  rise  to  the  absurd  insinuation  of  cowardice 
against  a  man  who  was  in  the  thick  of  a  hundred  fights. 
He  could  plan,  and,  better  still,  change  his  plans  for  the 
most  complicated  operations ;  he  could  teach  the  fainting 
battle  how  to  rage,  could  bring  up  fresh  troops  at  the 
very  moment  they  were  wanted,  and  rally  fliers  in  the 
full  torrent  of  their  flight.  But  he  lacked  the  hat- 


2 1  o  MARLBOROUGH 

waving,  sword-flourishing,  gallant-speech-making  qua- 
lities of  a  general,  and  his  fame  has  perhaps  a  little 
suffered  from  that  too.  Frederick  the  Great,  as  all  men 
know,  might  at  one  time  have  been  accused  of  cowardice 
with  something  more  than  a  show  of  reason,  and  he 
exposed  himself  in  battle  not  one  whit  more  than 
Marlborough.  But  the  few  stories  which  are  told,  like 
the  famous  '  Wollt  ihr  ewig  leben  ? '  give  his  victories 
and  his  defeats  the  personal  touch  which  is  somehow 
wanting  to  Maryborough's,  and  have,  perhaps,  helped 
to  excuse  crimes  blacker  than  Maryborough's  as  well  as 
to  enhance  military  genius  far  inferior,  when  the  quality 
of  his  antagonists  and  his  command  of  the  resources  on 
his  own  side  are  remembered. 

But  there  is  compensation  in  all  things,  and  for 
those  who  delight  in  appreciating  everything  after  its 
own  kind,  the  life,  and  to  a  great  extent  the  character,  of 
Marlborough  have  a  peculiar  attraction,  different  indeed 
from,  but  not  less  than,  the  attraction  of  generals  like 
Montrose  and  Claverhouse.  With  all  his  weaknesses, 
or  rather  with  his  one  great  weakness,  of  always  playing 
to  win,  Marlborough  had  in  perhaps  the  greatest  measure 
of  any  Englishman  every  great  practical  quality  of  the 
English  character,  except  unflinching  honesty  and  truth. 
His  covetousness,  though  not  his  parsimony,  can,  it  is 
to  be  feared,  hardly  be  set  down  as  altogether  un-English. 
But  the  entire  absence  of  vainglory  andforfanterie  in  him, 
the  intense  businesslike  energy  with  which  he  set  about 
his  work,  the  complete  freedom  from  flightiness  and 
fidgetiness  with  which  he  carried  it  out,  the  thorough- 
ness with  which  he  put  the  final  touches  on  it,  are  all 
examples,  on  the  greatest  scale,  of  qualities  on  which 


CONCLUSION  211 

Englishmen  especially  pride  themselves.  In  Marl- 
borough's  fashion  of  war-making  there  was  emphatically 
no  nonsense.  He  never  wasted  a  man  or  a  movement ; 
he  never  executed  a  single  manoeuvre  for  show;  he 
never,  either  in  words  or  deeds,  indulged  in  the  least 
gasconading.  Probably  no  man  ever  had  such  a  super- 
human business  as  he  had  put  on  his  shoulders  in  the 
business  of  at  once  fighting  half  Europe  and  keeping 
the  other  half  in  fighting  order.  Help,  of  the  practical 
kind,  except  from  Godolphin's  financial  talent,  he  had 
none.  Obstacles  he  had  innumerable ;  probably  no  man 
ever  had  so  much  of  what  is  specially  irritating  to  most 
expert  craftsmen,  the  difficulty  of  getting  at  the  work 
that  they  are  specially  fitted  to  do.  For  the  four  great 
occasions  on  which  M  arlborough  was  enabled  to  show 
his  talent  unhampered  or  almost  unhampered,  there 
must  have  been  at  least  forty  when,  if  he  had  not  been 
hampered,  if  he  had  been  in  the  position  of  Frederick 
or  of  Napoleon,  he -might  have  equalled  Blenheim  in 
success  and  Ramillies  in  tactics.  To  say  that  he  never 
complained  of  these  hindrances  and  disappointments 
would,  of  course,  be  untrue.  Considering  the  voluminous 
and  unrestrained  private  correspondence  of  his  that  we 
have,  such  an  absence  of  complaint  would  have  been  an 
evidence  rather  of  hypocrisy  or  insensibility  than  of 
heroism.  But  his  annoyance  never  affected  his  judg- 
ment, never  obscured  his  vision.  The  hackneyed  simile 
of  the  angel  deserved  its  popularity  if  only  for  the  fact 
that  Addison  exactly  hit  the  truth,  as  well  as  hit  upon 
a  method  of  conveying  the  truth  which  pleased  the 
poetical  taste  of  the  time.  The  godlike  equanimity 
of  Marlborousrh  has  extorted  admiration  even  from 


212  MARLBOROUGH 

Thackeray;  it  is  certainly  the  characteristic  which, 
taken  with  the  capacity  for  action  that  accompanied  it, 
is  the  most  wonderful  and  attractive  feature  of  his 
career.  He  is  never  for  one  moment  in  a  flurry,  never 
at  a  loss,  never  lets  go  of  command  of  himself  and  of  the 
situation.  His  panegyrist  in  the  case  of  the  angel, 
elsewhere  remarked  that  it  was  not  in  mortals  to  com- 
mand success,  but  it  certainly  seems  to  have  been  in 
Marlborough ;  and  it  is  not  merely  the  fact  of  this 
success,  but  the  kind  of  it  that  charms  the  student  of 
its  history.  Fortune  never  favoured  him  very  decidedly, 
and  when  she  did,  as  in  the  squabbles  of  Vendome  and 
Burgundy  at  Oudenarde,  the  use  he  made  of  her  favours 
almost  made  the  favours  themselves  his  own  merit  and 
doing.  To  anyone  who  is  conscious  of  the  peculiar 
delight  of '  seeing  the  game  played,'  Marlborough  gives 
that  delight  perhaps  more  keenly  and  in  larger  measure 
than  any  character  of  history,  certainly  than  any 
general. 

There  is,  of  course,  what  some  accomplished  cosmo- 
politans of  our  time  doubtless  regard  as  a  more  vulgar 
side  to  the  attraction  of  his  life,  and  I  for  one  have  ne 
hesitation  in  saying  that  it  does  not  seem  to  me  vulgar 
at  all.  It  is  that  expressed  by  the  old  and  not  very 
exquisite  rhyme — 

Jack  of  Marlborough, 
Who  beat  the  Frenchmen  thorough  and  thorough. 

When  •  Marlborough  took  up  the  supreme  command  it 
was  nearly  three  hundred  years  since  England  had 
fought  on  land,  and  against  foes  not  of  her  own  blood, 
any  but  insignificant  battles ;  and  over  the  French,  in 


CONCLUSION  213 

particular,  no  success  of  any  importance  had  been 
gained.  The  advent  of  William  the  Deliverer  had, 
indeed,  set  France  and  England  once  more  thoroughly 
by  the  ears,  but  the  result  had  hitherto  been  little  but 
some  more  or  less  honourable  beatings.  With  Marl- 
borough's  appearance  things  at  once  changed.  The  force 
of  native  English  soldiers  under  his  command  was  at  no 
time  very  great,  but  it  was  sufficient  to  give  the  country 
something  more  than  a  share  in  the  mere  fighting  part  of 
his  victories ;  and  in  point  of  generalship  the  most  pre- 
judiced enemy  could  not  deny  that  Europe  did  not  hold 
the  Englishman's  superior,  while  not  merely  friends, 
but  impartial  judges,  would  have  been  unanimous  in 
agreeing  that  it  did  not  hold  his  equal.  A  slight,  if 
not  a  reproach,  of  centuries  was  rolled  away  from  the 
nation  in  the  course  of  those  ten  years. 

It  is  for  this,  first  of  all,  that  Englishmen  ought  to 
reverence  the  memory,  stained  as  it  is,  and  even  if  it 
were  worse  stained  than  it  is,  of  Jack  of  Marlborough. 

10 


INDEX. 


ALLIANCE 

ALLIANCE,  The  Grand,  diffi- 
culties of,  84,  85,  97,  124- 
126 

Assassination  plot,  64-56 


BERWICK,  James  Fitzjames, 
Duke  of,  5,  101,  106,  107 

Blandford,  Marquis  of,  dies, 
66 

Blenheim,  battle  of,  74-83 

—  Palace,  146,  175,  187,  201- 
203 


CADOGAN,  General,  100,  109- 
111, 193 

Camaret  Bay,  affair  of,  51-63 

Charles  XII.,  his  interview 
•with  Marlborough,  130-133 

Churchill,  Arabella,  3,  5 

—  George,  3 

Cork,  taking  of,  44 

Coxe,  Archdeacon,  his  Me- 
moirs of  the  Duke  of  Marl- 
borough,  1  note,  18,  27  tqq.t 
24,  61,  60,  64,  135 


JUNTA 

DONATJWEBTH,  operations  at, 
71 


ENGLISHMEN,     numbers     of 

present     in     Marlborough's 

campaigns,  61  note 
Estimates  of  Marlborough's 

gains,  176,  177  note 
Eugene,  Prince,  69  and  note, 

73-81,    100,    101,    104-111, 

114-118,  183  sq$. 


FENWICK,  Sir  John,  and  Marl- 
borough,  64,  55 


GODOLPHIN,   Sidney,   Earl  of 
67,  134,  141  sq.,  170 


HAELEY,  Robert,  Earl  of  Ox- 
ford, 154  g<z%. 

JUNTA,     characters     of     the 
Whig,  150 


2l6 


MARLBOROUGH 


KINSALE 
KIKSALE,  taking  of,  45 


LANDAU,  siege  of,  82,  83 
Lille,  siege  of,  105-111 


MACARTNEY,  General,  cash- 
iered, 173,  183;  Mohvm's 
second,  189 

Macaulay,  Lord,  his  remarks  on 
Marlborough,  4,  15,  18,  20, 
21,  24,  29  sqq.,  46  sq. 

Malplaquet,  Battle  of,  117-119 

Marlborough,  John  Churchill, 
Duke  of ;  his  birth  and 
parentage,  3  ;  his  education, 
4 ;  his  first  commission,  5 ; 
Court  intrigues  and  founda- 
tion of  fortune,  6 ;  serves 
under  Turenne,  7,  8 ;  his 
marriage,  11, 12;  under  Mon- 
mouth,  12  ;  secret  service 
employments  during  last 
years  of  Charles  II.,  13-15  ; 
made  a  Scotch  Peer,  15; 
acquires  Holywell  House, 
16  ;  sent  as  envoy  to  Paris 
and  made  an  English  Peer, 
19;  in  Monmouth's  rebel- 
lion, 19-20;  his  communica- 
tions with  the  Prince  of 
Orange,  22,  29;  deserts 
James,  25 ;  his  letter,  ibid, 
note ;  his  conduct  discussed, 
27-37;  at  Walcourt,  41; 
Earldom,  family,  &c.,  ibid, 
note ;  action  in  reference  to 
Princess  Anne's  establish- 
ment, 42,  43 ;  takes  Cork  and 


MAKLBOROT/GH 

Kinsale,  43-45 ;  makes  over- 
tures to  James,  46;  dis- 
missed from  his  offices,  47  ; 
implicated  in  Young's  plot, 
44 ;  robbed,  50 ;  discloses 
the  expedition  to  Camaret 
Bay,  61 ;  in  opposition  in 
Parliament,  53 ;  restored  to 
William's  favour,  ibid. ;  rela- 
tions to  Assassination  plot, 
54,  55 ;  made  governor  of 
the  Duke  of  Gloucester,  56 ; 
important  functions  just 
before  William's  death,  57 ; 
his  conduct  discussed,  58-60 ; 
circumstances  of  his  appoint- 
ment as  general,  62-64; 
leaves  for  the  Continent,  64 ; 
his  first  campaign,  65 ;  is 
nearly  captured,  ibid. ;  his 
son  dies,  66 ;  second  cam- 
paign ;  troubles  with  Dutch 
generals,  66-68 ;  prepares 
for  the  campaign  of  1704, 
69  ;  marches  on  the  Danube, 
70;  storms  the  Schellenberg, 
71  ;  devastates  Bavaria,  73  ; 
defeats  the  French  and 
Bavarians  at  Blenheim,  74- 
81 ;  besieges  Landau,  82 ; 
his  forced  march  on  Troves, 
ibid. ;  causes  which  checked 
his  successes,  84,  85; 
plans  invasion  of  France, 
86 ;  fails,  87  ;  forces  the 
lines  of  Brabant,  89 ;  visits 
German  capitals,  90 ;  re- 
covers principality  of  Min- 
dclheim,  91;  defeats  Villeroy 
at  Ramillics,  93-96  ;  his 


INDEX 


217 


MARLBOKOTJGH 

campaign  of  1707,  98:  de- 
feats Vendome  and  Bur- 
gundy at  Oudenarde,  99- 
104;  besieges  Lille,  105- 
112;  his  conduct  in  refer- 
ence to  General  Webb,  110, 
111 ;  passes  the  Scheldt,  112 ; 
his  campaign  of  1709,  113 ; 
besieges  Tournay,  116 ;  de- 
feats Villars  at  Malplaquet, 
117-119 ;  his  two  last  cam- 
paigns, 120, 121;  his  diploma- 
tic excursions,  127  sqq. ;  his 
meeting  with  Charles  XII., 
130-133 ;  his  relations  to  the 
peace  negotiations,  133-136 ; 
his  business  faculty,  137; 
letters  describing  his  four 
great  victories,  139, 140  note; 
attitude  towards  domestic 
politics,  141  sqq. ;  his  party 
politics,  145  ;  distrusts  both 
"Whigs  and  Tories,  146-148  ; 
first  supports  and  then  op- 
poses Occasional  Conformity 
Bill,  148-150 ;  begins  to  sup- 
port the  Whigs,  152;  be- 
comes hostile  to  Harley,  159 ; 
parries  or  rejects  the  Queen's 
appeals  to  him,  154, 158, 161, 
162 ;  applies  for  the  Captain- 
Generalship,  165 ;  relations 
with  Shrewsbury,  166;  drawn 
into  quarrels  with  the  Queen, 
168 ;  temporises  with  the 
new  Ministry,  172-4;  his 
behaviour  in  the  final  quarrel 
of  Anne  and  Sarah,  174 ; 
estimates  of  his  gains,  176, 
177;  rapprochement  with 


QUEEN 

Harley,  178 ;  charged  with 
peculation,  179 ;  dismissed, 
180 ;  is  accused  indirectly  of 
promoting  sedition,  182-6 ; 
Parliamentary  dispute  with 
Argyll  and  Poulett,  186; 
goes  abroad,  189;  further 
charges  of  peculation,  ibid. ; 
his  occupations  abroad,  191, 
192;  his  return,  192  ;  recep- 
tion and  appointments  by 
George  L,  193  ;  last  days, 
194-195;  death,  195;  fune- 
ral, 196 ;  character,  197-201 ; 
sketch  of  career  and  conduct, 
204-213 

Marlborough,  Sarah  Jennings, 
Duchess  of,  9-12,  14,  15,  17, 
26,  43,  48,  53,  63,  64,  139, 
143,  144,  145,  147,  150-175, 
194-197,  199-201 

Masham,  Abigail  Hill,  Mrs., 
her  rivalry  with  Sarah,  156- 
169 

Medina,  Sir  Solomon,  discloses 
bread  perquisite,  179 

Mindelheim,  principality  of, 
90-92 


NICKNAMES     of     the     Marl- 
borough  coterie,  147  note 

OCCASIONAL  Conformity  Bill, 

148-150 
Oudenarde,  battle  of,  99-104 


QUEEN  ANNE,  13,  15,  23,  24, 
26,     42,    43,    48;    protests 


218  MARLBOROUGH 

KAMILLIES  WYNENDAEI 

against  Marlborough's  par-  THACKERAY,  his    remarks  on 

tisanship,     154,     158,     161,  Marlborough,  18,   100,   110, 

162  138 

Tournay,  siege  of,  116 
Treves    captured    by    forced 
RAMILLIES,  battle  of,  93-96  march,  83 

,  Kevolution  of  1688,  its  anoma- 
lies, 38-41 

Eoads,  importance  of,  83,  84  UTRECHT,  discussion    of    the 

Peace  of,  122-126 

SCHELLENBEEG,  storming  of,  VILLARS,  Marshal,  86,  87, 114 

71 

«<7<7. 

Stollhoffen,  lines  of,  72,  73 
Sunderland,    Eoberb    Spencer, 

Earl  of,  170  WALCOUBT,  battle  of,  42,  43 

Swift,  Jonathan,  his  attacks  on  Webb,  General,  109-111 

Marlborough,  165, 183-186  Wynendael,  battle  of,  109-111 


BIBLIOGKAPHICAL  NOTE, 


For  those  who  desire  further  information  on  Marlborough  the 
following  short  list  of  books  may  be  useful.  Coxe's  and  Mrs. 
Creighton's  books  have  been  referred  to  on  page  1.  To  the 
list  of  authors  who  like  Macaulay  and  Thackeray  have  dealt 
copiously  with  Marlborough  under  other  titles  should  be  added 
Lord  Stanhope,  in  his  '  History  of  England,'  and  once  more 
in  his  '  Reign  of  Queen  Anne.' 

LEDIA.KD,  T. — The  Life  of  John  Duke  of  Marlborough.  3  vols 
London:  1736. 

HOOKE,  N. — An  Account  of  the  Conduct  of  the  Dowager  Duchess 
of  Marlborough.  London:  1742. 

KANB,  R. — Campaigns  of  King  "William  and  Queen  Anne.  Lon- 
don :  1745.  (In  the  second  edition  Marlborough's  Dame  was 
inserted  with  William's  in  the  title.) 

Histoire  de  John  Churchill,  Due  de  Marlborough.  Par  Madgett 
et  Dutems.  3  vols.  Paris :  18C6. 

Private  Correspondence  of  Sarah,  Duchess  of  Marlborough. 
2  vols.  London:  1838. 

Letters  and  Despatches  of  the  Duke  of  Marlborough  from  1701- 
1712.  By  Sir  George  Murray.  6  vols.  London :  1845. 

ALISON,  SIR  A. — Military  Life  of  the  Duke  of  Marlborough. 
Edinburgh :  1848.  (In  the  second  edition,  which  is  '  greatly 
enlarged,  Military '  disappears  from  the  title.) 


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